Kant and Secular Transcendentalism

This writing argues that some embedded moral and religious linkages in Kant’s metaphysical thought have been unobserved in much recent philosophical commentary, something we may attribute to the de-emphasis of metaphysics within significant parts of the contemporary academic world, combined with a lack of awareness of the religious milieu within which he worked. Paradoxically in the light of this, and based on the religious content I find in the first Critique and elsewhere, I explore what I perceive to be Kant’s attempt to steer traditional religious doctrines and practice into a secular, individualised, scientifically congruent, completely independent and universally acceptable format. From this, I develop the idea that an appreciation of these efforts to reform earlier theological thought allows for a more complete and coherent interpretation of critical philosophy than has previously been available, with application, for example, to a heightened understanding of the employment of the idea of things in themselves. The primary notion involved in this amended reading is the primacy Kant gives to practical reason..

Relational Space and Places of Value

Drawing on a Leibnizian panpsychist ontology of living beings ­comprising both body and soul, this chapter outlines a theory of space based on the perceptual and appetitive relations among these creatures’ souls. Co-extensive with physical space founded on relations among bodies subject to efficient causation, teleological space results from relations among souls subject to final causation, and is described qualitatively in terms of creatures’ pleasure and pain, wellbeing and happiness. Particular places within this space include the kingdom of grace, where morally responsible, rational beings act as far as possible in accord with the ideal of justice as universal love and wise benevolence. However, while Leibniz considered love as properly directed only towards rational beings, it is argued here that the truly wise person will direct their love and benevolence towards all living things

Leibniz's mirrors:Reflecting the past

My aim in this paper is to explore Leibniz’s intriguing description of the monad as a living mirror of the universe. I begin with a few brief observations on the status of mirrors in seventeenth century France, before embarking on a more detailed examination of the metaphor itself that focuses in particular on the ways in which mirrors represent space and time, the varying degrees of clarity and distinctness of their representations, and the ways in which mirrors reflect themselves. After arguing that all reflections are reflections upon the past and that self-reflection rests in part on the ability to perceive others different from the self, I turn finally to the question of how self-reflecting moral beings might best reflect the lives of others, and conclude by suggesting that self-reflecting beings have a moral imperative to love other self-reflecting beings, be they in the past, the present or the future, and to mirror the beauty of the world and its creator God as best they can

Leibniz-Stahl Controversy

The Leibniz-Stahl Controversy is the latest addition to the Yale Leibniz Series and is welcomed by historians of philosophy, of science, and of medicine. It holds especial interest for those who specialize on the work of Leibniz and of Stahl, who is an interesting figure in his own right, having influenced among others, the English eighteenth century chemist, Joseph Priestley and French nineteenth century philosopher, Félix Ravaisso

Teleology and Realism in Leibniz's Philosophy of Science

This paper argues for an interpretation of Leibniz’s claim that physics requires both mechanical and teleological principles as a view regarding the interpretation of physical theories. Granting that Leibniz’s fundamental ontology remains non-physical, or mentalistic, it argues that teleological principles nevertheless ground a realist commitment about mechanical descriptions of phenomena. The empirical results of the new sciences, according to Leibniz, have genuine truth conditions: there is a fact of the matter about the regularities observed in experience. Taking this stance, however, requires bringing non-empirical reasons to bear upon mechanical causal claims. This paper first evaluates extant interpretations of Leibniz’s thesis that there are two realms in physics as describing parallel, self-sufficient sets of laws. It then examines Leibniz’s use of teleological principles to interpret scientific results in the context of his interventions in debates in seventeenth-century kinematic theory, and in the teaching of Copernicanism. Leibniz’s use of the principle of continuity and the principle of simplicity, for instance, reveal an underlying commitment to the truth-aptness, or approximate truth-aptness, of the new natural sciences. The paper concludes with a brief remark on the relation between metaphysics, theology, and physics in Leibniz

A Method of Controlling Hemorrhage in Cholecystectomy

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