New Insights on the Question Particle "a" in Sardinian

The article analyzes the Sardinian question particle a in yes/no "special" questions. Following Obenauer (2004, 2006), this particle is taken to mark special interrogative clauses that cannot be answered with yes or no as they denote invitations or requests, express surprise, are biased towards an answer, or are rhetorical questions. Due to its additional focalization properties, the question particle a is analysed as a head merged in Foc° and moved to one of Obenauer's SpIntPs (special interrogative phrases). Furthermore, as in a-questions nominal constituents are obligatorily dislocated, the author argues that DPs are extracted to a functional projection beneath FocP before the remnant TP is moved to [spec, FocP]

Mineral and organic analyses of foods: new methods for the determination of sodium and crude fiber

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Can we trust trust explanations?An experimental illustration of how outcome based accounts of trust struggle to explain a basic phenomenon of human life

In Chapter 4, I will provide an overview of the findings and insights gained in experimental trust research. I will then discuss common consequential explanations and potential methodological reasons for high trust rates. Finally, I will present an empirical study in which all these explanations were tested using a between-subjects design. In this study, my coauthors and I could not find out why people trust, but we showed which explanations fail to explain trust. First, we showed that trust rates did not decrease when participants had to hand over their own money, compared to past studies in which participants played with a show-up fee (house money effects). For the first time, we conducted a trust game in which trustors could only hand over their own money; however, similar to what occurred in past studies, 57.1% of trustors did so. Second, anticipating high rates of trustworthiness was not the reason for participants to trust. In fact, they underestimated this share by almost 20 percentage points. Third, high trust rates were not explainable by high risk tolerance. Only 25.3% of participants were willing to bet money, making a risky decision identical in gains and similar in risks to the trust game but void of trust. However, trust games entail second players who can benefit from the money trustors hand over. Therefore, trustors might hand over money because they have preferences for equality or want to enlarge the pie. Contradicting these arguments, only 28.3% of participants bet money in a risky decision, which was not only similar to the trust game regarding gains and risks but also those involving a second player. Thus, we could not find evidence that trust can be explained by one of the explanations we tested. Chapter 5 deals with the question of how people behave in trust situations in which they cannot be better off if their trust is reciprocated by the partner with whom they interact (trustee). Former studies have examined only trust decisions in which people who trust (trustors) were rewarded if the person with whom they interacted proved to be trustworthy. Thus, it is not clear to what extent the strategic motive to be better off plays a role in trust decisions in general. In Chapter 5, I present a study on that issue. Using a full between-subjects design, this study examined non-strategic trust decisions in which participants cannot be better off or even only worse off by trusting others for the first time. To do this, my coauthors and I systematically manipulated the potential gains in trust games and compared them with lotteries void of any trust but equal in risks and gains. Our results show that both trust behavior and risky behavior unrelated to trust were dependent on potential gains and losses. However, whereas the number of risky decisions decreased to almost zero in lotteries entailing no or negative gains, trust behavior was comparably stable. Chapter 5 provides evidence that people do not trust strategically and that high trust rates are sustainable in different kinds of trust situations. While I considered only explanations for trust behavior that are basically consequential in Chapters 4 and 5, I go one step further in Chapter 6. Here, I examine whether trust behavior in trust games is driven by the curiosity trustors feel in the moment they make their trust decision. Thereby, I illuminate the question whether the paradigm of the trust game itself causes the phenomenon of high trust rates. In addition, I examine the influence of regret aversion (the tendency of people to avoid future regret) on trust. In order to give an answer to this question, I present a study in Chapter 6 in which my coauthors and I compared a trust game with conditional feedback to a trust game with unconditional feedback (between-subjects). Trustors in ordinary trust games receive conditional feedback only. That means they learn the trustworthiness of their trustee on the condition that they hand over their money to him or her. Thus, trustors might hand over money in trust games because they want to know whether their trustee is reliable. To find out, we compared an ordinary trust game with conditional feedback to a trust game with unconditional feedback in which trustors always learned the trustworthiness of their interaction partner. In this trust game, trustors were always informed about the decision of their assigned trustee, no matter whether they kept or handed over their money. Whereas the curiosity hypothesis predicts that more trustors hand over money when they receive conditional feedback, regret aversion would predict that fewer people will do so. In the trust game with unconditional feedback, trustors cannot avoid potential regret triggered by their decision to keep or to hand over money. Trustors, who keep the money, run the risk of learning that their trustee was reliable and that they would have doubled their money had they handed it over. Trustors, who hand over their money, run the risk of learning that their trustee was untrustworthy and that they would not have lost their money had they kept it. Thus, regret aversion should not influence trustors to make a particular decision in the trust game with unconditional feedback. However, in the trust game with conditional feedback, trustors can avoid potential regret by keeping the money because then they will never learn whether their assigned trustee was reliable and that they would have doubled their money, if they had handed it over. Therefore, regret aversion should influence trustors in the trust game with conditional feedback to keep their money. However, we did not find any difference between the trust rates in the trust game with conditional feedback and the trust game with unconditional feedback. Hence, neither the curiosity nor the regret hypothesis could be supported. At the end of Chapter 6, I discuss which implications these findings could have for further research

Developing Index Parameters for Cracking in Asphalt Pavements Through Black Space and Viscoelastic Continuum Damage Principles

Cracking is a major distress for asphalt concrete pavements and presents significant challenges to effective design and maintenance. Fatigue and thermal cracking decrease ride quality of the pavement and allow water to penetrate into underlying layers, which can result in major damage if left unchecked. The primary obstacle in predicting field performance for cracking in asphalt pavements is related to the interaction of material, structural, and environmental components. The major objective of this work is to develop index parameters to relate material and structural parameters, identifying whether a mixture is prone to fatigue or thermal cracking. A Simplified Viscoelastic Continuum Damage (S-VECD) model, which relates material integrity and damage growth under repeated loading, is used in this project. The structural response is evaluated using layered elastic analysis principles in order to establish a material-structure space, where the pass/fail determination is based. This pass/fail index parameter is operationally efficient and easy to implement at a contractor or owner agency with capacity to test materials in the S-VECD configuration. A thermal cracking parameter is developed for mixtures through a relation to laboratory and field performances in terms of Black Space. Since Black Space diagrams are able to capture changes in stiffness and relaxation, where separation would be indicative of poorly performing materials, these parameters provide insight into relationships among pavement structures and mixture designs. The results also lend themselves to the formation of performance-related specifications, where agencies can require a certain parameter value based on experimental and field observations. Opportunities exist to extend the parameter definitions among length scales, to further examine the effects of each on cracking performance. The capabilities of the parameter will influence design and funding decisions, resulting in cost savings at the owner agency and contractor levels through enhanced performance and a reduced testing framework

Overtly anaphoric control in type logical grammar

In this paper we analyse anaphoric pronouns in control sentences and we investigate the implications of these kinds of sentences in relation to the Propositional Theory versus Property Theory question. For these purposes, we invoke the categorial calculus with limited contraction, a conservative extension of Lambek calculus that builds contraction into the logical rules for a customized slash type-constructor.Peer ReviewedPostprint (author's final draft

Vispārīgā salīdzināmā reliģiju vēsture

Grāmatu no vācu valodas tulkojusi Latvijas Universitātes Centrālās Bibliotēkas bibliotekāre Helene ButulsSaturs: A. Reliģijas fainomenoloģija. I. Ievadītāji priekšjautājumi § i. Jautājuma nostādījums un metode 3 § 2. Reliģijas būtības noteikšana 9 II. Primitīvās reliģijas pamatelementi. § 1. Reliģija un maģija 18 § 2. Dabas tautu būtība 22 § 3. Mana 24 III. Numinozie objekti. § 1. Svētie akmeņi un svētie kalni 28 § 2. Svētie koki un svētie dzīvnieki 29 § 3. Ūdens, uguns un zeme 32 IV. Reliģijas parādība pasaule kultā. § 1. Kulta būtība 33 § 2. Sakrālā simbola ideja un parādību formas 36 § 3. Svētais vārds un svētā klusēšana 42 § 4. Svētā dziesma 47 § 5. Upuris 51 § 6. Kultiskā šķīstīšana un svētīšana 53 § 7. Mistēriju svinības un sakraments 54 § 8. Lūgšana kultā 56 § 9. Kulta reliģiskās kopības 60 § 10. Svētās vietas un svētie laiki 62 V. Sievietes stāvoklis reliģijā. § 1. Sievietes vērtēšana reliģijās 65 § 2. Sievietes loma oficiālā reliģijā 68 VI. Dieva idejas fainomenoloģija. § 1. Daimoniskā pirmvienība 73 § 2. „Daimoniska" jēdziens 76 § 3. Politeisms un monoteisms 78 VII. Nostāšanās pret pasauli, dzīvi un nāvi. § 1. Reliģiskā pasaules uzskata un reliģiskā dzīves uzskata pamatformas 80 § 2. Primitīvā nostāšanās pret nāvi un nemirstību 82 § 4. Kristīgā viņpasaules ticība 87 B. Reliģijas tipoloģija. I. Attīstības likumi. 1. Vienlaicīgās attīstības 91 2 . Reliģiju struktūras paralēles 93 § 1. Dibinātās un augušās reliģijas 93 § 2. Dabas reliģija, tautas reliģija, pasaules reliģija 95 3. Attīstības stadijas 99 § 1. „Stadijas" un ..attīstības" jēdzieni 99 § 2. Tiešuma stadija 102 § 3. Sistematizēšanas un asimilācijas stadija 103 § 4. Primārā un sekundārā reliģiozitāte. Reformācijas stadija 105 § 5. „Katoliski-protestantiskais" spriegums 110 § 6. Grimšanas stadija 113 II. Reliģiskā vadoņa tipoloģija. 1. Meistars 117 2. Mācekļi 120 III. Pazudināšanas tipoloģija. 1 . Ģenerālās pazudināšanas būtība 123 § 1. Vispārīgs raksturojums 123 § 2. Pazudināšana kā izolēta esamība 127 § 3. Pazudināšana kā nezināšana un neticība 130 § 4. Pazudināšana kā pirmvaina 133 2 . Pazudināšanas intuīciju pieskares punkts cilvēciskajā „es" 137 § 1. ,.Egoisms" kā maldīga ticība empīriskā „es" realitātei 137 § 2. „Egoisms" kā ' pašapliecināšanās kāda transcendentā priekšā 141 IV. Atpestīšanas tipoloģija. 1. Atpestīšana augstreliģijā 145 § 1. Saspriegums starp pazudināšanu ..laikā un telpā" un transcendento pazudināšanas izbeigšanu 145 § 2. Transcendentā ielaušanās 147 2 . Cilvēka „es" atpestīšanas procesā 152 § i. ,.Es" ceļā uz pestīšanu 152 § 2. „Es" pestīšanas stāvoklī 157Saturs: A. Reliģijas fainomenoloģija. I. Ievadītāji priekšjautājumi § i. Jautājuma nostādījums un metode 3 § 2. Reliģijas būtības noteikšana 9 II. Primitīvās reliģijas pamatelementi. § 1. Reliģija un maģija 18 § 2. Dabas tautu būtība 22 § 3. Mana 24 III. Numinozie objekti. § 1. Svētie akmeņi un svētie kalni 28 § 2. Svētie koki un svētie dzīvnieki 29 § 3. Ūdens, uguns un zeme 32 IV. Reliģijas parādība pasaule kultā. § 1. Kulta būtība 33 § 2. Sakrālā simbola ideja un parādību formas 36 § 3. Svētais vārds un svētā klusēšana 42 § 4. Svētā dziesma 47 § 5. Upuris 51 § 6. Kultiskā šķīstīšana un svētīšana 53 § 7. Mistēriju svinības un sakraments 54 § 8. Lūgšana kultā 56 § 9. Kulta reliģiskās kopības 60 § 10. Svētās vietas un svētie laiki 62 V. Sievietes stāvoklis reliģijā. § 1. Sievietes vērtēšana reliģijās 65 § 2. Sievietes loma oficiālā reliģijā 68 VI. Dieva idejas fainomenoloģija. § 1. Daimoniskā pirmvienība 73 § 2. „Daimoniska" jēdziens 76 § 3. Politeisms un monoteisms 78 VII. Nostāšanās pret pasauli, dzīvi un nāvi. § 1. Reliģiskā pasaules uzskata un reliģiskā dzīves uzskata pamatformas 80 § 2. Primitīvā nostāšanās pret nāvi un nemirstību 82 § 4. Kristīgā viņpasaules ticība 87 B. Reliģijas tipoloģija. I. Attīstības likumi. 1. Vienlaicīgās attīstības 91 2 . Reliģiju struktūras paralēles 93 § 1. Dibinātās un augušās reliģijas 93 § 2. Dabas reliģija, tautas reliģija, pasaules reliģija 95 3. Attīstības stadijas 99 § 1. „Stadijas" un ..attīstības" jēdzieni 99 § 2. Tiešuma stadija 102 § 3. Sistematizēšanas un asimilācijas stadija 103 § 4. Primārā un sekundārā reliģiozitāte. Reformācijas stadija 105 § 5. „Katoliski-protestantiskais" spriegums 110 § 6. Grimšanas stadija 113 II. Reliģiskā vadoņa tipoloģija. 1. Meistars 117 2. Mācekļi 120 III. Pazudināšanas tipoloģija. 1 . Ģenerālās pazudināšanas būtība 123 § 1. Vispārīgs raksturojums 123 § 2. Pazudināšana kā izolēta esamība 127 § 3. Pazudināšana kā nezināšana un neticība 130 § 4. Pazudināšana kā pirmvaina 133 2 . Pazudināšanas intuīciju pieskares punkts cilvēciskajā „es" 137 § 1. ,.Egoisms" kā maldīga ticība empīriskā „es" realitātei 137 § 2. „Egoisms" kā ' pašapliecināšanās kāda transcendentā priekšā 141 IV. Atpestīšanas tipoloģija. 1. Atpestīšana augstreliģijā 145 § 1. Saspriegums starp pazudināšanu ..laikā un telpā" un transcendento pazudināšanas izbeigšanu 145 § 2. Transcendentā ielaušanās 147 2 . Cilvēka „es" atpestīšanas procesā 152 § i. ,.Es" ceļā uz pestīšanu 152 § 2. „Es" pestīšanas stāvoklī 15