FLASHForward: plasma wakefield accelerator science for high-average-power applications.

The FLASHForward experimental facility is a high-performance test-bed for precision plasma wakefield research, aiming to accelerate high-quality electron beams to GeV-levels in a few centimetres of ionized gas. The plasma is created by ionizing gas in a gas cell either by a high-voltage discharge or a high-intensity laser pulse. The electrons to be accelerated will either be injected internally from the plasma background or externally from the FLASH superconducting RF front end. In both cases, the wakefield will be driven by electron beams provided by the FLASH gun and linac modules operating with a 10 Hz macro-pulse structure, generating 1.25 GeV, 1 nC electron bunches at up to 3 MHz micro-pulse repetition rates. At full capacity, this FLASH bunch-train structure corresponds to 30 kW of average power, orders of magnitude higher than drivers available to other state-of-the-art LWFA and PWFA experiments. This high-power functionality means FLASHForward is the only plasma wakefield facility in the world with the immediate capability to develop, explore and benchmark high-average-power plasma wakefield research essential for next-generation facilities. The operational parameters and technical highlights of the experiment are discussed, as well as the scientific goals and high-average-power outlook

Investigating the potentially contradictory microfoundations of financialization

The existing academic literature on financialization points to multiple instances in which firms attempt to demonstrate the vitality of their stock-market position in ways which ultimately prove to be self-harming. I demonstrate, in the first instance as a matt er of immanent logic, that these actions are linked to the interplay of contradictory tendencies in the microfoundations of financialization. Under conditions of financialization, firms create additional sources of credit to capitalize their productive activities by driving their stock price into greater increases than the market average, thereby generating capital gains. Yet, the more it becomes public knowledge that the financing tricks used to inflate the stock price provide no productive benefit to the firm, the more it would seem to create incentives for fund managers to hold portfolios that replicate the stock market as a whole. In this way, they will minimize their exposure to financial misrepresentation. Such a stance undermines financialized business models, but it does in any case conform to fund managers' basic theoretical training, which revolves around the logical demonstration that an individual stock cannot systematically out-perform the market average. I review the available empirical studies of fund manager decision-making to show that they find against the existence of a simple performativity loop operating between finance theory and fund manager behaviour. However, on many points the empirical evidence does confirm the theoretically derived conclusion concerning the potentially contradictory microfoundations of financialization. Fund managers often do act in a way which is consistent with finance theory's core claim that an index-tracking strategy represents the only equilibrium portfolio, even if this is only rarely as a result of the direct performativity of the theory

The Repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act and the Federal Reserve's Extraordinary Intervention During the Global Financial Crisis

Before the global financial crisis, the assistance of a lender of last resort was traditionally thought to be limited to commercial banks. During the crisis, however, the Federal Reserve created a number of facilities to support brokers and dealers, money market mutual funds, the commercial paper market, the mortgage-backed securities market, the triparty repo market, et cetera. In this paper, we argue that the elimination of specialized banking through the eventual repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act (GSA) has played an important role in the leakage of the public subsidy intended for commercial banks to nonbank financial institutions. In a specialized financial system, which the GSA had helped create, the use of the lender-of-last-resort safety net could be more comfortably limited to commercial banks. However, the elimination of GSA restrictions on bank-permissible activities has contributed to the rise of a financial system where the lines between regulated and protected banks and the so-called shadow banking system have become blurred. The existence of the shadow banking universe, which is directly or indirectly guaranteed by banks, has made it practically impossible to confine the safety to the regulated banking system. In this context, reforming the lender-of-last-resort institution requires fundamental changes within the financial system itself

Hawtreyan 'credit deadlock' or Keynesian 'liquidity trap'? Lessons for Japan from the great depression

This paper outlines the ideas of Ralph Hawtrey and Lauchlin Currie on the need for monetised fiscal deficit spending in 1930s USA to combat the deep depression into which the economy had been allowed to sink. In such exceptional circumstances of 'credit deadlock' in which banks were afraid to lend and households and business afraid to borrow, the deadlock could best be broken through the spending of new money into circulation via large fiscal deficits. This complementarity of fiscal and monetary policy was shown to be essential, and as such indicates the potential power of monetary policy - in contrast to the Keynesian "liquidity trap" view that it is powerless This lesson was not learned by the Japanese authorities in their response to the asset price collapse of 1991-92, resulting in a lost decade as ballooning fiscal deficits were neutralised throughout the 1990s by unhelpfully tight monetary policy with the Bank of Japan refusing to monetise the deficits

Shadow money and the public money supply: the impact of the 2007-2009 financial crisis on the monetary system

This article explores the effects of the political reactions to the 2007–2009 financial crisis on the monetary system. It chimes in with the view that shadow banks create ‘shadow money’, i.e. private substitutes for bank deposits. The article analyses how the three main forms of shadow money – money market fund shares, overnight repurchase agreements and asset-backed commercial papers – were affected by the short-term government intervention and medium-term regulation during and after the 2007–2009 financial crisis in the United States. The analysis reveals that the measures taken between 2007 and 2014 integrated some shadow money forms in the public money supply. In the year after the Lehman collapse, the initially private shadow money supply was either publicly backstopped or de-monetised as it had broken par to bank deposits. The public backstops took on the form of emergency facilities established by the Federal Reserve and guarantees proclaimed by the Treasury. Those backstops imply that the public institutional framework to protect bank deposits was extended to some forms of shadow money during the crisis. This tendency has continued in post-crisis regulation. Accordingly, the 2007–2009 financial crisis has triggered a paradigmatic change in the monetary system, attributable to the political decisions of US authorities

International money markets: eurocurrencies

Eurocurrencies are international markets for short-term wholesale bank deposits and loans. They emerged in Western Europe in the late 1950s and rapidly reached a global scale. A Eurocurrency is a form of bank money: an unsecured short-term bank debt denominated in a currency (for instance, US dollars) but issued by banks operating offshore, in a geographical location or a legal space situated outside of the jurisdiction of the national authorities presiding over that currency (for instance, the Federal Reserve). In Eurocurrency markets, banks intermediate mainly between foreign residents. They borrow funds by "accepting" foreign currency deposits and lend foreign currency-denominated funds by "placing" deposits with other banks, by granting short-term loans or investing in other liquid assets. Historically, Eurodollars accounted for the largest share of Eurocurrencies, although other international currencies (Deutsche Marks, Japanese yens, and especially Euros since 1999) played an important role. Eurocurrency markets were a manifestation of financial integration and interdependence in a globalizing economy and performed critical functions in the distribution and creation of international liquidity. At the same time, their fast growth was a recurrent source of concerns for central bankers and policymakers due to their implications for macroeconomic policies and financial stability. This chapter analyzes different aspects of the historical development of Eurocurrency markets and their role in the international monetary and financial system. The first part discusses theoretical interpretations, presents estimates of markets' size, describes their structure, and explains the determinants of their growth. The second part analyzes the spread between Eurodollar rates and other US money market rates, the role of arbitrage, the evolution of risk factors, and the causes of historical episodes of stress and contagion in the interbank market. The last part discusses political economy issues, such as the role of governments and market forces in the emergence of Eurodollars in the 1950s and the failed attempts to impose multilateral controls on Eurocurrency markets in the 1970s

The Critics of Modern Money Theory (MMT) are Right

Eric Tymoigne and Randall Wray's (T&W, 2013) defense of MMT leaves the MMT emperor even more naked than before (excuse the Yogi Berra-ism). The criticism of MMT is not that it has produced nothing new. The criticism is that MMT is a mix of old and new, the old is correct and well understood, while the new is substantially wrong. Among many failings, T&W fail to provide an explanation of how MMT generates full employment with price stability; lack a credible theory of inflation; and fail to justify the claim that the natural rate of interest is zero. MMT currently has appeal because it is a policy polemic for depressed times. That makes for good politics but, unfortunately, MMT's policy claims are based on unsubstantiated economics

Eupraxia, a step toward a plasma-wakefield based accelerator with high beam quality

The EuPRAXIA project aims at designing the world's first accelerator based on advanced plasma-wakefield techniques to deliver 5 GeV electron beams that simultaneously have high charge, low emittance and low energy spread, which are required for applications by future user communities. Meeting this challenging objective will only be possible through dedicated effort. Many injection/acceleration schemes and techniques have been explored by means of thorough simulations in more than ten European research institutes. This enables selection of the most appropriate methods for solving each particular problem. The specific challenge of generating, extracting and transporting high charge beams, while maintaining the high quality needed for user applications, are being tackled using innovative approaches. This article highlights preliminary results obtained by the EuPRAXIA collaboration, which also exhibit the required laser and plasma parameters

'The formula that killed Wall Street':The Gaussian copula and modelling practices in investment banking

Drawing on documentary sources and 114 interviews with market participants, this and a companion article discuss the development and use in finance of the Gaussian copula family of models, which are employed to estimate the probability distribution of losses on a pool of loans or bonds, and which were centrally involved in the credit crisis. This article, which explores how and why the Gaussian copula family developed in the way it did, employs the concept of ‘evaluation culture’, a set of practices, preferences and beliefs concerning how to determine the economic value of financial instruments that is shared by members of multiple organizations. We identify an evaluation culture, dominant within the derivatives departments of investment banks, which we call the ‘culture of no-arbitrage modelling’, and explore its relation to the development of Gaussian copula models. The article suggests that two themes from the science and technology studies literature on models (modelling as ‘impure’ bricolage, and modelling as articulating with heterogeneous objectives and constraints) help elucidate the history of Gaussian copula models in finance