Chains of large gaps between primes

Let $p_n$ denote the $n$-th prime, and for any $k \geq 1$ and sufficiently large $X$, define the quantity $$G_k(X) := \max_{p_{n+k} \leq X} \min( p_{n+1}-p_n, \dots, p_{n+k}-p_{n+k-1} ),$$ which measures the occurrence of chains of $k$ consecutive large gaps of primes. Recently, with Green and Konyagin, the authors showed that $$G_1(X) \gg \frac{\log X \log \log X\log\log\log\log X}{\log \log \log X}$$ for sufficiently large $X$. In this note, we combine the arguments in that paper with the Maier matrix method to show that $$G_k(X) \gg \frac{1}{k^2} \frac{\log X \log \log X\log\log\log\log X}{\log \log \log X}$$ for any fixed $k$ and sufficiently large $X$. The implied constant is effective and independent of $k$.Comment: 16 pages, no figure

Close-Range Photogrammetric Measurement of Static Deflections for an Aeroelastic Supercritical Wing

Close range photogrammetric measurements were made for the lower wing surface of a full span aspect ratio 10.3 aeroelastic supercritical research wing. The measurements were made during wind tunnel tests for quasi-steady pressure distributions on the wing. The tests were conducted in the NASA Langley Transonic Dynamics Tunnel at Mach numbers up to 0.90 and dynamic pressures up to 300 pounds per square foot. Deflection data were obtained for 57 locations on the wing lower surface using dual non-metric cameras. Representative data are presented as graphical overview to show variations and trends of spar deflection with test variables. Comparative data are presented for photogrammetric and cathetometric results of measurements for the wing tip deflections. A tabulation of the basic measurements is presented in a supplement to this report

Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata revisited: evolution of cooperation under environmental pressure

We propose an extension of the evolutionary Prisoner's Dilemma cellular automata, introduced by Nowak and May \cite{nm92}, in which the pressure of the environment is taken into account. This is implemented by requiring that individuals need to collect a minimum score $U_{min}$, representing indispensable resources (nutrients, energy, money, etc.) to prosper in this environment. So the agents, instead of evolving just by adopting the behaviour of the most successful neighbour (who got $U^{msn}$), also take into account if $U^{msn}$ is above or below the threshold $U_{min}$. If $U^{msn}<U_{min}$ an individual has a probability of adopting the opposite behaviour from the one used by its most successful neighbour. This modification allows the evolution of cooperation for payoffs for which defection was the rule (as it happens, for example, when the sucker's payoff is much worse than the punishment for mutual defection). We also analyse a more sophisticated version of this model in which the selective rule is supplemented with a "win-stay, lose-shift" criterion. The cluster structure is analyzed and, for this more complex version we found power-law scaling for a restricted region in the parameter space.Comment: 15 pages, 8 figures; added figures and revised tex

Proton lifetime bounds from chirally symmetric lattice QCD

We present results for the matrix elements relevant for proton decay in Grand Unified Theories (GUTs). The calculation is performed at a fixed lattice spacing a^{-1}=1.73(3) GeV using 2+1 flavors of domain wall fermions on lattices of size 16^3\times32 and 24^3\times64 with a fifth dimension of length 16. We use the indirect method which relies on an effective field theory description of proton decay, where we need to estimate the low energy constants, \alpha = -0.0112(25) GeV^3 and \beta = 0.0120(26) GeV^3. We relate these low energy constants to the proton decay matrix elements using leading order chiral perturbation theory. These can then be combined with experimental bounds on the proton lifetime to bound parameters of individual GUTs.Comment: 17 pages, 9 Figure

The normalization of sibling violence: Does gender and personal experience of violence influence perceptions of physical assault against siblings?

Despite its pervasive and detrimental nature, sibling violence (SV) remains marginalized as a harmless and inconsequential form of familial aggression. The present study investigates the extent to which perceptions of SV differ from those of other types of interpersonal violence. A total of 605 respondents (197 males, 408 females) read one of four hypothetical physical assault scenarios that varied according to perpetrator–victim relationship type (i.e., sibling vs. dating partner vs. peer vs. stranger) before completing a series of 24 attribution items. Respondents also reported on their own experiences of interpersonal violence during childhood. Exploratory factor analysis reduced 23 attribution items to three internally reliable factors reflecting perceived assault severity, victim culpability, and victim resistance ratings. A 4 × 2 MANCOVA—controlling for respondent age—revealed several significant effects. Overall, males deemed the assault less severe and the victim more culpable than did females. In addition, the sibling assault was deemed less severe compared to assault on either a dating partner or a stranger, with the victim of SV rated just as culpable as the victim of dating, peer, or stranger-perpetrated violence. Finally, respondents with more (frequent) experiences of childhood SV victimization perceived the hypothetical SV assault as being less severe, and victim more culpable, than respondents with no SV victimization. Results are discussed in the context of SV normalization. Methodological limitations and applications for current findings are also outlined

Aspiring to the fittest and promotion of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game

Strategy changes are an essential part of evolutionary games. Here we introduce a simple rule that, depending on the value of a single parameter $w$, influences the selection of players that are considered as potential sources of the new strategy. For positive $w$ players with high payoffs will be considered more likely, while for negative $w$ the opposite holds. Setting $w$ equal to zero returns the frequently adopted random selection of the opponent. We find that increasing the probability of adopting the strategy from the fittest player within reach, i.e. setting $w$ positive, promotes the evolution of cooperation. The robustness of this observation is tested against different levels of uncertainty in the strategy adoption process and for different interaction network. Since the evolution to widespread defection is tightly associated with cooperators having a lower fitness than defectors, the fact that positive values of $w$ facilitate cooperation is quite surprising. We show that the results can be explained by means of a negative feedback effect that increases the vulnerability of defectors although initially increasing their survivability. Moreover, we demonstrate that the introduction of $w$ effectively alters the interaction network and thus also the impact of uncertainty by strategy adoptions on the evolution of cooperation.Comment: 7 two-column pages, 5 figures; accepted for publication in Physical Review

Domain-Wall Energies and Magnetization of the Two-Dimensional Random-Bond Ising Model

We study ground-state properties of the two-dimensional random-bond Ising model with couplings having a concentration $p\in[0,1]$ of antiferromagnetic and $(1-p)$ of ferromagnetic bonds. We apply an exact matching algorithm which enables us the study of systems with linear dimension $L$ up to 700. We study the behavior of the domain-wall energies and of the magnetization. We find that the paramagnet-ferromagnet transition occurs at $p_c \sim 0.103$ compared to the concentration $p_n\sim 0.109$ at the Nishimory point, which means that the phase diagram of the model exhibits a reentrance. Furthermore, we find no indications for an (intermediate) spin-glass ordering at finite temperature.Comment: 7 pages, 12 figures, revTe