Do actions occur inside the body?

The paper offers a critical examination of Jennifer Hornsby's view that actions are internal to the body. It focuses on three of Hornsby's central claims: (P) many actions are bodily movements (in a special sense of the word “movement”) (Q) all actions are tryings; and (R) all actions occur inside the body. It is argued, contra Hornsby, that we may accept (P) and (Q) without accepting also the implausible (R). Two arguments are first offered in favour of the thesis (Contrary-R): that no actions occur inside the body. Three of Hornsby's arguments in favour of R are then examined. It is argued that we need to make a distinction between the causes and the causings of bodily movements (in the ordinary sense of the word “movement”) and that actions ought to be identified with the latter rather than the former. This distinction is then used to show how Hornsby's arguments for (R) may be resisted

Novel colours and the content of experience

I propose a counterexample to naturalistic representational theories of phenomenal character. The counterexample is generated by experiences of novel colours reported by Crane and Piantanida. I consider various replies that a representationalist might make, including whether novel colours could be possible colours of objects and whether one can account for novel colours as one would account for binary colours or colour mixtures. I argue that none of these strategies is successful and therefore that one cannot fully explain the nature of the phenomenal character of perceptual experiences using a naturalistic conception of representation

A randomized trial of fish oil omega-3 fatty acids on arterial health, inflammation, and metabolic syndrome in a young healthy population

BACKGROUND: Long chain omega-3 fatty acids from fish oils (O3) are known to have beneficial effects on a number of vascular risk factors in at-risk populations. The effects of a highly bioavailable emulsified preparation on an overweight young adult population are less well known. METHODS: Young adults, age 18–30, with body mass indices (BMIs) greater than 23 (average = 28.1) were administered 1.7 g of O3 per day (N = 30) or safflower oil placebo (N = 27) in an emulsified preparation (Coromega, Inc.) for 4 weeks in a double-blind randomized design. Blood was drawn and anthropometric measurements taken before and after dosing. Hemodynamic measures (central pulse wave velocity, augmentation index, and aortic systolic blood pressure), inflammatory cytokines (IL-6, IL-8, IL-10, and tumor necrosis factor-α), red blood cell and plasma phospholipid fatty acid profiles, fasting serum lipids, glucose, and C-reactive protein were measured. RESULTS: Red cell and plasma phospholipid eicosapentaenoic acid and docosahexaenoic acid concentrations increased over the four weeks of dosing in the O3 group. Dosing with O3 did not affect central pulse wave velocity, augmentation index, or aortic systolic blood pressure. None of the five American Heart Association metabolic syndrome components improved over the dosing period. None of the inflammatory cytokines, C-reactive protein, or lipids (total or LDL cholesterol) improved over the dosing period. CONCLUSIONS: No salutary effects of O3 were observed in hemodynamic, metabolic syndrome criteria or inflammatory markers as a result of this relatively short period of administration in this relatively overweight, but healthy young adult cohort

Why the idea of framework propositions cannot contribute to an understanding of delusions

One of the tasks that recent philosophy of psychiatry has taken upon itself is to extend the range of understanding to some of those aspects of psychopathology that Jaspers deemed beyond its limits. Given the fundamental difficulties of offering a literal interpretation of the contents of primary delusions, a number of alternative strategies have been put forward including regarding them as abnormal versions of framework propositions described by Wittgenstein in On Certainty. But although framework propositions share some of the apparent epistemic features of primary delusions, their role in partially constituting the sense of inquiry rules out their role in helping to understand delusions

Ambiguous figures and the content of experience

Representationalism is the position that the phenomenal character of an experience is either identical with, or supervenes on, the content of that experience. Many representationalists hold that the relevant content of experience is nonconceptual. I propose a counterexample to this form of representationalism that arises from the phenomenon of Gestalt switching, which occurs when viewing ambiguous figures. First, I argue that one does not need to appeal to the conceptual content of experience or to judgements to account for Gestalt switching. I then argue that experiences of certain ambiguous figures are problematic because they have different phenomenal characters but that no difference in the nonconceptual content of these experiences can be identified. I consider three solutions to this problem that have been proposed by both philosophers and psychologists and conclude that none can account for all the ambiguous figures that pose the problem. I conclude that the onus is on representationalists to specify the relevant difference in content or to abandon their position

Theories of Reference: What Was the Question?

The new theory of reference has won popularity. However, a number of noted philosophers have also attempted to reply to the critical arguments of Kripke and others, and aimed to vindicate the description theory of reference. Such responses are often based on ingenious novel kinds of descriptions, such as rigidified descriptions, causal descriptions, and metalinguistic descriptions. This prolonged debate raises the doubt whether different parties really have any shared understanding of what the central question of the philosophical theory of reference is: what is the main question to which descriptivism and the causal-historical theory have presented competing answers. One aim of the paper is to clarify this issue. The most influential objections to the new theory of reference are critically reviewed. Special attention is also paid to certain important later advances in the new theory of reference, due to Devitt and others

Assessment and treatment of distorted schemas in sexual offenders

The aim of this review is to examine the literature related to the assessment and treatment of sex offenders’ distorted schemas. Where appropriate, the review draws upon current insights from the field of social cognition to aid in the critical evaluation of the findings. First, the review considers the various different methodologies for assessing distorted schemas, discussing their strengths and limitations. Second, the review examines the work related to the treatment of sex offenders’ schemas. Suggestions for future research, and the implications for clinical practice, are highlighted in the article