Weightlifting exercise and the size-weight illusion

In the size-weight illusion (SWI), large objects feel lighter than equally weighted small objects. In the present study, we investigated whether this powerful weight illusion could influence real-lift behavior-namely, whether individuals would perform more bicep curls with a dumbbell that felt subjectively lighter than with an identically weighted, but heavier-feeling, dumbbell. Participants performed bicep curls until they were unable to continue with both a large, light-feeling 5-lb dumbbell and a smaller, heavy-feeling 5-lb dumbbell. No differences emerged in the amounts of exercise that participants performed with each dumbbell, even though they felt that the large dumbbell was lighter than the small dumbbell. Furthermore, in a second experiment, we found no differences in how subjectively tired participants felt after exercising for a set time with either dumbbell. We did find, however, differences in the lifting dynamics, such that the small dumbbell was moved at a higher average velocity and peak acceleration. These results suggest that the SWI does not appear to influence exercise outcomes, suggesting that perceptual illusions are unlikely to affect one's ability to persevere with lifting weights.The authors thank J. Ladich for his help with creating the stimuli. G.B. was supported with a Banting Postdoctoral Fellowship, awarded by the Natural Sciences and Engineering Research Council of Canada (NSERC)

Trial Delay Caused by Discrete Systemwide Events: The Post-Jordan Era Meets the Age of COVID-19

Court closures necessitated by COVID-19 have resulted in extensive trial delay, with implications for the section 11(b) Charter right to be tried within a reasonable time. Although COVID-19 appears to be a straightforward example of an “exceptional circumstance” under the Jordan framework that governs section 11(b), careful analysis reveals that it falls within a category not contemplated by that framework—what this article calls “discrete systemwide events.” Because COVID delay impacts cases across the system, the reasonable steps that can be taken to reduce it are themselves largely systemic in nature. Crucially, the exceptional circumstances analysis stipulated by Jordan focuses exclusively on the steps available in an individual case, while systemic delay is addressed indirectly through presumptive ceilings. Because the presumptive ceilings were not calibrated with COVID-19 in mind, they cannot account for COVID delay. Nor can systemic responses to COVID delay be assessed as part of the general exceptional circumstances analysis: Such an approach would require judges to adjudicate the reasonableness of myriad institutional policies, giving rise to problems ranging from a lack of data to separation of powers issues. This conundrum points towards one of two extremes: discount COVID delay without a full Jordan analysis, thereby partially relieving the Crown of its burden to justify presumptively unreasonable delay and leaving accused persons to bear the cost; or effectively prevent Crowns from justifying COVID delay as an exceptional circumstance, thereby risking thousands of stayed criminal charges flowing from the pandemic. This article suggests an alternative approach that navigates between these extremes: In some instances, delay caused by a discrete systemwide event like COVID-19 should be remedied by a sentencing reduction, authorized either by the Charter or by the sentencing process set out in the Criminal Code. This solution, while imperfect, achieves a more palatable result while adding minimal complexity to the section 11(b) analysis. If adopted, it could save accused persons from disproportionately bearing the costs of COVID delay, which would be the likely outcome were the Jordan framework applied straightforwardly

Proof and Progress: Coping with the Law of Evidence in a Technological Age

This article outlines those rules of evidence that are most likely to be called upon to fit new technologies. It identifies some of the challenges that are presented, and identifies modest techniques or suggestions for coping. Those suggestions include taking the kind of relaxed view as to when expert evidence is being offered illustrated by the Ontario Court of Appeal in R. v. Hamilton; taking a functional approach to judicial notice; ensuring that authentication and the “best evidence” rule for electronic records are not applied in a highly technical fashion; understanding the law of hearsay and remaining familiar with key hearsay exceptions; applying the law of privilege in ways that reflect the new realities that compromise privacy; understanding the limits of character evidence and the opportunities for the exclusionary discretion; and recognizing the utility in the technological presentation of evidence

When Open Courts Meet Closed Government

The law largely controls the degree to which the open court principle is respected. “Legal culture,” however, has as much to do with the fortunes of the “open court principle” as does the law. The law often provides only standards — not clear answers. The extent to which the open court principle is respected the refore comes down to attitude or the commitment to it among justice system participants. We are fortunate that this is a country with a long and demonstrated commitment to the open court principle. The terrorist attacks of 2001 have ushered in a heightened sense of purpose and secrecy on the part of government and the intelligence and law enforcement communities, all in the interests of that profoundly powerful goal of “national security.” National security is being invoked, however, with increasing frequency. The attitude that gives priority to national security concerns challenges the open court principle in criminal cases. While it is to be expected, it is worrisome because it is precisely in times of national insecurity that the open court principle takes on special urgency. After all, one of the roles of the open court principle is to ensure that individuals brought before the courts for prosecution are being treated fairly. The other role of the open court principle is to secure democracy, yet, as has also been observed, “the powers necessary to defeat terrorism and suppress insurrection [including state control on the flow of information] are the very ones needed to enforce a tyranny.” Unless those responsible for the administration of the open court principle – the executive, government officials, line peace officers and of course courts — turn their mind to the issue and reaffirm their commitment to leave our courts as open as they can be in this age of insecurity, our freedom and democracy will be diminished more than it need be. Society will suffer for it, and so too will some individuals