Competitive Balance and Revenue Sharing in Sports Leagues with Utility-Maximizing Teams

This paper develops a contest model of a professional sports league in which clubs maximize a weighted sum of profits and wins (utility maximization). The model analyzes how more win-orientated behavior of certain clubs affects talent investments, competitive balance and club profits. Moreover, in contrast to traditional models, we show that revenue sharing does not always reduce investment incentives due to the dulling effect. We identify a new effect of revenue sharing called the "sharpening effect". In the presence of the sharpening effect (dulling effect), revenue sharing enhances (reduces) investment incentives and improves (deteriorates) competitive balance in the league.Competitive balance, contest, invariance proposition, objective function, revenue sharing, team sports league, utility maximization

The Sugar Daddy's Game: How Wealthy Investors Change Competition in Professional Team Sports

Professional sports leagues have witnessed the appearance of so-called "sugar daddies" - people who invest enormous amounts of money into clubs and become their owners. This paper presents a contest model of a professional sports league that incorporates this phenomenon. We analyze how the appearance of a sugar daddy alters competitive balance and social welfare compared to a league with purely profit-maximizing club owners. We further show that the welfare effect of revenue sharing in a sugar daddy league is ambiguous and depends on the degree of redistribution and on whether the sugar daddy invests in a small or large club.Competitive balance, contest model, social welfare, sports leagues, sugar daddy

The Combined Effect of Salary Restrictions and Revenue Sharing on Club Profits, Player Salaries, and Competitive Balance

This article provides a standard "Fort and Quirk"-style model of a professional team sports league and analyzes the combined effect of salary restrictions (caps and floors) and revenue-sharing arrangements. It shows that the invariance proposition does not hold even under Walrasian conjectures if revenue sharing is combined with either a salary cap or a salary floor. In leagues with a binding salary cap for large clubs but no binding salary floor for small clubs, revenue sharing will decrease the competitive balance and increase club profits. Moreover, a salary cap produces a more balanced league and decreases the cost per unit of talent. The effect of a more restrictive salary cap on the profits of the small clubs is positive, whereas the effects on the profits of the large clubs as well as on aggregate profits are ambiguous. In leagues with a binding salary floor for the small clubs but no binding salary cap for the large clubs, revenue sharing will increase the competitive balance. Moreover, revenue sharing will decrease (increase) the profits of large (small) clubs. Implementing a more restrictive salary floor produces a less balanced league and increases the cost per unit of talent. Furthermore, a salary floor will result in lower profits for all clubs.Team sports leagues, invariance proposition, competitive balance, revenue sharing, salary cap, salary floor

Welfare Effects of Salary Caps in Sports Leagues with Win-Maximizing Clubs

This paper studies the welfare effect of a percentage-of-revenue salary cap in a European context with win-maximizing clubs. It shows that a percentage-of-revenue cap increases competitive balance and decreases the overall salary payments in the league, therefore contributing to financial stability. A percentage-of-revenue cap will always increase social welfare if the weight on aggregate club surplus in the welfare function is sufficiently high. Additionally, if fans’ preferences for aggregate talent are sufficiently high then the percentage-of-revenue cap will also increase social welfare; no matter how much weight the league puts on financial stability.Salary Caps, Social Welfare, Competitive Balance, Team Sports League

THE ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF FOREIGNER RULES IN NATIONAL SPORTS LEAGUES

Profitable and balanced domestic league sports are among the central prerequisites for attracting the right to host a mega-event like the soccer world cup as well as for the overall economic success of such events. This paper provides a contest model of a professional team sports league and analyzes the impact of a restriction on foreign players. It shows that a league with binding restrictions on foreign talent for all clubs is more balanced than a league without binding restrictions on foreign talent. Moreover, the wage level of domestic (foreign) talent is higher (lower) in a league with a binding restriction on foreign players. Finally, a tighter restriction on foreign players increases profits of all clubs.TEAM SPORTS LEAGUES, COMPETITIVE BALANCE, PLAYER SALARIES

Revisiting the distance to the nearest UHECR source: Effects of extra-galactic magnetic fields

We update the constraints on the location of the nearest UHECR source. By analyzing recent data from the Pierre Auger Observatory using state-of-the-art CR propagation models, we reaffirm the need of local sources with a distance less than 25-100 Mpc, depending on mass composition. A new fast semi-analytical method for the propagation of UHECR in environments with turbulent magnetic fields is developed. The onset of an enhancement and a low-energy magnetic horizon of cosmic rays from sources located within a particular distance range is demonstrated. We investigate the distance to the nearest source, taking into account these magnetic field effects. The results obtained highlight the robustness of our constrained distances to the nearest source

Executive Pay Regulation: What Regulators, Shareholders, and Managers Can Learn from Major Sports Leagues

Executive pay regulation is widely discussed as a measure to reduce financial mismanagement in corporations. We show that the professional team sports industry, the only industry with substantial experience in the regulation of compensation arrangements, provides valuable insights for the regulation of executive pay. Based on the experience from professional sports leagues, we develop implications for the corporate sector regarding the establishment and enforcement of executive pay regulation as well as the level, structure, and rigidity of such regulatory measures.Salary Caps, Executive Compensation, Corporate Governance, Financial Crisis, Financial Regulation