A Bow-Tie Approach for the Identification of Scenarios Induced by Physical Intentional Attacks to Chemical and Process Plants

The possibility of inducing major accident scenarios by physical intentional attacks (e.g. terrorist attacks) to chemical and process plants processing and storing hazardous substances, has been increasingly recognized in the last decades. The identification of the credible security scenarios (chain from attack scenarios to major accident scenarios) is required by Security Vulnerability/Risk Assessment (SVA/SRA) methodologies, but an evident lack of supporting tools is present in the literature. The present study proposes a Bow-Tie approach for the identification of reference security scenarios to support hazard identification phase in SVA/SRA. The potential use of the results is demonstrated on a test case (industrial atmospheric tank storing a flammable liquid)

Modelling standoff distances to prevent escalation in shooting attacks to tanks storing hazardous materials

Industrial equipment storing hazardous substances can be the target of intentional malicious attacks causing escalation scenarios involving the release of flammable and/or toxic material with severe consequences on people, assets, and the environment. In the present study, a novel modelling approach was developed to assess the baseline values of standoff distances for atmospheric and pressurized storage equipment considering a set of standardized handgun and rifle projectiles not specific for military uses. The calculation of standoff distances is based on specific models for projectile perforation and flight. The range of standoff distances varies depending on the type of firearm used. Standoff distances resulted in the range of less than 10 meters in case of handgun projectiles and up to 1130 meters in case of hard-core rifle projectiles. Important differences in standoff distances were found for atmospheric and pressurized tanks. The effect of the initial offset angle of the shooter on the standoff distance was assessed by a Monte Carlo analysis based on credible offset angles for handgun and rifle projectiles. A case study demonstrates the importance of the results to improve chemical site security with respect to attack detection, emergency response, and mitigation actions aimed at preventing escalation scenarios

Assessing the Security of Offshore Oil gas Installations Using Adversary Sequence Diagrams

Offshore Oil&Gas fluid production installations may be the target of intentional malicious acts (security attacks) carried out by adversaries of different nature and different motivations which may generate major events with severe consequences on workers, the environment and the property. The current study reviews the state of the art concerning the security of Offshore Oil&Gas operations, which is typically addressed according to best practices and qualitative or semi-quantitative methods. However, systematic approaches or guidelines in support of the analysis are still lacking. The current study investigates the possibility of using Adversary Sequence Diagrams (ASDs) as Security Vulnerability/Risk Assessment (SVA/SRA) supporting tools. A case study addressing a fixed Offshore Oil&Gas fluid production platform proved the ability of ASDs to provide credible attack modes within the Physical Protection System (PPS) that the adversaries have to perform in order to accomplish their objectives, as well as the security barriers that can potentially be effective in delaying and detecting the attacks, which are information required by SVA/SRA studies

Critical Cybersecurity Scenarios in Drinking Water Treatment Plants

The increasing interconnectivity with external networks and the higher reliance on digital systems make chemical and process industries, including waste and drinking water treatment plants, more vulnerable to cyber-attacks. Historical evidence shows that these attacks have the potential to cause events with severe consequences on property, people, and the surrounding environment, posing a serious threat. While the risks deriving from the malicious manipulation of the Basic Process Control System (BPCS) and the Safety Instrumented System (SIS) in chemical and Oil&Gas facilities have been systematically analysed in the available literature, including previous works of the Authors, the analysis of the consequences of cyber-attacks to drinking water treatment plants has not been conducted to date. To fill this gap, in the present study the methodology POROS 2.0 (Process Operability Analysis of Remote manipulations through the cOntrol System) developed by the Authors was applied to a drinking water treatment plant, providing valuable insights on possible critical scenarios originated by cyber-attacks in these facilities

Quantitative Evaluation of the Probability of Success of Deliberate Attacks in the Offshore Oil gas Industry

Deliberate attacks (security attacks) pose a significant threat to offshore Oil&Gas critical infrastructures as they have the potential of triggering major event scenarios with severe consequences on people, property, and the surrounding environment. The standards API RP 70 and API RP 70I address security issues in the offshore Oil&Gas sector, providing a semi-quantitative approach to evaluate the actual level of security risk. However, as the credibility of security attacks grows, security risk assessments should be approached in a more systematic and quantitative way to measure vulnerabilities and determine the level of protection available in the site. In this context, the present study introduces a systematic quantitative procedure using Bayesian Network (BN) to calculate the probability of success of physical attacks and the role of preventive and mitigative response strategies. The procedure is applied to a case study allowing to show its potential for improving security in the offshore Oil&Gas industry

Security Management of Offshore Oil&Gas Installations: the Italian Experience

Offshore Oil&Gas installations face unique security challenges due to their remote and often vulnerable nature, as dramatically confirmed by the large number of past incidents occurred worldwide in the offshore sector. This paper delves into the security management of these installations, with the specific focus on the Italian context. It explores the strategies implemented by Italian authorities and industry stakeholders to address security challenges in the offshore sector, pointing out the regulatory framework and industry standards. Additionally, the paper discusses methodologies for conducting a security risk assessment in offshore Oil&Gas facilities and identifies best practices for the adoption of security measures to enhance security resilience in this sector. By leveraging the Italian experience, this paper aims at providing insights and practical recommendations regarding the security management of offshore operations

Italian Hydrocarbon Upstream: Report on the State and Safety of the Offshore Activities (years 2016-2023)

Exploration, drilling, production, transportation, and logistics in offshore environment play a crucial role in the global energy sector, contributing substantially to the world's oil and gas supply. Ensuring safe offshore operations is key requirement for the social acceptability of offshore activities. The Legislative Decree n. 145/2015 (Italian transposition of the European Directive 2013/30) has established the creation of a Competent Authority responsible for overseeing and coordinating various aspects related to maritime safety as a multi-branch structure which comprises key representatives from various public bodies. This article will delve into key aspects of offshore activities and their safety performance. The available data (years from 2016 to 2023) on offshore operations in the Italian offshore are analysed using specifically developed key performance indicators. The data includes the number and type of offshore installations, total offshore working hours, total oil and gas production rates, reported inspections conducted offshore. Data on past undesirable events occurred in Italian offshore installations were also analysed. Through the examination of these quantitative indicators, the article aims to provide a comprehensive insight of the state and safety of the Italian offshore hydrocarbon upstream activities, crucial for stakeholders, regulators, and industry

Security Management of Offshore Oil&gas Installations: the Italian Experience

Offshore Oil&Gas installations face unique security challenges due to their remote and often vulnerable nature, as dramatically confirmed by the large number of past incidents occurred worldwide in the offshore sector. This paper delves into the security management of these installations, with the specific focus on the Italian context. It explores the strategies implemented by Italian authorities and industry stakeholders to address security challenges in the offshore sector, pointing out the regulatory framework and industry standards. Additionally, the paper discusses methodologies for conducting a security risk assessment in offshore Oil&Gas facilities and identifies best practices for the adoption of security measures to enhance security resilience in this sector. By leveraging the Italian experience, this paper aims at providing insights and practical recommendations regarding the security management of offshore operations

Quantitative Evaluation of the Probability of Success of Deliberate Attacks in the Offshore Oil&gas Industry

Deliberate attacks (security attacks) pose a significant threat to offshore Oil&Gas critical infrastructures as they have the potential of triggering major event scenarios with severe consequences on people, property, and the surrounding environment. The standards API RP 70 and API RP 70I address security issues in the offshore Oil&Gas sector, providing a semi-quantitative approach to evaluate the actual level of security risk. However, as the credibility of security attacks grows, security risk assessments should be approached in a more systematic and quantitative way to measure vulnerabilities and determine the level of protection available in the site. In this context, the present study introduces a systematic quantitative procedure using Bayesian Network (BN) to calculate the probability of success of physical attacks and the role of preventive and mitigative response strategies. The procedure is applied to a case study allowing to show its potential for improving security in the offshore Oil&Gas industry

Is HCV elimination among persons living with HIV feasible? Data from the NoCo study in the setting of the ICONA cohort

Background and aims: Whether the HCV test-and-treat strategy impacted on the rate of new HCV infections among PLWH in Italy is unknown. Methods: Prospective study of PLWH in the ICONA network. At baseline, PLWH were tested for HCV-Ab; HCV-RNA (if HCV-Ab positive) and, if positive, treated with DAA. SVR12 indicated eradication. Seroconversions and re-infections were evaluated yearly in HCV-Ab neg and HCV-RNA neg at first screening. We estimated the following: HCV seroconversions, incidence of HCV reinfections, and access to DAA and SVR12 rates tighter with factors associated with each outcome. Data were analysed by Cox regression, Poisson regression and logistic regression models. Results: Sixteen thousand seven hundred and forty-three PLWH were included; 27.3% HCV-Ab positive; of these, 39.3% HCV-RNA positive. HCV seroconversion incidence: .48/100 PYFU (95% CI: .36-.65); re-infections incidence: 1.40/100 PYFU (95% CI: .91-2.04). The risk factor for HCV re-infection was young age: aIRR 1.85, 95% CI: 1.17-2.95) per 10 years younger. 86.4% of HCV viremic in follow-up started DAA. PWID vs. heterosexuals (aHR .75, 95% CI .62-.90), HIV-RNA >50 copies/mL (aHR .70, 95% CI .56-.87), HCV genotype other than G1, G2, G3, G4 or with multiple/missing HCV genotype and post-COVID-19 calendar periods were associated with lower DAA access. 922/965 (95.5%) PLWH achieved SVR12. We estimated 72% reduction of chance to achieve SVR12 in PLWH with a CD4 count <200/mm3 (vs. CD4 ≥200/mm3 aOR .18, 95% CI: .07-.46). 95.5% of DAA-treated individuals eradicated HCV, but they represent only 53.2% of HCV viremic PLWH and 66.4% of those in follow-up. HCV-RNA positivity by year decreased from 41.7% in 2017 to 11.7% in 2022. Conclusions: The screening-and-treat campaign implemented in Italy, even if only partially effective, resulted in a dramatic drop in HCV circulation in our cohort