Sharing Longevity Risk: Why Governments Should Issue Longevity Bonds

Government-issued longevity bonds would allow longevity risk to be shared efficiently and fairly between generations. In exchange for paying a longevity risk premium, the current generation of retirees can look to future generations to hedge their systematic longevity risk. Longevity bonds will lead to a more secure pension savings market, together with a more efficient annuity market. By issuing longevity bonds, governments can aid the establishment of reliable longevity indices and key price points on the longevity risk term structure and help the emerging capital market in longevity-linked instruments to build on this term structure with liquid longevity derivatives

Discretion in accounting for pensions under IAS 19: using the ‘magic telescope’?

We use a panel data set of UK-listed companies over the period 2005 to 2009 to analyse the actuarial assumptions used to value pension plan liabilities under IAS 19. The valuation process requires companies to make assumptions about financial and demographic variables, notably discount rate, price inflation, salary inflation, and mortality/life expectancy of plan members/beneficiaries. We use regression analysis to analyse the relationships between these key assumptions (except mortality, where disclosures are limited) and company-specific factors such as the pension plan funding position and duration of pension liabilities. We find evidence of selective ‘management’ of the three assumptions investigated, although the nature of this appears to differ from the findings of US authors. We conclude that IAS 19 does not prevent the use of managerial discretion, particularly by companies whose pension plan funding positions are weak, thereby reducing the representational faithfulness of the reported pension figures. We also highlight that the degree of discretion used reflects the extent to which IAS 19 defines how the assumptions are to be determined. We therefore suggest that companies should be encouraged to justify more explicitly their choice of assumptions

Pension scheme trustees as surrogate decision makers

Pension trustees make surrogate decisions on behalf of scheme members. However, prior research has not explored how this might affect pension adequacy. Our results show that when setting targets for pension replacement income, trustees project their own preferences instead of reflecting member preferences. Furthermore, projection was more pronounced for trustees with lower financial literacy. Trustees choose significantly higher pension replacement rates for members than members choose for themselves. Trustees also choose replacement rates higher than current benchmarks. The economic consequences are potentially considerable, due to high levels of pension contributions and incompatible risk-taking. A better understanding of the dynamics of decisions made by trustees is needed to ensure better member outcomes