Lineages of Islamic Extremism in Egypt: Ikhwan al-Muslimun, State Violence and the Origins of Radical Politics

This article examines why an Islamic organization appeal into radical behavior? Focusing on Ikhwan al-Muslimun (IM) and its splinter groups in Egypt, this article seeks to highlight historical-institutional underpinnings of when and how political Islam faced obstacles to enter pragmatic politics. Political experiences of the IM in the 1950s and the institutional structures created by Nasser’s regime in the early 1960s have shaped a condition of uncertainty that constrained Islamist activists to twart moderation. Islamist thinkers such as Sayyid Qutb exploited the fear of Nasserism and new emerging state institutions, to convince many members that they were threatened by the current regime. Initiatives to embrace radical ideology and actions have become dominant frameworks in the IM. The extent to which this radical ideology may develop is not only because of these institutional constraints, but also because of the absence of pragmatic-minded leaders who appealed with non-violence ideas to integrate Islamic agenda in institutional opportunities. [Tulisan ini membahas organisasi Islam yang cenderung menjadi radikal, studi kasus Ikhwan al-Muslimun (IM) dan pecahannya di Mesir, dengan mengulas secara organisasional historis disaat Islam politik tersebut mendapat rintangan ketika memasuki politik praktis. Pengalaman politik IM tahun 1950an dan 1960an saat dibawah rezim Nasser telah membawa ketidakpastian dan yang menyebabkan para aktifis menjauhi sikap moderat. Seorang Sayyid Qutb pun mengangkat ketakutan pada kekuasaan rezim Nasser untuk meyakinkan massa pada sebuah ancaman baru. Cara berpikir dan bertindak radikal telah menjadi pilihan yang dominan bagi anggota IM. Kesuburan paham radikal tersebut dimungkinkan karena tidak hanya adanya tekanan organisasional, tetapi juga tiadanya tokoh politik yang mendorong pendekatan non kekerasan dalam integrasikan agenda politik dengan peluang organisasioanal.

Pesantren dan Islam Wasathiyah: Ulama, Tradisi intelektual dan Akar Sosial Moderasi Islam

Pesantren as Islamic educational institutions have undergone institutional transformation. Pesantren have been able to become a means for the emergence of a new generation of Muslim educated people who are familiar with modern terms. This research will examine how socio-political attitudes and orientations develop in pesantren today. The pesantren that become the object of this research are Pesantren Buntet Cirebon, Pesantren Tebuireng Jombang, and Pesantren API Tegalrejo. Through these pesantrens, this research will look at the extent to which thecontinuity aspect of the pesantrens in maintaining their traditions over the centuries.  In addition, this study will also capture thechanges experienced by pesantren in responding to the development of attitudes and behaviors regarding contemporary and religious issues. Through the two aspects above, this research is expected to obtain an overview of the views of kyai and pesantren in viewing the idea of Wasathiyah Islam, especially related to issues of socio-cultural plurality, tolerance, democracy, and issues of civic values that develop in society

Islamic Populism and Symbolic Convergence in the 2019 Presidential Election

This research reveals that both candidates in the 2019 Presidential Election engaged in Islamic populist movements in an attempt to garner sympathy and increase their respective electability. The symbolic convergence of Prabowo's campaign is evident in the institutional nature of the fantasy theme woven by his team, with actions that signify the fundamentalism of Prabowo's camp. In contrast, the fantasy theme constructed by Jokowi's team is notably moderate, as exemplified by the phrase "Jokowi Loves Santri," which gave rise to the narrative that Jokowi is a moderate figure. Consequently, a shared rhetorical vision was formed, positioning Jokowi as a moderate individual, with his disseminators acting more individually, unlike Prabowo's camp, which often coalitions with Islamic mass bases

‘NOT A RELIGIOUS STATE’ A study of three Indonesian religious leaders on the relation of state and religion

This article explores the concept of a ‘secular state’ offered by three Indonesian religious leaders: a Catholic priest, Nicolaus Driyarkara (1913–1967), and two Muslim intellectuals who were also state officials, Mukti Ali (1923–2004) and Munawir Sjadzali (1925–2004). All three, who represented the immediate generation after the revolution for Indonesian independence from the Dutch (1945), defended the legitimacy of a secular state for Indonesia based on the state ideology Pancasila (Five Principles of Indonesia). In doing so, they argued that a religious state, for example an Islamic state, is incompatible with a plural nation that has diverse cultures, faiths, and ethnicities. The three also argued that the state should remain neutral about its citizens’ faith and should not be dominated by a single religion, i.e. Islam. Instead, the state is obliged to protect all religions embraced by Indonesians. This argument becomes a vital foundation in the establishment of Indonesia’s trajectory of unique ‘secularisation’. Whilst these three intellectuals opposed the idea of establishing a religious or Islamic state in Indonesia, it was not because they envisioned the decline of the role of religion in politics and the public domain but rather that they regarded religiosity in Indonesia as vital in nation building within a multi-religious society. In particular, the two Muslim leaders used religious legitimacy to sustain the New Order’s political stability, and harnessed state authority to modernise the Indonesian Islamic community

Islam, Ethnicity and Secession: Forms of Cultural Mobilization in Aceh Rebellions

This article explains the appeal of two different remarkable forms of cultural mobilization within the Aceh secessionist movement. The first form is the emergence of the Darul Islam (DI) rebellion in the 1950s; and the second is the rise of the Free Aceh Movement (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM) during the 1980s and 1990s. Recent trends in Aceh’s political dynamics pose a striking puzzle as to how the institutional arrangements created by the government of Aceh have complicated the political dimensions of GAM. Some institutions have shaped new patterns of Aceh-Jakarta relations, but others represent a revitalization of the previous Aceh-Islamic state rebellion under DI/TII. What are the likely causes for the re-emergence of Islam coming to the center stage of Aceh politics? This article argues that the primary forces that have driven these variations in the two periods of rebellion were the interaction between the institutional design of the nation-state and the considerable opportunity for cultural mobilization at a particular institutional juncture. Secessionist ideologies such as those in Aceh are shaped and mediated by the institutional context in which they manifest.DOI: 10.15408/sdi.v23i1.265

‘Ties that would Divide’: Explaining the NU’s Exit from Masyumi in 1952

This article explains the political and historical roots of the making of Muslim political identities in Indonesia. It seeks to answer the question:  why Muslim communities in Indonesia are inclined to grouping in such social differences between traditionalist (NU) and modernist (Muhammadiyah) organizations. These two organizations emerged as a model of social division based on religio-cultural groupings of Indonesian Muslims that emerged during the process of national identity construction in the late colonial period. Concerned with the historical development of Islamic organizations in the post-independent Indonesia, this article specifically examines the role of Masyumi in creating both unity and conflict in Muslim society, which occurred in the 1950s. However, this article’s principal explanation for the emergence of Muslim cleavages is the subsequent moment of elite conflict in response to the most important political development in Indonesia: the first national elections in 1955.DOI: 10.15408/sdi.v19i2.36

The Khittah of 1926 Reexamined: Views of the NU in Post-Cipasung Congress

When established in 1926 in Surabaya, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) is meant as an organization of scholars engaged in the field of socio-religious. Concentration struggles and activities of the organization was shaped in the development of the Indonesian Muslim community in the socio-cultural field such as education, teaching, health care, and economic development of the people. In this framework, then, the scholars and leaders of this organization to formulate a vision NU known as Khittah 1926. After a long period gait for NU deviate from Khittah as outlined, to enter the world of practical politics - join Masjumi, became NU party, the PPP fuse - at Muktamarnya 27th in Situbondo, 1984, KH duet. And KH Abdurrahman Wahid. Ahmad Siddiq managed to bring NU back to Khittah 1926. Decision was meant to remove themselves from the bondage of practical politics and prioritize the development of the Indonesian Muslim community culturally.DOI: 10.15408/sdi.v3i2.80