The compatibility of games and artworks

This discussion note is a response to Brock Rough’s “The Incompatibility of Games and Artworks”.  (Rough, 2017) http://dx.doi.org/10.5617/jpg.273

The value of value capture:Using gamification to address addiction and sequential choice problems

Gamification, roughly the use of game-like elements to motivate us to achieve practical ends “in the real world,” makes large promises. According to Jane McGonigal, gamification can save the world by channelling the amazing motivational power of gaming into pro-social causes ranging from alienation from our work to global resource scarcity and feeding the hungry (McGonigal 2011).  Even much more modest aims like improving personal fitness or promoting a more equitable division of household labour provide some license for optimism about the ability of gamification to improve our lives in more humble but still worthwhile ways.  On the other hand, Thi Nguyen has argued that there is a dark side to gamification: what he calls “value capture.”  Roughly, gamification works in large part because it offers a simplified value structure – this is an essential part of its appeal and motivational power.  However, especially in the context of gamification which exports these value schemes into our real-world lives, there is a risk that these overly simplistic models will displace our more rich, subtle values and that this will make our lives worse: this is value capture. The point is well-taken.  The way in which number of steps taken per day can, for an avid user of “FitBit,” displace more accurate measurements of how one’s activities contribute to one’s fitness is a compelling example.   If I become so obsessed with “getting my 10,000 steps” that I stop making time to go to the gym, jog or do my yoga/pilates then that is not a net gain.  However, there is an important range of cases that Nguyen’s discussion ignores but which provide an important exception to his critique:  value capture relative to behaviours that are addictive and destructive.  Here I have in mind things like alcoholism, drug addiction, and gambling addiction.  With these kinds of activities, value capture can not only be good but essential to a person’s well-being because (and not in spite of) of its displacement of the person’s more rich, subtle values.  Interestingly, the point is not limited to cases of addictive behaviour, though they put the point in its most sharp relief.  Any situation in which making rational decisions one by one can leave one worse off than “blindly” following a policy which is itself rational to adopt also turns out to illustrate the point, thus further expanding the role for value capture as itself a force for good.  The more general point is that certain kinds of sequential choice problems carve out an important and theoretically interesting exception to Nguyen’s worries about value capture.  In these kinds of choice contexts, value capture not only does not make our lives go worse, it may be essential to making our lives go better

Normativity, prudence and welfare

Most discussions of discourse about welfare and discourse about prudence are a “package deal” when it comes to their normativity—either both or neither are normative. In this paper I argue against this conventional “package deal” assumption. I argue that discourse about welfare is not normative in one useful sense of that term, but that prudential discourse is normative. My argument draws in part on ideas from Derek Parfit’s account of personal identity. I then offer a novel positive account of the meaning of ‘welfare’. On the proposed account, the concept of welfare is not itself normative, in the sense of functioning directly to settle the thing to do. Even a global nihilist can coherently make claims about welfare. However, the concept of welfare is in a sense I will articulate “conditionally normative,” and this merely conditional normativity explains many of the data points which might seem to imply that welfare discourse is normative

Human GUCY2C-Targeted Chimeric Antigen Receptor (CAR)-Expressing T Cells Eliminate Colorectal Cancer Metastases.

One major hurdle to the success of adoptive T-cell therapy is the identification of antigens that permit effective targeting of tumors in the absence of toxicities to essential organs. Previous work has demonstrated that T cells engineered to express chimeric antigen receptors (CAR-T cells) targeting the murine homolog of the colorectal cancer antigen GUCY2C treat established colorectal cancer metastases, without toxicity to the normal GUCY2C-expressing intestinal epithelium, reflecting structural compartmentalization of endogenous GUCY2C to apical membranes comprising the intestinal lumen. Here, we examined the utility of a human-specific, GUCY2C-directed single-chain variable fragment as the basis for a CAR construct targeting human GUCY2C-expressing metastases. Human GUCY2C-targeted murine CAR-T cells promoted antigen-dependent T-cell activation quantified by activation marker upregulation, cytokine production, and killing of GUCY2C-expressing, but not GUCY2C-deficient, cancer cells in vitro. GUCY2C CAR-T cells provided long-term protection against lung metastases of murine colorectal cancer cells engineered to express human GUCY2C in a syngeneic mouse model. GUCY2C murine CAR-T cells recognized and killed human colorectal cancer cells endogenously expressing GUCY2C, providing durable survival in a human xenograft model in immunodeficient mice. Thus, we have identified a human GUCY2C-specific CAR-T cell therapy approach that may be developed for the treatment of GUCY2C-expressing metastatic colorectal cancer

Reinventing ethics:Inventing right and wrong

I offer new arguments for an unorthodox reading of J. L. Mackie’s Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong, one on which Mackie does not think all substantive moral claims are false, but allows that a proper subset of them are true. Further, those that are true should be understood in terms of a “hybrid theory”. The proposed reading is one on which Mackie is a conceptual pruner, arguing that we should prune away error-ridden moral claims but hold onto those already free of error. This reading is very different from the standard ones found in the literature. I build on recent work by Moberger and argue that this reading is better corroborated by close attention to the way in which Mackie argues at length that terms like “good” and “ought” are systematically context-sensitive, as well as by considerable additional textual evidence. This reading, however, faces an important challenge—to explain in what sense, if any, morality retains its “normativity” on the proposed reading. I argue that this challenge can be met, at least given some of Mackie’s further assumptions about the nature of rationality