PRIVATIZING MARKETS FOR HETEROGENEOUS, EXPERIENCE GOODS: COFFEE IN NORTHWEST CAMEROON

Reform and privatization of administratively controlled marketing parastatals is always a thorny issue. Reform of public coffee parastatals is one of the most fascinating-and trickiest-exercises in free-market development. Coffee, a heterogenous, experience good, undergoes several processing stages with imperfect quality control, leading to agency problems. Successful privatization must address these problems. This paper analyzes the reform and partial privatization of the North West Cooperative Association (NWCA) parastatal in Cameroon. A conceptual, principal-agent framework informs the analysis. In an interesting twist, the reforms structured the marketing chain so that farmers are the residual claimants to profits from international sales, in effect making them the principals. As is suggested by the conceptual framework, empirical work confirms that farmers as principals have reinvested in coffee quality. However, the evidence also shows that agency problems still exist at later stages of the marketing chain. This is consistent with the principal-agent framework, since incentive-compatible contracts are not used in this marketing chain. The paper concludes by drawing more general lessons about how incomplete information and incentive structure issues arising from imperfect markets might be handled within the context of market liberalization.Marketing,

PRIVATIZING MARKETS FOR HETEROGENOUS, EXPERIENCE GOODS: COFFEE IN NORTHWEST CAMEROON

Reform and privatization of administratively controlled marketing parastatals is always a thorny issue. Reform of public coffee parastatals is one of the most fascinating and trickiest exercises in free-market development. Coffee, a heterogenous, experience good, undergoes several processing stages with imperfect quality control, leading to agency problems. Successful privatization must address these problems. This paper analyzes the reform and partial privatization of the North West Cooperative Association (NWCA) parastatal in Cameroon. A conceptual, principal-agent framework informs the analysis. In an interesting twist, the reforms structured the marketing chain so that farmers are the residual claimants to profits from international sales, in effect making them the principals. As is suggested by the conceptual framework, empirical work confirms that farmers as principals have reinvested in coffee quality. However, the evidence also shows that agency problems still exist at later stages of the marketing chain. This is consistent with the principal-agent framework, since incentive-compatible contracts are not used in this marketing chain. The paper concludes by drawing more general lessons about how incomplete information and incentive structure issues arising from imperfect markets might be handled within the context of market liberalization.Marketing,

Controlling Marangoni induced instabilities in spin-cast polymer films: how to prepare uniform films

In both research and industrial settings spin coating is extensively used to prepare highly uniform thin polymer films. However, under certain conditions, spin coating results in films with non-uniform surface morphologies. Although the spin coating process has been extensively studied, the origin of these morphologies is not fully understood and the formation of non-uniform spincast films remains a practical problem. Here we report on experiments demonstrating that the formation of surface instabilities during spin coating is dependent on temperature. Our results suggest that non-uniform spincast films form as a result of the Marangoni effect, which describes flow due to surface tension gradients. We find that both the wavelength and amplitude of the pattern increase with temperature. Finally, and most important from a practical viewpoint, the non-uniformities in the film thickness can be entirely avoided simply by lowering the spin coating temperature.Comment: 8 pages, 6 figures. electronic supplementary material: 3 pages, 4 figure