Screening vs. signaling in technology licensing

A patent holder owning a two-period lasting innovation is unable to push it into the market, so it is licensed to a downstream user with production capabilities to market it. The production cost of this firm can be low or high, but the patent holder has only a prior on this factLicensing, asymmetric information, screening, signaling

Complementaries and commitment in a Cournot setting

When oligopolistic firms compete by investing simultaneously in cost-reducing R&D and in demand-creating advertising expenditures, their strategic commitment in such assets may differ qualitatively from the behavior pursued when only one of them is used. In particular, if R&D (and advertising) investment is decided on and made public before selecting the output, then cases of undercommitment in cost reduction can arise despite the non-existence of technological spillovers; and others in which there is no room for a differentiated strategic use of R\&D. Furthermore, when advertising is included among the investment variables of firms, their R&D expenses may equal or even exceed the socially optimal level.

A reescrita de Lady Macbeth por Leskov e os processos de adaptação e de apropriação

This article tries to provide a thorough analysis of Nikolai Leskov’s rewriting of Lady Macbeth, the Shakespearean character, in the novella Lady Macbeth of the Mtsensk District, from the perspective of Translation and Adaptation Studies. The focus will be placed on the ideology of the author who, with full knowledge, rewrites a previous work to adapt it to a specific context. Apart from Leskov’s work, attention will be also paid to two of its subsequent adaptations: Dmitri Shostakovich’s homonymous opera and William Oldroyd’s filmic version, Lady Macbeth. Finally, the importance of these processes for the development of target literary systems will be discussed and emphasized.Este artículo trata de ofrecer un exhaustivo análisis desde la perspectiva de los Estudios de Traducción y Adaptación sobre el proceso de reescritura de Lady Macbeth, el personaje shakesperiano, en la novela corta Lady Macbeth del Distrito de Mtsensk del escritor Nikolai Leskov. Para ello, se prestará especial atención a la ideología del autor, quien, de manera plenamente consciente, reescribe una obra anterior con el propósito de adaptarla a un contexto concreto. Aparte de la novela corta de Leskov, también analizaremos dos de sus adaptaciones posteriores: la ópera homónima de Dmitri Shostakovich y la versión cinematográfica de William Oldroyd, Lady Macbeth. Por último, destacaremos la importancia de estos procesos para el desarrollo literario de la cultura de llegada.Este artigo propõe uma análise exaustiva de Lady Macbeth, a personagem shakespeariana, na novela Lady Macbeth do Distrito de Mtsensk, na perspetiva dos Estudos de Tradução e de Adaptação. Será prestada especial atenção à ideologia do autor, que, de maneira plenamente consciente, reescreve uma obra anterior com o propósito de a adaptar a um contexto concreto. Para além da obra de Leskov, serão analisadas ainda duas adaptações posteriores da sua novela: a ópera homónima de Dmitri Shostakovich e a versão cinematográfica de William Oldroyd, Lady Macbeth. Finalmente, será discutida e enfatizada a importância destes processos para o desenvolvimento de sistemas literários de chegada

Geometric-type Sobolev inequalities and applications to the regularity of minimizers

The purpose of this paper is twofold. We first prove a weighted Sobolev inequality and part of a weighted Morrey's inequality, where the weights are a power of the mean curvature of the level sets of the function appearing in the inequalities. Then, as main application of our inequalities, we establish new $L^q$ and $W^{1,q}$ estimates for semi-stable solutions of $-\Delta u=g(u)$ in a bounded domain $\Omega$ of $\mathbb{R}^n$. These estimates lead to an $L^{2n/(n-4)}(\Omega)$ bound for the extremal solution of $-\Delta u=\lambda f(u)$ when $n\geq 5$ and the domain is convex. We recall that extremal solutions are known to be bounded in convex domains if $n\leq 4$, and that their boundedness is expected ---but still unkwown--- for $n\leq 9$.Comment: 20 pages; 1 figur

Monopoly, asymmetric information, and optimal environmental taxation

This paper aims to examine optimal environmental taxation in an incomplete-information two-period model in which a monopolistic firm produces and pollutes. It is assumed that the polluting firm is privately informed about its costs of production, and the policymaker, which can only infer the firm's costs from observing the output produced in the first period, has the chance to set environmental taxes to affect emissions; the emitter of pollution may then choose a non-optimal level of production in such a period in order to manipulate the policymaker's beliefs concerning its costs. If the policymaker values environmental quality sufficiently, the low-cost polluter has an incentive to misrepresent itself as a high-cost firm in order to secure a low environmental tax in the second period. This leads the high-cost polluting firm to produce, in the first period, an output level that is not higher than output which would be optimal if only short-term considerations were taken into account. The optimal environmental tax rate in the first period, when the firm's output is a signal of its cost, is then lower than or equal to what it would be if the firm's output was not a signal of firm's costs. The expected emissions in the former context are also lower than or equal to those in the latter case. By contrast, when the policymaker's valuation of the environment is sufficiently low, the environmental tax is negative (a subsidy per unit of pollutant emitted) in both the signaling and non-signaling contexts and no less in the former context than in the latter.Environmental tax and subsidy policy, monopolistic polluting firm, vertical asymmetric information, signaling and non-signaling