Ethical Egoism

Selfishness is often considered a vice and selfish actions are often judged to be wrong. But sometimes we ought to do what’s best for ourselves: in a sense, we sometimes should be selfish. The ethical theory known as ethical egoism states that we are always morally required to do what’s in our own self-interest. The view isn’t that we are selfish—this is psychological egoism—but that we ought to be. This essay explores ethical egoism and the main arguments for and against it. [Note: there are links for two versions below; a 1000 Word Philosophy version and a longer version in "Introduction to Ethics: An Open Educational Resource"

Thinking Critically About Abortion

An editorial / opinion piece on abortion: "I’m a philosophy professor who specializes in medical ethics and I teach and write about the ethics of abortion. So I am very familiar with the medical, legal and – most importantly – ethical or moral issues related to HB 481, the so-called “heartbeat bill” that would effectively ban abortion in Georgia. At least hundreds of other philosophy, ethics and law professors in Georgia teach these ethical debates about abortion: they are also, to varying degrees, experts on the issues. What is taught is the arguments about the ethics of abortion, that is, the reasons to think that abortion is wrong and the reasons to think that it’s not wrong. Evaluating these arguments requires understanding and skill. Much of these skills amount to consistently asking ‘What do you mean?’ and ‘Why think that?’ We need better arguments on these issues, and asking and answering these questions helps with that. . .

Early and Later Abortions: Ethics and Law

Most abortions occur early in pregnancy. I argue that these abortions, and so most abortions, are not morally wrong and that the best arguments given to think that these abortions are wrong are weak. I also argue that these abortions, and probably all abortions, should be legal. I begin by observing that people sometimes respond to the issue by describing the circumstances of abortion, not offering reasons for their views about those circumstances; I then dismiss “question-begging” arguments about abortion that merely assume the conclusions they are given to support; most importantly, I evaluate many arguments: both common, often-heard arguments and arguments developed by philosophers. My defense of abortion is based on facts about early fetuses’ not yet possessing consciousness or any mental life, awareness or feeling, as well as concerns about rights to one’s own body

Tom Regan on Kind Arguments against Animal Rights and for Human Rights

Tom Regan argues that human beings and some non-human animals have moral rights because they are “subjects of lives,” that is, roughly, conscious, sentient beings with an experiential welfare. A prominent critic, Carl Cohen, objects: he argues that only moral agents have rights and so animals, since they are not moral agents, lack rights. An objection to Cohen’s argument is that his theory of rights seems to imply that human beings who are not moral agents have no moral rights, but since these human beings have rights, his theory of rights is false, and so he fails to show that animals lack rights. Cohen responds that this objection fails because human beings who are not moral agents nevertheless are the “kind” of beings who are moral agents and so have rights, but animals are not that “kind” of being and so lack rights. Regan argues that Cohen’s “kind” arguments fail: they fail to explain why human beings who are not moral agents have rights and they fail to show that animals lack rights. Since Cohen’s “kind” arguments are influential, I review and critique Regan’s objections . I offer suggestions for stronger responses to arguments like Cohen’s

Euthanasia, or Mercy Killing

Sadly, there are people in very bad medical conditions who want to die. They are in pain, they are suffering, and they no longer find their quality of life to be at an acceptable level anymore. When people like this are kept alive by machines or other medical treatments, can it be morally permissible to let them die? Advocates of “passive euthanasia” argue that it can be. Their reasons, however, suggest that it can sometimes be not wrong to actively kill some patients, i.e., that “active euthanasia” can be permissible also. This essay reviews these arguments

Dwarf shrub vegetation of rock ledges and clefts in the Pamir Alai Mountains (Middle Asia: Tajikistan)

The paper presents the results of phytosociological researches on rocky slope vegetation in Tajikistan with the aim to establish a comprehensive syntaxonomical classifi cation system. Field studies were conducted in 2010–2014 in Pamir Alai ranges and Pamirian plateau. Nearly 500 relevés documenting rock and scree vegetation were made according to the Braun-Blanquet method. Numerical analyses of selected 58 relevés representing dwarf shrub vegetation on rock ledges made it possible to distinguish: Ephedro glaucae- Spiraeion baldschuanicae and Ephedrion regeliano-fedtschenkoi alliances, as well as Spiraeetum baldschuanicae, Rhamnetum coriaceae, Pentaphylloidetum parvifoliae and Pentaphylloidetum dryadanthoidis associations, community of Ephedra glauca and community of Rhamnus minuta. The classification of vegetation of dwarf shrubs on rock walls occurring in the Pamir Alai Mts is proposed. Because of the species composition, physiognomy and microhabitat conditions, the plant communities were included into Artemisio santolinifoliae- Berberidetea sibiricae class Ermakov et al. 2006. The main factors determining the species composition of the classifi ed associations seem to be the elevation above sea level.The newly described syntaxa are largely defined by species restricted to very narrow ranges in Middle Asi

Intercultural relations, global oecumene, cultural diversity

The classical anthropological paradigm of plurality of separate cultures became contested at the turn of the last century. Researchers such as Thomas Hylland Eriksen, Wolfgang Welsch or Ulf Hannerz show that there are no intercultural boundaries anymore and cultures permeate within each other. Some of the researchers suggest that we can speak only about a single global culture. The outlined vision of reality pressures us to ask the old question of cultural studies: What are the cultural differences and where are their sources? It leads us to another issue: How should we understand intercultural relations if we accept the axiom of the single culture? The article is an attempt to deal with those problems

Responding to Morally Flawed Historical Philosophers and Philosophies

Many historically-influential philosophers had profoundly wrong moral views or behaved very badly. Aristotle thought women were “deformed men” and that some people were slaves “by nature.” Descartes had disturbing views about non-human animals. Hume and Kant were racists. Hegel disparaged Africans. Nietzsche despised sick people. Mill condoned colonialism. Fanon was homophobic. Frege was anti-Semitic; Heidegger was a Nazi. Schopenhauer was sexist. Rousseau abandoned his children. Wittgenstein beat his young students. Unfortunately, these examples are just a start. These philosophers are famous for their intellectual accomplishments, yet they display serious moral or intellectual flaws in their beliefs or actions. At least, some of their views were false, ultimately unjustified and, perhaps, harmful. How should we respond to brilliant-but-flawed philosophers from the past? Here we explore the issues, asking questions and offering few answers. Any insights gained here might be applicable to contemporary imperfect philosophers, scholars in other fields, and people in general

Differential influence of four invasive plant species on soil physicochemical properties in a pot experiment

Purpose This study compared the effects of four invasive plants, namely Impatiens glandulifera, Reynoutria japonica, Rudbeckia laciniata, and Solidago gigantea, as well as two native species-Artemisia vulgaris, Phalaris arundinacea, and their mixture on soil physicochemical properties in a pot experiment. Materials and methods Plants were planted in pots in two loamy sand soils. The soils were collected from fallows located outside (fallow soil) and within river valley (valley soil) under native plant communities. Aboveground plant biomass, cover, and soil physicochemical properties such as nutrient concentrations, pH, and water holding capacity (WHC) were measured after two growing seasons. Discriminant analysis (DA) was used to identify soil variables responsible for the discrimination between plant treatments. Identified variables were further compared between treatments using one-way ANOVA followed by Tukey’s HSD test. Results and discussion Plant biomass, cover, and soil parameters depended on species and soil type. DA effectively separated soils under different plant species. DA on fallow soil data separated R. laciniata from all other treatments, especially I. glandulifera, native species and bare soil, along axis 1 (related mainly to exchangeable K, N-NH_{4}, total P, N-NO_{3}, and WHC). Large differences were found between R. laciniata and S. gigantea as indicated by axis 2 (S-SO_{4}, exchangeable Mg, total P, exchangeable Ca, and total Mg). DA on valley soil data separated R. japonica from all other treatments, particularly S. gigantea, R. laciniata, and native mixture, along axis 1 (N-NO_{3}, total N, S-SO_{4}, total P, pH). Along axis 2 (N-NO_{3}, N-NH_{4}, Olsen P, exchangeable K, WHC), large differences were observed between I. glandulifera and all other invaders. Conclusions Plant influence on soil differed both among invasive species and between invasive and native species. Impatiens glandulifera had a relatively weak effect and its soil was similar to both native and bare soils. Multidirectional effects of different invaders resulted in a considerable divergence in soil characteristics. Invasion-driven changes in the soil environment may trigger feedbacks that stabilize or accelerate invasion and hinder re-colonization by native vegetation, which has implications for the restoration of invaded habitats