Monetary economic research at the St. Louis Fed during Ted Balbach's tenure as research director

Ted Balbach served as research director at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis from 1975 to 1992. This paper lauds his contributions during that time, including the expanded influence of the Review, enhanced databases and data publications, and a visiting scholar program that attracted leading economists from around the world. Balbach is remembered fondly as a visionary leader and gracious mentor.Balbach, Anatol ; Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis ; Research

Measuring Real Economic Effects of Bailouts: Historical Perspectives on How Countries in Financial Distress Have Fared With and Without Bailouts

In this paper we first trace the changing nature of banking, currency and debt crises from the last century to the present. Each type of crisis has transmogrified in the presence of official intervention and the creation of a safety net. A similar pattern is observed for international rescue loans. We then present evidence suggesting that the incidence has increased and the severity of financial crises has changed little in emerging markets from the pre-1914 era to the present. Finally we assess the impact of IMF loans on the macro performance of the recipients. A simple with-without comparison of countries receiving IMF assistance during crises in the period 1973-98 with countries in the same region not receiving assistance suggests that the real performance of the former group was possibly worse than the latter. Similar results obtain adjusting for self-selection bias and counterfactual policies.

The Specie Standard as a Contingent Rule: Some Evidence for Core and Peripheral Countries, 1880-1990

The specie standard that prevailed before 1914 was a contingent rule. Under the rule specie convertibiltity could be suspended in the event of a well understood, exogenously produced emergency, such as a war, on the understanding that after the emergency had safely passed convertibility would be restored at the original parity. Market agents would regard successful adherence as evidence of a credible commitment and would allow th authorities access to seignorage and bond finance at favorable terms. This paper surveys the history of the specie standard as a contingent rule for 21 countries divided into core and peripheral countries. As a comparison we also briedfly consider the Bretton Woods system and the recent managed floating regime. We then present evidence across four regimes (pre-1914 gold standard; interward gold standard; Bretton Woods; the subsequent managed exchange rate float) for the 21 countries on the stability of macro variables as well as on the demand shocks (reflecting policy actions specific to the regime) and supply shocks (reflecting shocks to the environment independence of the regime). These measures allow us to determine whether adherents to the rule consistently pursued different policy actions from nonadherents, and whether persistent adverse shocks to the environment may, for some countries, have precluded adherence to the rule.

Real Versus Pseudo-International Systemic Risk: Some Lessons from History

This paper considers the meaning of domestic and international systemic risk. It examines scenarios that have been adduced as creating systemic risk both within countries and among them. It distinguishes between the concepts of real and pseudo-systemic risk. We examine the history of episodes commonly viewed either as financial crises or as evidencing systemic risk to glean lessons for today. We also present some statistical evidence on possible recent systemic risk linkages between the stock markets of emerging countries. The paper concludes with a discussion of the lessons yielded by the record.

The ECU - An Imaginary or Embryonic Form of Money: What Can We Learn from History?

We present historical examples of new forms of money that can be com- pared with the ECU. We first define the ECU in its official role before turning to developments in the private market for ECUs. We then examine historical antecedents of three attributes of ECUs: a unit of account; a basket of currencies; a basis for monetary integration. We discuss which features if any of ECUs are unique, and the contribution of the historical analysis to assessing the future of ECUs. We then ask whether governments or markets have been dominant in the emergence of new forms of money. Whatever emerges as money in an economy becomes the general means of payment. Prices of commodities, services, and bonds are expressed in units of the money. Buyers use the money to purchase goods or bonds and sellers receive the money is exchange for goods or bonds. We conclude that, at this stage in its history, the ECU at best is an embryonic form of money, closer to historical imaginary monies than to existing currencies that the world has known.

Was Expansionary Monetary Policy Feasible During the Great Contraction? An Examination of the Gold Standard Constraint

The recent consensus view, that the gold standard was the leading cause of the worldwide Great Depression 1929-33, stems from two propositions: (1) Under the gold standard, deflationary shocks were transmitted between countries and, (2) for most countries, continued adherence to gold prevented monetary authorities from offsetting banking panics and blocked their recoveries. In this paper we contend that the second proposition applies only to small open economies with limited gold reserves. This was not the case for the US, the largest country in the world, holding massive gold reserves. The US was not constrained from using expansionary policy to offset banking panics, deflation, and declining economic activity. Simulations, based on a model of a large open economy, indicate that expansionary open market operations by the Federal Reserve at two critical junctures (October 1930 to February 1931; September 1931 through January 1932) would have been successful in averting the banking panics that occurred, without endangering convertibility. Indeed had expansionary open market purchases been conducted in 1930, the contraction would not have led to the international crises that followed.

IS-LM and Monetarism

This paper discusses monetarist objections to the IS-LM model. We explore the views of two principal spokesmen for monetarism: Milton Friedman and the team of Karl Brunner and Allan Meltzer. Friedman did not explicitly state the reasons he generally chose not to use the IS-LM model in rejecting Keynesian views on the demand function for money, the role of autonomous expenditures in cyclical fluctuations, the potency of fiscal policy as against monetary policy, etc. He presented statistical findings, historical evidence, and econometric results to support his alternative analysis of macroeconomics, but his critics were unconvinced. In 1970, in an effort to use his critics' common language, he set up a model with explicit terms for IS-LM to encompass both the quantity theory and the income-expenditure theory. Friedman attributed the failure of this effort to the fact that he was a Marshallian, his opponents Walrasians. Brunner and Meltzer's objections to IS-LM were explicit. They found it too spare, so they elaborated it by adding a credit market, disaggregating the asset market by specifying three assets: base money, government debt, and real capital. They set up a model with financial institutions and utilized it to study the effects of a variety of policies. In brief, summarizing the views of both Friedman and Brunner and Meltzer, monetarists dislike the IS-LM framework because it limits monetary influence too narrowly, essentially to the interest elasticity of money demand, and defines investment in an excessively narrow fashion, and even that is not explicit.

The Federal Reserve as an informed foreign-exchange trader: 1973-1995

If official interventions convey private information useful for price discovery in foreign-exchange markets, then they should have value as a forecast of near-term exchange-rate movements. Using a set of standard criteria, we show that approximately 60 percent of all U.S. foreign-exchange interventions between 1973 and 1995 were successful in this sense. This percentage, however, is no better than random. U.S. intervention sales and purchases of foreign exchange were incapable of forecasting dollar appreciations or depreciations. U.S. interventions, however, were associated with more moderate dollar movements in a manner consistent with leaning against the wind, but only about 22 percent of all U.S. interventions conformed to this pattern. We also found that the larger the size of an intervention, the greater was its probability of success, although some interventions were inefficiently large. Other potential characteristics of intervention, notably coordination and secrecy, did not seem to influence our success rates.Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.) ; Foreign exchange

U.S. foreign-exchange-market intervention during the Volcker-Greenspan era

The Federal Reserve abandoned foreign-exchange-market intervention because it conflicted with the System’s commitment to price stability. By the early 1980s, economists generally concluded that, absent a portfolio-balance channel, sterilized foreign-exchange-market intervention did not provide central banks with a mechanism for systematically influencing exchange rates independent of their monetary policies. If intervention were to have anything other than a fleeting, hit-or-miss effect on exchange rates, monetary policy had to support it. Exchange rates, however, often responded to U.S. monetary-policy initiatives, so intervention to offset or reverse those exchange-rate responses can seem a contrary policy move and can create uncertainty about the strength of the System's commitment to price stability. That the U.S. Treasury maintained primary responsibility for foreign-exchange intervention only compounded this uncertainty. In addition, many FOMC participants feared that swap drawings and warehousing could contravene the Congressional appropriations process and, therefore, potentially pose a threat to System independence, a necessary condition for monetary-policy credibility.Banks and banking, Central ; Foreign exchange administration ; Monetary policy ; Federal Open Market Committee