New and old social risks in Korean social policy: the case of the National Pension Scheme

This is a study of old and new social risks in Korean social policy, in relation to the National Pension Scheme (NPS). It provides a comprehensive overview of the Korean pension structure and the emergence of new social risk groups. Based on the Korean Labour and Income Panel Study undertaken over eleven years and using bivariate and multivariate analysis, this thesis examines the effectiveness of the NPS and its reforms in protecting new social risk groups. The analytical framework of this thesis is based on the New Social Risk theory. Its limitation in explaining developing welfare states like Korea is also highlighted. Over the past two decades, the NPS has undergone dramatic financial cuts as its coverage expands rapidly. Given Korea’s aging population, the reliance on such public schemes will further increase, which will have a profound impact particularly, on those with low income. Societal and economic changes in the Korean society, as a result of de-industrialisation, have given rise to new social risks groups that differ from those that predominate in the post-war welfare era. These new groups are vulnerable because they cannot afford to contribute to their pension even during their working life with the likelihood that they will have little or no benefit from the NPS when they retire. They tend to be the atypical contract holders and workers of small-scale enterprises without unions. Contrary to expectation, women with care responsibility and young workers are less vulnerable

Discretion in accounting for pensions under IAS 19: using the ‘magic telescope’?

We use a panel data set of UK-listed companies over the period 2005 to 2009 to analyse the actuarial assumptions used to value pension plan liabilities under IAS 19. The valuation process requires companies to make assumptions about financial and demographic variables, notably discount rate, price inflation, salary inflation, and mortality/life expectancy of plan members/beneficiaries. We use regression analysis to analyse the relationships between these key assumptions (except mortality, where disclosures are limited) and company-specific factors such as the pension plan funding position and duration of pension liabilities. We find evidence of selective ‘management’ of the three assumptions investigated, although the nature of this appears to differ from the findings of US authors. We conclude that IAS 19 does not prevent the use of managerial discretion, particularly by companies whose pension plan funding positions are weak, thereby reducing the representational faithfulness of the reported pension figures. We also highlight that the degree of discretion used reflects the extent to which IAS 19 defines how the assumptions are to be determined. We therefore suggest that companies should be encouraged to justify more explicitly their choice of assumptions

Sharing Longevity Risk: Why Governments Should Issue Longevity Bonds

Government-issued longevity bonds would allow longevity risk to be shared efficiently and fairly between generations. In exchange for paying a longevity risk premium, the current generation of retirees can look to future generations to hedge their systematic longevity risk. Longevity bonds will lead to a more secure pension savings market, together with a more efficient annuity market. By issuing longevity bonds, governments can aid the establishment of reliable longevity indices and key price points on the longevity risk term structure and help the emerging capital market in longevity-linked instruments to build on this term structure with liquid longevity derivatives

Pension Insurance Data Book 2001

[Excerpt] The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) was established by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to ensure that participants in defined benefit pension plans receive their pensions if their plans terminate without sufficient assets to pay promised benefits. PBGC administers separate insurance programs to protect participants in single-employer and multiemployer plans. PBGC has published the Pension Insurance Data Book annually since 1996 to present detailed statistics on PBGC program operations and benefit protection. In addition to tabular presentations of current and historical data on PBGC’s single-employer and multiemployer pension insurance programs, this edition features graphics illustrating selected current data and trends in PBGC operations and in the U.S. private pension universe insured by PBGC. A number of tables in this Data Book are based on data from the 1999 Form 5500. Problems with the processing of these forms resulted in incomplete data. When data were missing, we substituted data from the 1998 Form 5500

Poster Regarding Senator Langer\u27s Old Age Pension Plan

Undated broadside in support of Senator William Langer\u27s old age pension plan. North Dakota Governor John Moses and State Senator Arthur Fowler are both identified as not being supportive of the plan. The poster was published by members of the Old Age Pension Committee: Langer, O.E. (Oscar) Erickson, and P.G. Head.https://commons.und.edu/langer-papers/1078/thumbnail.jp

Pension Insurance Data Book 2003

[Excerpt] The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) was established by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to ensure that participants in defined benefit pension plans receive their pensions if their plans terminate without sufficient assets to pay promised benefits. PBGC administers separate insurance programs to protect participants in single-employer and multiemployer plans. PBGC has published the Pension Insurance Data Book annually since 1996 to present detailed statistics on PBGC program operations and benefit protection. This edition of the Pension Insurance Data Book has been expanded and the order of the tables has been revised. Tables related to PBGC’s claims experience have been added to provide more historical data on the number and size of claims by the year the plans terminated, the funding levels in the plans at termination, and the size of the plans at termination. Tables related to people receiving benefits from PBGC have also been added to provide payment data separately for retired participants and beneficiaries of deceased participants. A “table listing key” at the end of this book will assist those familiar with the table numbers in older editions of the Pension Insurance Data Book in finding the relevant table(s) in this edition. The Data Book tables are available in electronic form on PBGC’s Web site at www.pbgc.gov/publications/databook

Pension Insurance Data Book 2004

[Excerpt] The Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) was established by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 to ensure that participants in defined benefit pension plans receive their pensions if their plans terminate without sufficient assets to pay promised benefits. PBGC administers separate insurance programs to protect participants in single-employer and multiemployer plans. PBGC has published the Pension Insurance Data Book annually since 1996 to present detailed statistics on PBGC program operations and benefit protection. This edition of the Pension Insurance Data Book has been expanded and the order of the tables has been slightly revised. Tables related to the growing number of plans using hybrid benefit formulas have been added to provide more data on this significant trend in retirement benefits. A “table listing key” at the end of this book will assist those familiar with the table numbers in the 2003 edition of the Pension Insurance Data Book in finding the relevant table(s) in this edition. The Data Book tables are available in electronic form on PBGC’s Web site at www.pbgc.gov/publications/databook

Pension Insurance Data Book 1998 - Graphic Supplement

1998databook_supplement.pdf: 51 downloads, before Oct. 1, 2020