Frankfurt's gemeinnützige Anstalten : eine historisch-statistische Darstellung der milden Stiftungen, Stipendien, Wittwen u. Waisen-, Hülfs- und Sparkassen, Vereine, Schulen &c. ; nebst einem geschichtlichen Ueberblick der in dieser Stadt erschienenen periodischen Schriften und Lokalblätter ; von der ältesten bis auf die gegenwärtige Zeit ; Theil 1-2

Enthaltene Teile: [1] . - 1845. - XVI, 472 S. + 2. Die Jahre 1845 bis 1855 enthaltend. - 1856. - XII, 270 S

A note on NMHV form factors from the Gra{\ss}mannian and the twistor string

In this note we investigate Gra{\ss}mannian formulas for form factors of the chiral part of the stress-tensor multiplet in $\mathcal{N}=4$ superconformal Yang-Mills theory. We present an all-$n$ contour for the $G(3,n+2)$ Gra{\ss}mannian integral of NMHV form factors derived from on-shell diagrams and the BCFW recursion relation. In addition, we study other $G(3,n+2)$ formulas obtained from the connected prescription introduced recently. We find a recursive expression for all $n$ and study its properties. For $n \geq 6$, our formula has the same recursive structure as its amplitude counterpart, making its soft behaviour manifest. Finally, we explore the connection between the two Gra{\ss}mannian formulations, using the global residue theorem, and find that it is much more intricate compared to scattering amplitudes.Comment: 21 pages, 3 figures; v2: JHEP version + minor correction

Does Team-Based Compensation Give Rise to Problems when Agents Vary in their Ability ?

This paper reports the results of an experiment on how team composition influences both the contract offer of employers and employee performance when a revenue-sharing scheme is introduced. Experimental evidence shows that the principal ceases trying to monitor her team through a contract offer when agents vary in their ability. In this case, agents focus more heavily on their teammate's behaviour than on the principal's offer and therefore, regardless of the level of team-based compensation, a large amount of free-riding occurs within the team. In contrast, when the team is homogeneous, agents are better able to use the contract offer as a coordination device among themselves and therefore achieve higher efficiency.compensation; experimental economics; free-riding; peer pressure; teamwork

Peeking Under the Covers: Taking a Closer Look at Prosecutorial Decision-Making Involving Queer Youth and Statutory Rape

Queer youth are in a precarious position. In comparison to their heterosexual peers, queer youth are disproportionately punished in the criminal justice system, and they may be more vulnerable to being prosecuted for statutory rape. They may be selectively prosecuted because prosecutors have broad discretion in whom they prosecute, and social norms favoring heterosexuals may be part of their decision-making process. In light of the significant barriers before a statutory rape defendant alleging selective prosecution, especially for juvenile defendants, limited discovery orders like the one at issue in Commonwealth v. Washington may be a pragmatic way to make equitable change

Leadership in Teams: Signaling or Reciprocating ?

How does leadership work in teams? In this paper, leadership is grounded on both the possession of a private information by the leader and by her ability to communicate credibly with followers in order to induce them to expand high efforts. This paper reports an experiment testing the efficiency of two costly communication devices introduced by Hermalin (1998): leading-by-example and leading-by-sacrifice. In leading-by-example, the leader's effort is observable by the follower. Experimental evidence shows that leadership works more through reciprocity than through signaling. In leading-by-sacrifice, the leader can give up a part of her payoff. Experimental evidence indicates that this sacrifice works as a truthful signaling device when it is lost for the follower but not when it is transferred to him.experimental economics; leadership; reciprocity; signaling; work teams

Interpersonal perception of authoritarians and nonauthoritarians

Call number: LD2668 .T4 1955 M49Master of Scienc

Predicting the particle-induced background for future x-ray astronomy missions: the importance of experimental validation for GEANT4 simulations

Particle-induced background, or “instrument background”, produced from the interaction of background photons and charged particles with a detector, either as primaries or through the generation of secondary photons or particles, is one of the major sources of background for the focal plane sensors in X-ray astronomy missions. In previous studies for the European Space Agency (ESA) X-ray Multi Mirror (XMM-Newton) mission, the dominant source of background was found to be caused by the knock-on electrons generated as high-energy protons pass through the shielding materials surrounding the detector. From XMM-Newton, the contribution of Compton and other photon-generated background was small in comparison to the knock-on electron component. However, for the Wide Field Imager (WFI) on board the ESA Advanced Telescope for High-ENergy Astrophysics (ATHENA) mission Athena, which houses much thicker silicon in the depleted p-channel field effect transistor (DEPFET) active pixel sensors of the focal plane when compared to the Charge Coupled Devices (CCDs) used in the XMM-Newton EPIC MOS cameras, this photon component may no longer be expected to have such a minimal impact and therefore both the photon and proton-induced components must be considered in more detail. In order to minimise the background, studies have been conducted on the use of a graded-Z shield in addition to an aluminium proton shield (employed for radiation damage minimization). For thin detectors, a low-Z component alone may suffice, reducing the fluorescence components of the background. However, with thicker detectors a high-Z component may give added benefit through the combination of the high-Z component to reduce the photon-induced effects and a low-Z component to reduce the fluorescence components from the shielding’s inner-surfaces, thus creating an “aluminium sandwich”. In all cases, careful optimization of the shielding configuration is required to balance each component of background specific to the design of the instrument involved. The optimization of any shielding relies heavily upon a validated and verified simulation toolkit. Here we present the latest progress on our ongoing validation and verification studies of the GEANT4 simulations used for such an optimization process through a series of experimental test campaigns

Leadership in Teams: Signaling or Reciprocating ?

Working Paper du GATE 2002-13How does leadership work in teams? In this paper, leadership is grounded on both the possession of a private information by the leader and by her ability to communicate credibly with followers in order to induce them to expand high efforts. This paper reports an experiment testing the efficiency of two costly communication devices introduced by Hermalin (1998): leading-by-example and leading-by-sacrifice. In leading-by-example, the leader's effort is observable by the follower. Experimental evidence shows that leadership works more through reciprocity than through signaling. In leading-by-sacrifice, the leader can give up a part of her payoff. Experimental evidence indicates that this sacrifice works as a truthful signaling device when it is lost for the follower but not when it is transferred to him.Comment fonctionne le leadership au sein des équipes? Le leadership s'appuie à la fois sur la possession d'une information privée par un leader et sur sa capacité à transmettre cette information de manière crédible aux autres membres de l'équipe de façon à les amener à exercer un effort important. Cet article présente une expérience visant à tester l'efficacité de deux modes de communication coûteux tels qu'introduits par Hermalin (1998). Avec le « leadership par l'exemple », seul l'effort du leader est observable par l'autre membre de l'équipe. Les résultats montrent que ce leadership fonctionne davantage par la réciprocité que par l'effet de signal. Avec le “leadership par le sacrifice”, le leader peut renoncer à une partie de son gain, ce qui constitue une information sur l'état de la nature. Ce sacrifice fonctionne comme un mode de communication crédible lorsqu'il n'augmente pas le gain de l'autre membre de l'équipe mais pas quand il l'accroît directement