40S ribosome biogenesis co-factors are essential for gametophyte and embryo development

Ribosome biogenesis is well described in Saccharomyces cerevisiae. In contrast only very little information is available on this pathway in plants. This study presents the characterization of five putative protein co-factors of ribosome biogenesis in Arabidopsis thaliana, namely Rrp5, Pwp2, Nob1, Enp1 and Noc4. The characterization of the proteins in respect to localization, enzymatic activity and association with pre-ribosomal complexes is shown. Additionally, analyses of T-DNA insertion mutants aimed to reveal an involvement of the plant co-factors in ribosome biogenesis. The investigated proteins localize mainly to the nucleolus or the nucleus, and atEnp1 and atNob1 co-migrate with 40S pre-ribosomal complexes. The analysis of T-DNA insertion lines revealed that all proteins are essential in Arabidopsis thaliana and mutant plants show alterations of rRNA intermediate abundance already in the heterozygous state. The most significant alteration was observed in the NOB1 T-DNA insertion line where the P-A3 fragment, a 23S-like rRNA precursor, accumulated. The transmission of the T-DNA through the male and female gametophyte was strongly inhibited indicating a high importance of ribosome co-factor genes in the haploid stages of plant development. Additionally impaired embryogenesis was observed in some mutant plant lines. All results support an involvement of the analyzed proteins in ribosome biogenesis but differences in rRNA processing, gametophyte and embryo development suggested an alternative regulation in plants

Book review: Shira Sebban: Vietnam's Modern Day Boat People - Bridging Borders for Freedom

Missbach A. Shira Sebban: Vietnam's Modern Day Boat People - Bridging Borders for Freedom. 01.07.2024;55(1):123-125

Accommodating Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Indonesia: From Immigration Detention to Containment in “Alternatives to Detention”

Considered the last ‘stepping stone’ before Australia, Indonesia plays an important role in immobilising secondary movements of asylum seekers and refugees in Southeast Asia. While migration scholarship has dedicated substantial attention to immigration detention and the deplorable living conditions inside immigration detention centres (IDCs), this article explores “alternatives to detention” (ATD) in two Indonesian localities: the city of Makassar and the province of Aceh. Seeking to contribute to a critical examination of ATD more generally, this article examines individual freedom, mobility, mechanisms of care and aid provision, protection of rights, self-determination, and matters of personal safety. The article illustrates the remaining limitations and the lack of rights that asylum seekers and refugees in Indonesia continue to face outside of IDCs. A durable solution, in the form of integration, is not available to asylum seekers and refugees, as they are prevented from integrating into the local host societies, and their social and economic mobility remains widely restricted. Yet at the same time, despite more physical mobility in ATD, asylum seekers and refugees remain contained within Indonesia as their onward movement remains deterred as well.Considérée comme le dernier tremplin vers l’Australie, l’Indonésie joue un rôle important pour bloquer les mouvements secondaires des demandeurs d’asile et des réfugiés en Asie du Sud-Est. Tandis que les études sur la migration se sont beaucoup focalisées sur la la détention des immigrants et les conditions de vie déplorables dans les les centres de détention des immigrants (CDI), cet article explore des alternatives à la détention (AD) à deux endroits d’Indonésie: la ville de Makassar et la province d’Aceh. À des fins plus générales de contribution critique sur les CDI, il étudie la liberté individuelle, la mobilité, les mécanismes de soins et les dispositions d’aides, la protection des droits, l’autodétermination, et les questions de sécurité personnelle. Il illustre enfin les limites persistantes et le manque de droits auxquels font toujours face, en Indonésie, les demandeurs d’asile et les réfugiés à l’extérieur des CDI. Du fait qu’on les empêche de s’intégrer aux sociétés hôtes locales et que leur mobilité sociale et économique est extrêmement limitée, on ne leur offre pas de solution durable sous la forme d’une intégration. En dépit d’une certaine mobilité physique dans le cadre des AD, les demandeurs d’asile et les réfugiés restent confinés à l’intérieur de l’Indonésie du fait qu’on les décourage également d’aller de l’avant

Lessons Not Learned

In July 1936, Spain descended into chaos and civil war. Fascists in the military, Catholic Church, and aristocracy rebelled against a government elected to reform centuries old power structures. The United States reacted in surprise and joined France and Britain, staunchly refusing to be involved. For six months, the Department of State impeded attempts to material assist the Spanish government, until Congress passed an updated neutrality law prohibiting trade with Spain or the rebels. Congress again renewed and updated the law a year later. Yet in spring of 1939, at the end of the war, Franklin D. Roosevelt told his ambassador to Spain he regretted not assisting the Spanish government. The president, however, unfairly critiqued himself. The United States never debated involvement. “Foreign Relations of the United States” (FRUS), the State Department’s official edited record of diplomatic reporting, has no record of diplomatic reporting warning of imminent war, despite ample indications. Bowers provided timely reports during the first six months of the war on assisting Americans in Spain and the diplomatic community’s activities. He did not report his observations of German and Italian military activity, atrocities committed by the fascists, or the consequences of prohibiting supplies from reaching Spanish government forces. It is impossible to know how broader reporting might have changed decisions in Washington. This thesis does not argue American intervention could or would have changed the outcome of the war. This thesis argues that Bowers had a responsibility for fuller diplomatic vi reporting to inform better policy decisions in Washington and that lessons American learned post World War II resulting in intervention, globalist international policies, and diplomats opining on policy and recommending changes rather than just reporting, could have been learned from the Spanish Civil War

Waiting on the islands of 'stuckedness': managing asylum seekers in island detention camps in Indonesia ; from the late 1970s to the early 2000s

"This article sheds light on the obstructed mobility of asylum seekers who were passing through Indonesia during their search for permanent and eff ective protection, and the politics of their detention. The fl ows of Indochinese asylum seekers who were ‘stored’ in Galang Island between the late 1970s and the mid-1990s, awaiting either their resettlement or repatriation, are compared with more recent arrivals of asylum seekers from the Middle East, many of whom were hosted in open detention facilities on Lombok Island during the mid-2000s. This comparison provides comprehensive background information on how the asylum seekers and their claims for international protection have been handled in Indonesia. Given that Indonesia is not a party to the 1951 Refugee Convention and the 1967 Protocol, Indonesia off ers no formal rights to asylum seekers and refugees within its territory. Instead, Indonesia ‘tolerates’ their presence as long as they are under the auspices of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) or the International Organization for Migration (IOM). Highlighting the diff erences regarding the management of these two distinctive groups of asylum seekers helps to grasp the full scope of ‘stuckedness’ (Hage, 2009) and also helps to understand the varied impacts of obstructed mobility on asylum seekers looking for permanent and eff ective protection." (author's abstract)"Dieser Artikel beleuchtet die eingeschränkte Mobilität von Asylsuchenden auf ihrem Weg durch Indonesien auf der Suche nach dauerhaftem und eff ektivem Schutz sowie die Politik ihrer Inhaftierung. In diesem Kontext werden Asylsuchende aus den Indochina-Staaten, die von den späten 1970er bis Mitte der 1990er Jahre auf der Insel Galang festgehalten waren und dort auf ihre Umsiedlung beziehungsweise Repatriierung warteten, mit den neueren Flüchtlingsankünften aus Nahost verglichen, von denen viele Mitte der 2000er Jahre auf der Insel Lombok in off enen Asylstätten festgehalten wurden. Dieser Vergleich dient in erster Linie dazu, den Umgang Indonesiens mit Asylsuchenden in den letzten drei Jahrzehnten aufzuzeigen. Angesichts der Tatsache, dass Indonesien bisher die Flüchtlingskonvention der Vereinten Nationen (1951) sowie das dazugehörige Protokoll (1967) nicht unterschrieben hat, bietet Indonesien Asylsuchenden und Flüchtlingen keine formellen Rechte. Solange diese sich jedoch beim Flüchtlingshochkommissariat der Vereinten Nationen (UNHCR) oder auch bei der Internationalen Organisation für Migration (IOM) registrieren, toleriert Indonesien ihre Anwesenheit innerhalb seines Territoriums. Unterschiede im Umgang mit diesen beiden Flüchtlingsgruppen verdeutlichen nicht nur das volle Ausmaß des „Festsitzens“ (stuckedness) (Hage, 2009), sondern zeigen auch verschiedene Auswirkungen von eingeschränkter Mobilität auf, wenn es um den Zugang zu dauerhaftem und effektivem Schutz geht." (Autorenreferat

Book Review: Palmer, Wayne, Indonesia's Overseas Labour Migration Programme, 1969–2010

Book Review of the monograph by Wayne Palmer (2016), Indonesia’s Overseas Labour Migration Programme, 1969–2010. Leiden and Boston: Brill, ISBN13: 978-900-432-544-9, xiv + 202 page