Evolutionary Markovian Strategies in 2 x 2 Spatial Games

Evolutionary spatial 2 x 2 games between heterogeneous agents are analyzed using different variants of cellular automata (CA). Agents play repeatedly against their nearest neighbors 2 x 2 games specified by a rescaled payoff matrix with two parameteres. Each agent is governed by a binary Markovian strategy (BMS) specified by 4 conditional probabilities [p_R, p_S, p_T, p_P] that take values 0 or 1. The initial configuration consists in a random assignment of "strategists" among the 2^4= 16 possible BMS. The system then evolves within strategy space according to the simple standard rule: each agent copies the strategy of the neighbor who got the highest payoff. Besides on the payoff matrix, the dominant strategy -and the degree of cooperation- depend on i) the type of the neighborhood (von Neumann or Moore); ii) the way the cooperation state is actualized (deterministically or stochastichally); and iii) the amount of noise measured by a parameter epsilon. However a robust winner strategy is [1,0,1,1].Comment: 18 pages, 8 figures (7 of these figures contain 4 encapsulapted poscript files each

Evolutionarily Stable Strategies in Quantum Games

Evolutionarily Stable Strategy (ESS) in classical game theory is a refinement of Nash equilibrium concept. We investigate the consequences when a small group of mutants using quantum strategies try to invade a classical ESS in a population engaged in symmetric bimatrix game of Prisoner's Dilemma. Secondly we show that in an asymmetric quantum game between two players an ESS pair can be made to appear or disappear by resorting to entangled or unentangled initial states used to play the game even when the strategy pair remains a Nash equilibrium in both forms of the game.Comment: RevTex,contents extended to include asymmetric games,no figur

A study of the quantitative formation of furfural from d-lyxose

Thesis (B.S.)--Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Dept. of Chemistry, 1939.MIT copy bound with: Reactions of β-ionone / by Ida Rovno [1939]Includes bibliographical references (leaf [28]).by Maynard E. Smith.B.S

Evolutionary Stability of Ecological Hierarchy

A self-similar hierarchical solution that is both dynamically and evolutionarily stable is found to the multi dimensional Lotka-Volterra equation with a single chain of prey-predator relations. This gives a simple and natural explanation to the key features of hierarchical ecosystems, such as its ubiquity, pyramidal population distribution, and higher aggressiveness among higher trophic levels. pacs{87.23.Kg, 89.75.Da, 05.45.-a} keywords{Lotka-Volterra equation, Trophic pyramid, Self-similarity}Comment: 4 Pages RevTeX4, 1 Fig, 1 Table, shortened by publishers reques

Strategies for the evolution of sex

We find that the hypothesis made by Jan, Stauffer and Moseley [Theory in Biosc., 119, 166 (2000)] for the evolution of sex, namely a strategy devised to escape extinction due to too many deleterious mutations, is sufficient but not necessary for the successful evolution of a steady state population of sexual individuals within a finite population. Simply allowing for a finite probability for conversion to sex in each generation also gives rise to a stable sexual population, in the presence of an upper limit on the number of deleterious mutations per individual. For large values of this probability, we find a phase transition to an intermittent, multi-stable regime. On the other hand, in the limit of extremely slow drive, another transition takes place to a different steady state distribution, with fewer deleterious mutations within the asexual population.Comment: RevTeX, 11 pages, multicolumn, including 12 figure

Robust ecological pattern formation induced by demographic noise

We demonstrate that demographic noise can induce persistent spatial pattern formation and temporal oscillations in the Levin-Segel predator-prey model for plankton-herbivore population dynamics. Although the model exhibits a Turing instability in mean field theory, demographic noise greatly enlarges the region of parameter space where pattern formation occurs. To distinguish between patterns generated by fluctuations and those present at the mean field level in real ecosystems, we calculate the power spectrum in the noise-driven case and predict the presence of fat tails not present in the mean field case. These results may account for the prevalence of large-scale ecological patterns, beyond that expected from traditional non-stochastic approaches.Comment: Revised version. Supporting simulation at: http://guava.physics.uiuc.edu/~tom/Netlogo

Evolutionary prisoner's dilemma game on hierarchical lattices

An evolutionary prisoner's dilemma (PD) game is studied with players located on a hierarchical structure of layered square lattices. The players can follow two strategies [D (defector) and C (cooperator)] and their income comes from PD games with the ``neighbors.'' The adoption of one of the neighboring strategies is allowed with a probability dependent on the payoff difference. Monte Carlo simulations are performed to study how the measure of cooperation is affected by the number of hierarchical levels (Q) and by the temptation to defect. According to the simulations the highest frequency of cooperation can be observed at the top level if the number of hierarchical levels is low (Q<4). For larger Q, however, the highest frequency of cooperators occurs in the middle layers. The four-level hierarchical structure provides the highest average (total) income for the whole community.Comment: appendix adde

Near-periodic substitution and the genetic variance induced by environmental change

We investigate a model that describes the evolution of a diploid sexual population in a changing environment. Individuals have discrete generations and are subject to selection on the phenotypic value of a quantitative trait, which is controlled by a finite number of bialleic loci. Environmental change is taken to lead to a uniformly changing optimal phenotypic value. The population continually adapts to the changing environment, by allelic substitution, at the loci controlling the trait. We investigate the detailed interrelation between the process of allelic substitution and the adaptation and variation of the population, via infinite population calculations and finite population simulations. We find a simple relation between the substitution rate and the rate of change of the optimal phenotypic value

Mobility, fitness collection, and the breakdown of cooperation

The spatial arrangement of individuals is thought to overcome the dilemma of cooperation: When cooperators engage in clusters, they might share the benefit of cooperation while being more protected against noncooperating individuals, who benefit from cooperation but save the cost of cooperation. This is paradigmatically shown by the spatial prisoner's dilemma model. Here, we study this model in one and two spatial dimensions, but explicitly take into account that in biological setups, fitness collection and selection are separated processes occurring mostly on vastly different time scales. This separation is particularly important to understand the impact of mobility on the evolution of cooperation. We find that even small diffusive mobility strongly restricts cooperation since it enables noncooperative individuals to invade cooperative clusters. Thus, in most biological scenarios, where the mobility of competing individuals is an irrefutable fact, the spatial prisoner's dilemma alone cannot explain stable cooperation, but additional mechanisms are necessary for spatial structure to promote the evolution of cooperation. The breakdown of cooperation is analyzed in detail. We confirm the existence of a phase transition, here controlled by mobility and costs, which distinguishes between purely cooperative and noncooperative absorbing states. While in one dimension the model is in the class of the voter model, it belongs to the directed percolation universality class in two dimensions. DOI: 10.1103/PhysRevE.87.04271