Negative and positive externalities in intergroup conflict: exposure to the opportunity to help the outgroup reduces the inclination to harm it

Outgroup hate, in the context of intergroup conflict, can be expressed by harming the outgroup, but also by denying it help. Previous work established that this distinction—whether the externality on the outgroup is negative or positive—has an important effect on the likelihood of outgroup hate emerging as a motivation for individual participation in intergroup conflict. The current work uses a within-subject design to examine the behavior of the same individuals in intergroup conflict with negative and positive externalities on the outgroup. Each participant made two choices, one for each type of externality, and the order was counter balanced. The main results are that (1) behavior is fairly consistent across negative and positive externalities, i.e., the tendency to display outgroup hate by harming the outgroup is correlated with the tendency to display outgroup hate by avoiding to help the outgroup; (2) People are reluctant to harm the outgroup after being exposed to the opportunity to help it; (3) Groupness—the degree to which people care about their group and its well-being—is related to outgroup hate only when participants encounter the opportunity to harm the outgroup first (before they encounter the opportunity to help it). In this setting the relationship between groupness and outgroup hate spilled over to the subsequent interaction, where it was possible to help the outgroup. When the opportunity to help the outgroup was encountered first, groupness was not related to outgroup hate

Social motives in intergroup conflict

We experimentally test the social motives behind individual participation in intergroup conflict by manipulating the framing and symmetry of conflict. We find that behavior in conflict depends on whether one is harmed by actions perpetrated by the out-group, but not on one's own influence on the outcome of the out-group. The way in which this harm is presented and perceived dramatically alters participation decisions. When people perceive their group to be under threat, they are mobilized to do what is good for the group and contribute to the conflict. On the other hand, if people perceive to be personally under threat, they are driven to do what is good for themselves and withhold their contribution. The first phenomenon is attributed to group identity, possibly combined with a concern for social welfare. The second phenomenon is attributed to a novel victim effect. Another social motive - reciprocity - is ruled out by the data

The collaborative roots of corruption

Cooperation is essential for completing tasks that individuals cannot accomplish alone. Whereas the benefits of cooperation are clear, little is known about its possible negative aspects. Introducing a novel sequential dyadic die-rolling paradigm, we show that collaborative settings provide fertile ground for the emergence of corruption. In the main experimental treatment the outcomes of the two players are perfectly aligned. Player A privately rolls a die, reports the result to player B, who then privately rolls and reports the result as well. Both players are paid the value of the reports if, and only if, they are identical (e.g., if both report 6, each earns €6). Because rolls are truly private, players can inflate their profit by misreporting the actual outcomes. Indeed, the proportion of reported doubles was 489 higher than the expected proportion assuming honesty, 48 higher than when individuals rolled and reported alone, and 96 higher than when lies only benefited the other player. Breaking the alignment in payoffs between player A and player B reduced the extent of brazen lying. Despite player B's central role in determining whether a double was reported, modifying the incentive structure of either player A or player B had nearly identical effects on the frequency of reported doubles. Our results highlight the role of collaboration—particularly on equal terms—in shaping corruption. These findings fit a functional perspective on morality. When facing opposing moral sentiments—to be honest vs. to join forces in collaboration—people often opt for engaging in corrupt collaboration

Tournaments and piece rates revisited: A theoretical and experimental study of premium incentives

Tournaments represent an increasingly important component of organizational compensation systems. While prior research focused on fixed-prize tournaments, i.e., on tournaments where the prize or prize sum to be awarded is set in advance, we introduce a new type of tournament into the literature: premium incentives. While premium incentives, just like fixed-prize tournaments, are based on relative performance, the prize to be awarded is not set in advance but is a function of the firm's success: the prize is high if the firm is successful and low if it is not successful. Relying on a simple model of cost minimization, we are able to show that premium incentives outperform fixed-prize tournaments as well as piece rates. Our theoretical result is qualitatively confirmed by a controlled laboratory experiment and has important practical implications for the design of organizational incentive systems

Dispositional free riders do not free ride on punishment

Strong reciprocity explains prosocial cooperation by the presence of individuals who incur costs to help those who helped them (‘strong positive reciprocity’) and to punish those who wronged them (‘strong negative reciprocity’). Theories of social preferences predict that in contrast to ‘strong reciprocators’, self-regarding people cooperate and punish only if there are sufficient future benefits. Here, we test this prediction in a two-stage design. First, participants are classified according to their disposition towards strong positive reciprocity as either dispositional conditional cooperators (DCC) or dispositional free riders (DFR). Participants then play a one-shot public goods game, either with or without punishment. As expected, DFR cooperate only when punishment is possible, whereas DCC cooperate without punishment. Surprisingly, dispositions towards strong positive reciprocity are unrelated to strong negative reciprocity: punishment by DCC and DFR is practically identical. The ‘burden of cooperation’ is thus carried by a larger set of individuals than previously assumed

Negative and positive externalities in intergroup conflict: exposure to the opportunity to help the outgroup reduces the inclination to harm it

Outgroup hate, in the context of intergroup conflict, can be expressed by harming the outgroup, but also by denying it help. Previous work established that this distinction—whether the externality on the outgroup is negative or positive—has an important effect on the likelihood of outgroup hate emerging as a motivation for individual participation in intergroup conflict. The current work uses a within-subject design to examine the behavior of the same individuals in intergroup conflict with negative and positive externalities on the outgroup. Each participant made two choices, one for each type of externality, and the order was counter balanced. The main results are that (1) behavior is fairly consistent across negative and positive externalities, i.e., the tendency to display outgroup hate by harming the outgroup is correlated with the tendency to display outgroup hate by avoiding to help the outgroup; (2) People are reluctant to harm the outgroup after being exposed to the opportunity to help it; (3) Groupness—the degree to which people care about their group and its well-being—is related to outgroup hate only when participants encounter the opportunity to harm the outgroup first (before they encounter the opportunity to help it). In this setting the relationship between groupness and outgroup hate spilled over to the subsequent interaction, where it was possible to help the outgroup. When the opportunity to help the outgroup was encountered first, groupness was not related to outgroup hate

A Flexible z-Tree Implementation of the Social Value Orientation Slider Measure (Murphy et al. 2011) – Manual

This manual describes a z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007) implementation of the paper-based Social Vaule Orientation (SVO) Slider Measure by Murphy et al. (2011). Using the paper-based version instead of the slider-based version (as implemented on the SVO-Website) avoids server-traffic related delays we experienced in the latter implementation

Tournaments and piece rates revisited: a theoretical and experimental study of output-dependent prize tournaments

Tournaments represent an increasingly important component of organizational compensation systems. While prior research focused on fixed-prize tournaments where the prize to be awarded is set in advance, we introduce ‘output-dependent prizes’ where the tournament prize is endogenously determined by agents’ output—it is high when the output is high and low when the output is low. We show that tournaments with output-dependent prizes outperform fixed-prize tournaments and piece rates. A multi-agent experiment supports the theoretical result

Wherefore art thou competitors? How situational affordances help differentiate among prosociality, individualism, and competition

The Triple Dominance Measure (choosing between prosocial, individualistic, and competitive options) and the Slider Measure (“sliding” between various orientations, for example, from individualistic to prosocial) are two widely used techniques to measure social value orientation, that is, the weight individuals assign to own and others’ outcomes in interdependent situations. Surprisingly, there is only moderate correspondence between these measures, but it is unclear why and what the implications are for identifying individual differences in social value orientation. Using a dataset of 8021 participants from 31 countries and regions, this study revealed that the Slider Measure identified fewer competitors than the Triple Dominance Measure, accounting for approximately one-third of the non-correspondence between the two measures. This is (partially) because many of the Slider items do not afford a competitive option. In items where competition is combined with individualism, competitors tended to make the same choices as individualists. Futhermore, we demonstrated the uniqueness of competitors. Compared to prosocials and individualists, competitors exhibited lower levels of both social mindfulness and trust. Overall, the present work highlights the importance of situational affordances in measuring personality, the benefits of distinguishing between individualists and competitors, and the importance of utilizing a measure that distinguishes between these two proself orientations