The scope of thermodynamics

This thesis investigates the application of the laws of thermodynamics to various sub-systems of the universe. I begin by distinguishing between three different second laws: orthodox, statistical and probabilistic. After suggesting that entropy is best understood in means-relative terms, I then show that this interpretation does not imply an epistemic understanding of thermodynamics, pace Jaynes. I conclude the discussion of phenomenological thermodynamics by arguing that thermodynamics can properly be applied to systems containing only a single particle, given the right circumstances. Next I discuss thermodynamics in the context of black holes, and examine the question of whether black hole entropy is genuine thermodynamic entropy, as opposed merely to information-theoretic entropy. I examine the original arguments by Bekenstein and Hawking, and conclude that these are unsatisfactory, but I go on to demonstrate that black holes ought to be considered to be genuine thermodynamic objects by constructing a black hole Carnot cycle. The third chapter investigates thermodynamics in the quantum realm and begins by discussing a recent argument by Hemmo and Shenker against the identification of the von Neumann entropy with the thermodynamic entropy. Their argument is shown to be flawed as it a) allows for a violation of the second law and b) is based on an incorrect calculation of the entropy. I continue by providing a derivation of the laws of thermodynamics from quantum mechanics and a few phenomenological assumptions. This approach is then compared to so-called resource theories of thermodynamics and to single-shot thermodynamics. I end my discussion of quantum thermodynamics with the analysis of an argument made by Cabello et al., who claim that thermodynamics allows for the derivation of an empirical difference between two important classes of quantum interpretation. I provide a counterexample to this claim and show that the alleged heat cost is fully accounted for in the external agent

Human Autonomy at Risk? An Analysis of the Challenges from AI

Autonomy is a core value that is deeply entrenched in the moral, legal, and political practices of many societies. The development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) have raised new questions about AI’s impacts on human autonomy. However, systematic assessments of these impacts are still rare and often held on a case-by-case basis. In this article, I provide a conceptual framework that both ties together seemingly disjoint issues about human autonomy, as well as highlights differences between them. In the first part, I distinguish between distinct concerns that are currently addressed under the umbrella term ‘human autonomy’. In particular, I show how differentiating between autonomy-as-authenticity and autonomy-as-agency helps us to pinpoint separate challenges from AI deployment. Some of these challenges are already well-known (e.g. online manipulation or limitation of freedom), whereas others have received much less attention (e.g. adaptive preference formation). In the second part, I address the different roles AI systems can assume in the context of autonomy. In particular, I differentiate between AI systems taking on agential roles and AI systems being used as tools. I conclude that while there is no ‘silver bullet’ to address concerns about human autonomy, considering its various dimensions can help us to systematically address the associated risks

On the thermodynamical cost of some interpretations of quantum theory

Recently, Cabello et al. (2016) claim to have proven the existence of an empirically verifiable difference between two broad classes of quantum interpretations. On the basis of three seemingly uncontentious assumptions, (i) the possibility of randomly selected measurements, (ii) the finiteness of a quantum system's memory, and (iii) the validity of Landauer's principle, and further, by applying computational mechanics to quantum processes, the authors arrive at the conclusion that some quantum interpretations (including central realist interpretations) are associated with an excess heat cost and are thereby untenable—or at least—that they can be distinguished empirically from their competitors by measuring the heat produced. Here, we provide an explicit counterexample to this claim and demonstrate that their surprising result can be traced back to a lack of distinction between system and external agent. By drawing the distinction carefully, we show that the resulting heat cost is fully accounted for in the external agent, thereby restoring the tenability of the quantum interpretations in question

AI & Agency

In July of 2019, at the Summer Institute on AI and Society in Edmonton, Canada (co-sponsored by CIFAR and the AI Pulse Project of UCLA Law), scholars from across disciplines came together in an intensive workshop. For the second half of the workshop, the cohort split into smaller working groups to delve into specific topics related to AI and Society.I proposed deeper exploration on the topic of “agency,” which is defined differently across domains and cultures, and relates to many of the topics of discussion in AI ethics, including responsibility and accountability. It is also the subject of an ongoing art and research project I’m producing. As a group, we looked at definitions of agency across fields, found paradoxes and incongruities, shared our own questions, and produced a visual map of the conceptual space. We decided that our disparate perspectives were better articulated through a collection of short written pieces, presented as a set, rather than a singular essay on the topic. The outputs of this work are shared here.This set of essays, many of which are framed as provocations, suggests that there remain many open questions, and inconsistent assumptions on the topic. Many of the writings include more questions than answers, encouraging readers to revisit their own beliefs about agency. As we further develop AI systems, and refer to humans and non-humans as “agents”– we will benefit from a better understanding of what we mean when we call something an “agent” or claim that an action involves “agency.” This work is under development and many of us will continue to explore this in our ongoing AI work.  – Sarah Newman, Project Lead, August 201

Is Thermodynamics Subjective?

Thermodynamics is an unusual theory. Prominent figures, including J. C. Maxwell and E. T. Jaynes, have suggested that thermodynamics is anthropocentric, and contemporary approaches label thermodynamics a “subjective theory.” Here, we evaluate the arguments for anthropocentrism but conclude that instead of pointing to an anthropocentric view, they point towards a resource-relative understanding of thermodynamics which can be shorn of the “subjective gloss.

Is There a Trade-Off Between Human Autonomy and the ‘Autonomy’ of AI Systems?

Autonomy is often considered a core value of Western society that is deeply entrenched in moral, legal, and political practices. The development and deployment of artificial intelligence (AI) systems to perform a wide variety of tasks has raised new questions about how AI may affect human autonomy. Numerous guidelines on the responsible development of AI now emphasise the need for human autonomy to be protected. In some cases, this need is linked to the emergence of increasingly ‘autonomous’ AI systems that can perform tasks without human control or supervision. Do such ‘autonomous’ systems pose a risk to our own human autonomy? In this article, I address the question of a trade-off between human autonomy and system ‘autonomy’