L’optimisation juridique du paiement pour services environnementaux en faveur de la préservation des services environnementaux : le cas du Cameroun et de la République Démocratique du Congo

The study starts from a hypothesis on the coherence and compatibility of the legal instruments in force in Cameroon and in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) with the optimization of payment for environmental services (PES) and the preservation of environmental services. This study has employed a legal approach and interviews in order to investigate whether there is coherence and compatibility or not between the two variables of this hypothesis: (1) the legal instruments in force in Cameroon and in the DRC and (2) the optimization of PES and the preservation of environmental services. This study consists of three parts. The first part deals with the theoretical framework of PES and the place of PES in the legal order. In this first part, the definition of an optimal PES, the indicators of an optimal PES and the categories of legal frameworks on PES have been revealed. These are the fundamental elements to conduct a systematic analysis in the second and third parts. Based on these fundamental elements, the study analyses the legal instru- ments from international, regional (Africa) and domestic (Cameroon and the DRC) levels and investigates through field research two PES projects, one in Cameroon called “PES comminatory project” and another in the DRC called “REDD CBFF-Luki” respectively in the second and the third parts. From the analysis of these legal instruments and the investigation of these two PES projects, it has become apparent that there is a lack of coherence and compatibility between the legal instruments and these two PES projects in Cameroon and in the DRC, and the optimization of PES and the preservation of environmental services in the Congo Basin in general, especially in these two States. Useful recommendations have been made to eradicate these shortcomings. Key words: payment for environmental services, environmental services, Congo Basi

Some remarks on weighted logarithmic Sobolev inequality

We give here a simple proof of weighted logarithmic Sobolev inequality, for example for Cauchy type measures, with optimal weight, sharpening results of Bobkov-Ledoux. Some consequences are also discussed

THz Magneto-electric atomic rotations in the chiral compound Ba3_3NbFe3_3Si2_2O14_{14}

We have determined the terahertz spectrum of the chiral langasite Ba$_3$NbFe$_3$Si$_2$O$_{14}$ by means of synchrotron-radiation measurements. Two excitations are revealed that are shown to have a different nature. The first one, purely magnetic, is observed at low temperature in the magnetically ordered phase and is assigned to a magnon. The second one persits far into the paramagnetic phase and exhibits both an electric and a magnetic activity at slightly different energies. This magnetoelectric excitation is interpreted in terms of atomic rotations and requires a helical electric polarization

Éducation Relative À L’Environnement Dans Les Établissements Secondaires Publics Du District D’Abidjan

La problématique de l’environnement a aujourd’hui totalement investi toutes les préoccupations mondiales. Cette révolution culturelle débute dans les années 1970 avec la prise de conscience écologique. Pour résoudre ces problèmes environnementaux, l’un des moyens est la pratique de l’éducation environnement. Cette étude vise à mettre en lumière les facteurs qui limitent l’adoption d’un comportement environnemental chez les élèves des établissements secondaires publics du district autonome d’Abidjan. Une approche mixte mobilisant les techniques et outils de collecte de données sociologiques dans les lycées modernes d’Abobo, de Cocody, de Port-Bouët et de Yopougon-Andokoi, a permis d’identifier les représentations sociales et les pratiques environnementales des acteurs chargés des questions environnementales de la direction de la vie scolaire et des établissements, de mettre en évidence les stratégies de gestion environnementale mises en œuvre et de décrire le processus de construction de la conscience environnementale des acteurs (élèves et personnels administratifs) autour de la question de l’environnement. Après analyse, il ressort que les représentations sociales que se font les acteurs, les pratiques environnementales et la conscience qu’ils construisent autour de l’environnement ne permettent pas l’adoption d’un comportement écocitoyen chez les élèves des établissements secondaires publics du district d’Abidjan

The Relationship of Ecosystem Services Valuation, Protection and Distribution with the Polluter-Pays Principle and the Provider-Gets Principle

This paper discusses the environmental, economic and social aspects of ecosystem services (ES) and their interactions with the polluter-pays principle and the provider-gets principle. The paper ends with observations concerning the theoretical and practical relationship of those principles with ES and Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) programs. ES have attracted increasing interest through PES as a mechanism which translates external, non-market values of the environment into real financial incentives for local actors to provide ES. The PES approach has inspired new incentives, innovative financing for ecosystem protection. The PES seeks to internalize what would otherwise be an externality. Here, we will observe two principles whose characteristics could relate to those of ES. As a principle which makes the responsible of a polluting activity bearing the cost of pollution, the polluter-pays principle has internalizing, redistributive, preventive and curative functions that combine economic, social and environmental objectives. This makes this principle an available tool for directing sustainable activities. However, sustainable activities could also result in increased environmental quality. In relation to that, the provider-gets principle has been formulated. This principle aims to reward the provider of sustainable activities and needs the description of a desired environmental quality to determinate how much ES are delivered and how they would be compensated. Both principles promote ES protection by means of taxes on pollution or the provision of ES. The provider-gets principle is closer than the polluter- pays principle to ecosystem protection. The polluter-pays principle could be important as an incentive to minimize ecosystem damage through a constraint pollution cost. The polluter-pays principle seeks the right price of an environmental resource through the internalization of the pollution cost of a resource into its price. The interaction of this principle with the ES valuation would depend on the certainty of the internalization of the environmental resource service price into the price of the resource where this service comes from. The counterbalance of ES delivered to rewarded credits inherent to the provider-gets principle confirms its relationship with the ES valuation. There are still uncertainties regarding the rewarded fee as this depends on issues such as consent of parties and the applied law in a PES contract. The social aim of the polluter-pays principle consists of the redistribution of the internalized externality in the community. The internalized pollution costs are, in principle, equally disseminated through public actions for the common interest. The provider-gets principle distributes fees from the ES user to the ES provider and purely environmental benefits to the community depended of ES. We could observe that those two principles could theoretically interact with ES. The provider-gets principle works in practice as PES programs. The polluter-pays principle could complete, PES programs where they are not applied, as an incentive against ecosystem damage and thus , could reduce leakage. Both principles could complementary function with /in PES programs