The Role of Imagination in Social Scientific Discovery: Why Machine Discoverers Will Need Imagination Algorithms

When philosophers discuss the possibility of machines making scientific discoveries, they typically focus on discoveries in physics, biology, chemistry and mathematics. Observing the rapid increase of computer-use in science, however, it becomes natural to ask whether there are any scientific domains out of reach for machine discovery. For example, could machines also make discoveries in qualitative social science? Is there something about humans that makes us uniquely suited to studying humans? Is there something about machines that would bar them from such activity? A close look at the methodology of interpretive social science reveals several abilities necessary to make a social scientific discovery, and one capacity necessary to possess any of them is imagination. For machines to make discoveries in social science, therefore, they must possess imagination algorithms

How Thought Experiments Increase Understanding

We might think that thought experiments are at their most powerful or most interesting when they produce new knowledge. This would be a mistake; thought experiments that seek understanding are just as powerful and interesting, and perhaps even more so. A growing number of epistemologists are emphasizing the importance of understanding for epistemology, arguing that it should supplant knowledge as the central notion. In this chapter, I bring the literature on understanding in epistemology to bear on explicating the different ways that thought experiments increase three important kinds of understanding: explanatory, objectual and practical

RAWS 1992 progress report

The purpose of the Radar Wind Sounder (RAWS) instrument is to measure winds aloft in clouds while providing additional capabilities as an ocean surface-wind and rainfall sensor. The concept of RAWS stems from the Laser Atmospheric Wind Sounder (LAWS) planned to monitor winds via Doppler shifts of lidar return from aerosols in a cloud-free environment. If, however, dense clouds are present, LAWS will be unable to measure the winds below the cloud tops. Thus an instrument that can penetrate clouds is necessary and is the basis for RAWS. The primary tasks related to the RAWS study are to determine: (1) scattering and attenuation models; (2) required radar sensitivity; (3) optical frequencies; (4) needed antenna size; (5) suitable scan pattern; (6) removal of the ambiguity imposed by range and Doppler-frequency sizes; (7) spectrum measurements; (8) system configuration; (9) performance as a rain sensor; and (10) performance as an ocean-surface wind sensor

Bibliometrics : an overview

Research support is an expanding area of activity for libraries in the HE sector. At the University of Hull, the recent reorganisation of Library and Learning Innovation involved a redistribution of expertise to meet the changing needs of the University, its staff and students. As part of this, a new Research Services Team was created to meet the needs of the research community and so contribute to a key strategic aim of increasing the quantity and quality of research outputs

The Content-Dependence of Imaginative Resistance

An observation of Hume’s has received a lot of attention over the last decade and a half: Although we can standardly imagine the most implausible scenarios, we encounter resistance when imagining propositions at odds with established moral (or perhaps more generally evaluative) convictions. The literature is ripe with ‘solutions’ to this so-called ‘Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance’. Few, however, question the plausibility of the empirical assumption at the heart of the puzzle. In this paper, we explore empirically whether the difficulty we witness in imagining certain propositions is indeed due to claim type (evaluative v. non-evaluative) or whether it is much rather driven by mundane features of content. Our findings suggest that claim type plays but a marginal role, and that there might hence not be much of a ‘puzzle’ to be solved

Taking Heisenberg's Potentia Seriously

It is argued that quantum theory is best understood as requiring an ontological duality of res extensa and res potentia, where the latter is understood per Heisenberg's original proposal, and the former is roughly equivalent to Descartes' 'extended substance.' However, this is not a dualism of mutually exclusive substances in the classical Cartesian sense, and therefore does not inherit the infamous 'mind-body' problem. Rather, res potentia and res extensa are proposed as mutually implicative ontological extants that serve to explain the key conceptual challenges of quantum theory; in particular, nonlocality, entanglement, null measurements, and wave function collapse. It is shown that a natural account of these quantum perplexities emerges, along with a need to reassess our usual ontological commitments involving the nature of space and time.Comment: Final version, to appear in International Journal of Quantum Foundation

Imagination: A Sine Qua Non of Science

What role does the imagination play in scientific progress? After examining several studies in cognitive science, I argue that one thing the imagination does is help to increase scientific understanding, which is itself indispensable for scientific progress. Then, I sketch a transcendental justification of the role of imagination in this process