Rational Voters in a Partisanship Model

This paper examines a voter model for the US which is interconnected with the partisan theory. In our model, voters are rational and forward-looking. They are perfectly informed about the preferences of political parties and about the state of the economy. The predictions of our voter model differ from the predictions of conventional voter models, according to which the incumbent benefits from low unemployment and low inflation, irrespective of its political colour. In a partisan setting, the democratic party benefits from high unemployment and the republican party benefits from high inflation. Regressions of presidential approval rates indicate that the predictions of both the partisan voter model and the conventional model are consistent with the data

Why Are Residents Reluctant to Consult Attending Physicians?

A physician performs two tasks: making diagnoses and determining treatments. To reduce medical error, residents are supposed to consult their supervisors when they face uncommon circumstances. However, recent research shows that residents are reluctant to do so. This paper presents a model that explains (i) which residents shy away from consulting; (ii) when residents are reluctant; (iii) the importance of protocols in the medical sector; and (iv) when consulting is a sign of strength or a sign of weakness. Furthermore, I show that encouraging residents to consult by investigating mishaps leads to another distortion: residents will give too much weight to own assessments

How committees of experts interact with the outside world: some theory, and evidence from the FOMC

Some committees are made up of experts, persons who care both about the matter at hand and about coming across as able decision- makers. We derive two propositions about the way members of such committees interact with the outside world. First, they would like to conceal disagreement from the public. That is, once the decision has been reached, they show a united front to the outside world. Second, if such committees are required to become transparent, e.g., by publishing verbatim transcripts of their meetings, members will organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. Large part of the paper is dedicated to a case study of the U.S. Federal Open Market Committee in the United States. It provides suggestive evidence supporting the two propositions

Sharing Information through Delegation and Collaboration

This article analyzes under which conditions a manager can motivate a junior worker by verbal communication, and explains why communication is often tied up with organizational choices as job enlargement and collaboration. Our model has two important features. First, the manager has more information about a junior's ability than the junior himself. Second, the junior's effort and ability are complements. We show that the manager has an incentive to exaggerate the junior's ability. We discuss two ways in which the manager can make credible statements about the junior's ability. First, the senior can delegate a task to the junior for which it is important that the junior has a correct perception of his ability. Information is shared through a costless signal. Second, the senior can spend more time on a junior she perceives as able than on a junior she perceives as less able. Information is then shared through a costly signal

Learning from others? Decision rights, strategic communication, and reputational concerns

We examine centralized versus decentralized decision making when experience of agents is private information and communication is necessary to learn from others. An agent has reputational concerns and his market may or may not observe what the other agent chooses (global versus local markets). With decentralized decision making, agents' willingness to communicate depends heavily on what a market observes. Strikingly, less communication may improve welfare. If markets are global, centralization outperforms decentralization as it makes communication possible, and communication is informative for any finite degree of conflict among agents and with the center

Do More Powerful Interest Groups have a Disproportionate Influence on Policy?

Decisions-makers often rely on information supplied by interested parties. In practice, some parties have easier access to information than other parties. In this light, we examine whether more powerful parties have a disproportionate influence on decisions. We show that more powerful parties influence decisions with higher probability. However, in expected terms, decisions do not depend on the relative strength of interested parties. When parties have not provided information, decisions are biased towards the less powerful parties. Finally, we show that compelling parties to supply information destroys incentives to collect information

Delegation or Voting

Collective decision procedures should balance the incentives they provide to acquire information and their capacity to aggregate private information. In a decision problem in which a project can be accepted or rejected once information about its quality has been acquired or not, we compare the performance of a delegation structure with that of two voting procedures. Delegation makes one's acceptance decision pivotal by definition. The decisiveness of one's vote in a voting procedure depends on the other agent's vote. This in turn determines the decision to acquire information. In the debate about a rational choice foundation of Condorcet's Jury Theorem, the distribution of information was left exogenous. Mixed (acceptance) strategies were required to validate th

Policy Makers, Advisors, and Reputation

When hiring an adviser (he), a policy maker (she) often faces the problem that she has incomplete information about his preferences. Some advisers are good, in the sense that their preferences are closely aligned to the policy maker's preferences, and some advisers are bad. Recently, some scholars have argued that the policy maker's power to replace her adviser induces the adviser to act more in line with the policy maker's interests. The idea is that the adviser's desire to put a stamp on future policy reduces his incentive to manipulate information. This paper shows that the policy maker's power to replace her adviser may harm her. The reason is that this power may have an adverse effect on the behavior of good advisers

Producing and Manipulating Information: Private Information Providers versus Public Information Providers

To reduce the chances of policy failures, policy makers need information about the effects of policies. Sometimes, policy makers can rely on agents who already possess the information. Often, the information does not exist yet. This raises two questions. First, how much resources should be devoted to the production of information? Second, should information be produced by a profit- maximizing firm (a private consultant) or by someone who has an interest in policy outcomes (a political adviser)? This paper shows that policy makers may prefer hiring a political adviser for two reasons. First, in contrast to a private consultant, a political adviser need not be fully compensated for exerting effort. Second, a political adviser with moderate preferences produces information of a higher expected quality than a private consultant is induced to do by the optimal monetary incentive scheme. The cost of hiring a political adviser is that she may distort policy decisions by manipulating information. As long as a political adviser is not too biassed, the policy maker prefers consulting a political adviser to consulting a private consultant, even if a political adviser and a private consultant are equally costly. Competition among political advisers is shown to reduce the willingness of political advisers to produce information

Is Transparency to no avail? Committee Decision-making, Pre-meetings, and Credible Deals

Transparent decision-making processes are widely regarded as a prerequisite for the working of a representative democracy. It facilitates accountability, and citizens may suspect that decisions, if taken behind closed doors, do not promote their interests. Why else the secrecy? We provide a model of committee decision-making that explains the public’s demand for transparency, and committee members’ aversion to it. In line with case study evidence, we show how pressures to become transparent induce committee members to organize pre-meetings away from the public eye. Outcomes of pre-meetings are less determined, more anarchic, than those of formal meetings, but within bounds. We characterize feasible deals that are credible and will be endorsed in the formal meeting