Confirming Information Flows in Networks

Social networks, be it on the internet or in real life, facilitate information flows. We model this by giving agents incentives to link with others and receive information through those links. In many networks agents will value confirmation of the information they receive from others. Our paper analyzes the impact such a need for confirmation has on the social networks which are formed. We first study the existence of Nash equilibria and then characterize the set of strict Nash networks. Next, we characterize the set of strictly ecient networks and discuss the relationship between strictly efficient networks and strict Nash networks

Les concessions d'exploitation forestière menacent-elles les tourbières en République démocratique du Congo ?

peer reviewed[No abstract available

The Sixth Framework Program as an Affiliation Network: Representation and Analysis

In this paper, we compare two different representations of Framework Programs as affiliation network: 'One-mode networks' and 'Two-mode networks'. The aim of this article is to show that the choice of the representation has an impact on the analysis of the networks and on the results of the analysis. In order to support our proposals, we present two forms of representation and different indicators used in the analysis. We study the network of the 6th Framework Program using the two forms of representation. In particular, we show that the identification of the central nodes is sensitive to the chosen representation. Furthermore, the nodes forming the core of the network vary according to the representation. These differences of results are important as they can influence innovation policies

What Factors Determine the Number of Trading Partners?

The purpose of the paper is to provide a simple model explaining buyer-supplier relationships and show what factors determine the number of trading partners. We show that when the supplier is able to determine the number of trading partners, the optimal number is small if the supplier's bargaining power with them is weak, the economy of scope in the supplier's variable costs is significant, and that in its sunk investment is weak. Investment may be greater when the number of trading partners is small. The results may be consistent with the formation of Japanese buyer-supplier relations

Extending Networks of Collaboration to Multimarket Oligopolies

International audienceIn this article, we extend the Goyal and Joshi's model (2003) of network of collaboration in oligopoly to multi-market situations. We examine the incentive of firms to form links and the architectures of the resulting networks in this setting. We also present some results on efficient networks