"System, power, and European monetary integration"

[From the Introduction]. Theories of international relations and comparative politics characterize the movement within Western Europe toward monetary integration primarily in regional terms. The global context within which European monetary integration is taking place is viewed in this literature as having little influence or influence which is only episodic, momentary, or ancillary to other, more primary forces. Regional political integration, regional economic interdependence, sectoral interests within European countries, and strategies of national executives and central bankers are instead given primary emphasis. This article argues, by contrast, that the international system has provided strong incentives for and greatly affected European monetary integration. Changes in and unpredictability of international monetary policies of the United States, in particular, have pushed European governments toward regional monetary integration at several critical historical junctures. Indeed, all of the major successes in monetary integration were closely, and causally, associated with transatlantic monetary conflict and the decline or weakness of the international monetary regime

Congress, Treasury, and the Accountability of Exchange Rate Policy: How the 1988 Trade Act Should Be Reformed

The controversy within the United States over Chinese exchange rate policy has generated a series of legislative proposals to restrict the discretion of the Treasury Department in determining currency manipulation and to reform the department’s accountability to Congress. This paper reviews Treasury’s reports to Congress on exchange rate policy—introduced by the 1988 Trade Act—and Congress’s treatment of them. It finds that the accountability process has often not worked well in practice: The reports provide only a partial basis for effective congressional oversight. For its part, Congress held hearings on less than half of the reports and overlooked some important substantive issues. Several recommendations can improve guidance to the Treasury, standards for assessment, and congressional oversight. These include (1) refining the criteria used to determine currency manipulation and writing them into law, (2) explicitly harnessing US decisions on manipulation to the International Monetary Fund’s rules on exchange rates, (3) clarifying the general objectives of US exchange rate policy, (4) reaffirming the mandate to seek international macroeconomic and currency cooperation, (5) requiring Treasury to lead an executivewide policy review, and (6) institutionalizing multicommittee oversight of exchange rate policy by Congress. Legislators should strengthen reporting and oversight of broader exchange rate policy in addition to strengthening the provisions targeting manipulation.Exchange rate policy, currency manipulation, accountability, congressional oversight, China,Treasury, International Monetary Fund

US Interests and the International Monetary Fund

The US Congress is now considering legislation to approve President Obama's pledge, made at the G-20 London summit in April, to increase the US commitment to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). This pledge is part of a collective effort by the G-20 leaders to triple the resources available to the IMF so that it can better respond to the ongoing global economic crisis. To this end, President Obama has submitted a four-part package to Congress for approval. The package would increase the US quota contribution to the IMF by about $8 billion, raise an emergency line of credit for the Fund by nearly$100 billion, endorse the IMF's plan to endow an investment fund through sales of some of its gold reserves in order to provide for its operational expenses, and approve a special allocation of the IMF's synthetic reserve asset, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). C. Randall Henning analyzes the politics and policy merits of the IMF legislation before Congress through a discussion of the IMF's role in the international monetary system, its relationship to US interests, and the congressional record of past IMF legislation. He argues that the present financial troubles have only increased the need for strong US support of the Fund. The IMF reflects the economic policy interests of the United States more faithfully than perhaps any other international institution and congressional action should reflect this basic convergence of interest. Failure to support the IMF now would not only hamper global and US recovery from the current crisis, but it would also undermine US influence, both within the IMF and in international relations generally.

Gravity in the Randall-Sundrum Brane World

We discuss the weak gravitational field created by isolated matter sources in the Randall-Sundrum brane-world. In the case of two branes of opposite tension, linearized Brans-Dicke (BD) gravity is recovered on either wall, with different BD parameters. On the wall with positive tension the BD parameter is larger than 3000 provided that the separation between walls is larger than 4 times the AdS radius. For the wall of negative tension, the BD parameter is always negative but greater than -3/2. In either case, shadow matter from the other wall gravitates upon us. For equal Newtonian mass, light deflection from shadow matter is 25 % weaker than from ordinary matter. Hence, the effective mass of a clustered object containing shadow dark matter would be underestimated if naively measured through its lensing effect. For the case of a single wall of positive tension, Einstein gravity is recovered on the wall to leading order, and if the source is stationary the field stays localized near the wall. We calculate the leading Kaluza-Klein corrections to the linearized gravitational field of a non-relativistic spherical object and find that the metric is different from the Schwarzschild solution at large distances. We believe that our linearized solution corresponds to the field far from the horizon after gravitational collapse of matter on the brane.Comment: 8 pages, 1 figure. Replaced with revised version to be published in Phys. Rev. Lett. Some comments adde