Campaign Advertising and Voter Welfare

This paper investigates the role of campaign advertising and the opportunity of legal restrictions on it. An electoral race is modeled as a signalling game with three classes of players: a continuum of voters, two candidates, and one interest group. The group has non-verifiable insider information on the candidates' valence and, on the basis of this information, offers a contribution to each candidate in exchange for a favorable policy position. Candidates spend the contributions they receive on non-directly informative advertising. This paper shows that: (1) A separating equilibrium exists in which the group contributes to a candidate only if the insider information about that candidate is positive; (2) Although voters are fully rational, a ban on campaign advertising can be welfare-improving; and (3) Split contributions may arise in equilibrium (and should be prohibited).Elections;campaign contributions;advertising;voter welfare;split contributions

Common Agency and Computational Complexity: Theory and Experimental Evidence

In a common agency game, several principals try to influence the behavior of an agent. Common agency games typically have multiple equilibria. One class of equilibria, called truthful, has been identified by Bernheim and Whinston and has found widespread use in the political economy literature. In this paper we identify another class of equilibria, which we call natural. In a natural equilibrium, each principal offers a strictly positive contribution on at most one alternative. We show that a natural equilibrium always exists and that its computational complexity is much smaller than that of a truthful equilibrium. To compare the predictive power of the two concepts, we run an experiment on a common agency game for which the two equilibria predict a different equilibrium alternative. The results strongly reject the truthful equilibrium. The alternative predicted by the natural equilibrium is chosen in 65% of the matches, while the one predicted by the truthful equilibrium is chosen in less than 5% of the matches.lobbying;experimental economics;common agency;truthful equilibrium;natural equilibrium;computational complexity

Sequential Common Agency

In a common agency game a set of principals promises monetary transfers to an agent which depend on the action he will take. The agent then chooses the action, and is paid the corresponding transfers. Principals announce their transfers simultaneously. This game has many equilibria; Bernheim and Whinston ([1]) prove that the action chosen in the coalition-proof equilibrium is e±cient. The coalition-proof equilibria have an alternative characterization as truthful equilibria. The other equilibria may be inefficient. Here we study the sequential formulation of the common agency game: principals announce their transfers sequentially. We prove that the set of equilibria is different in many important ways. The outcome is efficient in all the equilibria. The truthful equilibria still exist, but are no longer coalition-proof. Focal equilibria are now a different type of equilibria, that we call thrifty. In thrifty equilibria of the sequential games, principals are better off (and the agent worse off) than in the truthful equilibria of the simultaneous common agency. These results suggest that the sequential game is more desirable institution, because it does not have ine±cient equilibrium outcomes; but it is less likely to emerge when agents have the power to design the institution.Common agency;sequential games;principal agent games;political influence

Mutual Fund Tournament: Risk Taking Incentives Induced by Ranking Objectives

There is now extensive empirical evidence showing that fund managers have relative performance objectives and adapt their investment strategy in the last part of the calendar year to their performance in the early part of the year. However, emphasis was put on returns in excess of some exogenous benchmark return.In this paper, we investigate whether fund managers have ranking objectives (as in a tournament).First, in a two-period model, we analyze the game played by two risk-neutral fund managers with ranking objectives.We derive conditions on the set of possible strategies under which the aggregate amount of risk undertaken in the late period is larger than in the first period.In the second part of the paper, we provide evidence that (i) funds have risk incentives generated by ranking objectives, (ii) risk induced by ranking objectives is mainly idiosyncratic, and (iii) risk incentives generated by ranking objectives are stronger for funds ranked in the top decile after the first part of the year.investment trusts;financial management;financial risk;performance

The Endoplasmic Reticulum Glucosyltransferase Recognizes Nearly Native Glycoprotein Folding Intermediates

The UDP-Glc:glycoprotein glucosyltransferase (GT), a key player in the endoplasmic reticulum (ER) quality control of glycoprotein folding, only glucosylates glycoproteins displaying non-native conformations. To determine whether GT recognizes folding intermediates or irreparably misfolded species with nearly native structures, we generated and tested as GT substrates neoglycoprotein fragments derived from chymotrypsin inhibitor 2 (GCI2) bearing from 53 to 64 (full-length) amino acids. Fragment conformations mimicked the last stage-folding structures adopted by a glycoprotein entering the ER lumen. GT catalytic efficiency (V(max)/K(m)) remained constant from GCI2-(1-53) to GCI2-(1-58) and then steadily declined to reach a minimal value with GCI2-(1-64). The same parameter showed a direct hyperbolic relationship with solvent accessibility of the single Trp residue but only in fragments exposing hydrophobic amino acid patches. Mutations introduced (GCI2-(1-63)V63S and GCI2-(1-64)V63S) produced slight structural destabilizations but increased GT catalytic efficiency. This parameter presented an inverse exponential relationship with the free energy of unfolding of canonical and mutant fragments. Moreover, the catalytic efficiency showed a linear relationship with the fraction of unfolded species in water. It was concluded that the GT-derived quality control may be operative with nearly native conformers and that no alternative ER-retaining mechanisms are required when glycoproteins approach their proper folding.Fil: Caramelo, Julio Javier. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Bioquímicas de Buenos Aires. Fundación Instituto Leloir. Instituto de Investigaciones Bioquímicas de Buenos Aires; ArgentinaFil: Castro, Olga Alejandra. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Bioquímicas de Buenos Aires. Fundación Instituto Leloir. Instituto de Investigaciones Bioquímicas de Buenos Aires; ArgentinaFil: de Prat Gay, Gonzalo. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Bioquímicas de Buenos Aires. Fundación Instituto Leloir. Instituto de Investigaciones Bioquímicas de Buenos Aires; ArgentinaFil: Parodi, Armando José A.. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Parque Centenario. Instituto de Investigaciones Bioquímicas de Buenos Aires. Fundación Instituto Leloir. Instituto de Investigaciones Bioquímicas de Buenos Aires; Argentin

Suelos volcanicos endurecidos

The purpose of this study is to precise the conditions of agricultural reclamation of tepetate in the eastern part of the Mexico valley (Texcoco). The Tepetate is a compact and sterile material. The lack of nitrogen, carbon and the poor biological activity limit the possibility of plant development. But after the use of heavy machinery and terracing, it is possible, under certain conditions, to use this new soil for agriculture. From 1993 until 1996, we compared native soil and different treatments applied to the tepetate reclaimed, such as the deepness of the reclamation, the use of chemical/biological fertilisers, the mono-culture/associated cultures, the tillage practices of the new soil on 6 different terraces of 700 m2. One of our goals was to find the best ways to use the new tepetate soils as real agricultural soils. The conclusions complete those of previous works. It is necessary to use a cereal of small seeds (wheat, barley...) in association with a leguminous, especially the Medicago polimorfa, the first year of cultivation. The use of corn is possible since the second year, but with a high quantity of fertilisers, especially the Medicago polimorfa, the first year of cultivation. The use of corn is possible since the second year, but with a high quantity of fertilisers, especially of nitrogen. It is also important to supply those elements in two or three applications instead of one. It is always better to use association than monoculture. In the case of corn, the association with string bean is excellent, while it is possible but risky with red bean. The action of the manure is not very efective if it is not complemented at the moment of the seeding with some synthetical fertilisers. The best depth for tepetate reclamation is 40-50 cm. In fact, in this regions, the main problem is not really the condition of reclaiming of the tepetates but the poor quantities and the unpredictable distribution of precipitations during the rainy season. (Résumé d'auteur)

Suelos volcanicos endurecidos

The reclamation of volcanic indurated soils called tepetates in Mexico must control soil erosion and generate a good productivity of these new soils according to a sustainable development strategy. This paper shows the results of an european research program involving ORSTOM and the Colegio de Postgraduados en Agrociencias in the eastern part of valley of Mexico (Texcoco). Different systems of culture have been studied (mono/associated culture, with/without manure, soil/tepetate, natural/cultivated tepetate, tepetate with deep/normal subsoiling, tillage practice) during four years on 8 large terraces (700 m2). After every rain, we measured the runoff, took and dried all the sediments, sampled water and followed the vegetation cover, the soil surface aggregates, the crops growing (see this papers in this publication). (Résumé d'auteur.