A Cut-Free Sequent Calculus for Defeasible Erotetic Inferences

In recent years, the effort to formalize erotetic inferences (i.e., inferences to and from questions) has become a central concern for those working in erotetic logic. However, few have sought to formulate a proof theory for these inferences. To fill this lacuna, we construct a calculus for (classes of) sequents that are sound and complete for two species of erotetic inferences studied by Inferential Erotetic Logic (IEL): erotetic evocation and regular erotetic implication. While an attempt has been made to axiomatize the former in a sequent system, there is currently no proof theory for the latter. Moreover, the extant axiomatization of erotetic evocation fails to capture its defeasible character and provides no rules for introducing or eliminating question-forming operators. In contrast, our calculus encodes defeasibility conditions on sequents and provides rules governing the introduction and elimination of erotetic formulas. We demonstrate that an elimination theorem holds for a version of the cut rule that applies to both declarative and erotetic formulas and that the rules for the axiomatic account of question evocation in IEL are admissible in our system

On representation varieties of Artin groups, projective arrangements and the fundamental groups of smooth complex algebraic varieties

We prove that for any affine variety S defined over Q there exist Shephard and Artin groups G such that a Zariski open subset U of S is biregular isomorphic to a Zariski open subset of the character variety Hom(G, PO(3))//PO(3). The subset U contains all real points of S . As an application we construct new examples of finitely-presented groups which are not fundamental groups of smooth complex algebraic varieties.Comment: 68 pages 15 figure

Perspectives, Questions, and Epistemic Value

Many epistemologists endorse true-belief monism, the thesis that only true beliefs are of fundamental epistemic value. However, this view faces formidable counterexamples. In response to these challenges, we alter the letter, but not the spirit, of true-belief monism. We dub the resulting view “inquisitive truth monism”, which holds that only true answers to relevant questions are of fundamental epistemic value. Which questions are relevant is a function of an inquirer’s perspective, which is characterized by his/her interests, social role, and background assumptions. Using examples of several different scientific practices, we argue that inquisitive truth monism outperforms true-belief monism

On representation varieties of 3-manifold groups

We prove universality theorems ("Murphy's Laws") for representation schemes of fundamental groups of closed 3-dimensional manifolds. We show that germs of SL(2,C)-representation schemes of such groups are essentially the same as germs of schemes of over rational numbers.Comment: 28 page

Universality theorems for configuration spaces of planar linkages

We prove realizability theorems for vector-valued polynomial mappings, real-algebraic sets and compact smooth manifolds by moduli spaces of planar linkages. We also establish a relation between universality theorems for moduli spaces of mechanical linkages and projective arrangements.Comment: 45 pages, 15 figures. See also http://www.math.utah.edu/~kapovich/eprints.htm

Counterfactuals and Explanatory Pluralism

Recent literature on non-causal explanation raises the question as to whether explanatory monism, the thesis that all explanations submit to the same analysis, is true. The leading monist proposal holds that all explanations support change-relating counterfactuals. We provide several objections to this monist position. 1Introduction2Change-Relating Monism's Three Problems3Dependency and Monism: Unhappy Together4Another Challenge: Counterfactual Incidentalism4.1High-grade necessity4.2Unity in diversity5Conclusio