Conceptions of Press Freedom in a Globalising World

Article to accompany a talk given on 22 October 2008 at the Cambridge Festival of Ideas

Civic and Cosmopolitan Justice

This is the text of The Lindley Lecture for 2000, given by Onora O'Neill, a British philosopher

Autonomia, pluralidade e razão pública

I shall offer a reading of Kant’s conception of autonomy, distinguish it from some other ideas that go by the name of autonomy, and propose some reasons for thinking that autonomy in Kant’s sense of the term is indeed both a conception of practical reason and fundamental to morality. The line of thought I shall pursue is, I hope, both compatible with and a sympathetic extension of claims that Schneewind makes about Kant’s position.Pretendo oferecer uma leitura da concepção kantiana de autonomia, distingui-la de algumas outras concepções que recebem o nome de autonomia e propor algumas razões para pensar que a autonomia no sentido que Kant atribui ao termo é decerto tanto uma concepção de razão prática como também fundamental para a moralidade. A linha de pensamento que seguirei é, espero, compatível com as afirmações queSchneewind faz sobre a posição de Kant e, ao mesmo tempo, uma ampliação que favorece essas afirmações

Forst on Reciprocity of Reasons: a Critique

According to Rainer Forst, (i) moral and political claims must meet a requirement of reciprocal and general acceptability (RGA) while (ii) we are under a duty in engaged discursive practice to justify such claims to others, or be able to do so, on grounds that meet RGA. The paper critically engages this view. I argue that Forst builds a key component of RGA, i.e., reciprocity of reasons, on an idea of the reasonable that undermines both (i) and (ii): if RGA builds on this idea, RGA is viciously regressive and a duty of justification to meet RGA fails to be agent transparent. This negative result opens the door for alternative conceptions of reciprocity and generality. I then suggest that a more promising conception of reciprocity and generality needs to build on an idea of the reasonable that helps to reconcile the emancipatory or protective aspirations of reciprocal and general justification with its egalitarian commitments. But this requires to downgrade RGA in the order of justification and to determine on prior, substantive grounds what level of discursive influence in reciprocal and general justification relevant agents ought to have

Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics

Why has autonomy been a leading idea in philosophical writing on bioethics, and why has trust been marginal? In this important book, Onora O'Neill suggests that the conceptions of individual autonomy so widely relied on in bioethics are philosophically and ethically inadequate, and that they undermine rather than support relations of trust. She shows how Kant's non-individualistic view of autonomy provides a stronger basis for an approach to medicine, science and biotechnology, and does not marginalize untrustworthiness, while also explaining why trustworthy individuals and institutions are often undeservingly mistrusted. Her arguments are illustrated with issues raised by practices such as the use of genetic information by the police or insurers, research using human tissues, uses of new reproductive technologies, and media practices for reporting on medicine, science and technology. Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics will appeal to a wide range of readers in ethics, bioethics and related disciplines.</jats:p