Towards Network Games with Social Preferences

Many distributed systems can be modeled as network games: a collection of selfish players that communicate in order to maximize their individual utilities. The performance of such games can be evaluated through the costs of the system equilibria: the system states in which no player can increase her utility by unilaterally changing her behavior. However, assuming that all players are selfish and in particular that all players have the same utility function may not always be appropriate. Hence, several extensions to incorporate also altruistic and malicious behavior in addition to selfishness have been proposed over the last years. In this paper, we seek to go one step further and study arbitrary relationships between participants. In particular, we introduce the notion of the social range matrix and explore the effects of the social range matrix on the equilibria in a network game. In order to derive concrete results, we propose a simplistic network creation game that captures the effect of social relationships among players.Comment: 12 page

Reconfigurable Lattice Agreement and Applications

Reconfiguration is one of the central mechanisms in distributed systems. Due to failures and connectivity disruptions, the very set of service replicas (or servers) and their roles in the computation may have to be reconfigured over time. To provide the desired level of consistency and availability to applications running on top of these servers, the clients of the service should be able to reach some form of agreement on the system configuration. We observe that this agreement is naturally captured via a lattice partial order on the system states. We propose an asynchronous implementation of reconfigurable lattice agreement that implies elegant reconfigurable versions of a large class of lattice abstract data types, such as max-registers and conflict detectors, as well as popular distributed programming abstractions, such as atomic snapshot and commit-adopt