Reading Remedially: What Does King v. Burwell Teach Us About Modern Statutory Interpretation, and Can It Help Solve the Problems of CERCLA 113(h)?

In the latter half of the twentieth century, Congress drafted a law to solve a problem. As decades passed, that problem became increasingly complex. In the new millennium, Congress became increasingly polarized, and increasingly unproductive. 3 In the face of that inaction, the executive branch decided to rely on a provision of that earlier law to address a modern facet of that earlier problem. Or litigants decided to ask a court to rely on a provision of that earlier law to address a modern facet of that earlier problem. The Congress that drafted the law might not have understood this modern application, the law\u27s legislative history might be vague and confusing, and this modern interpretation might have important consequences for the overall evil that the earlier law was meant to remedy. What\u27s a court to do? This issue-what to do when the broad purpose of the law is evident, but the applicability in a particular scenario is less than clear is an increasing problem that the Supreme Court will address in coming terms. An example of seemingly clear purpose in the midst of confusing legislative history confronted the Court in King v. Burwell. King is a striking example of this issue because the litigation did not revolve around an obscure provision of a decades-old law, but rather on an obscure provision of a less-than-a-decade old law. Yet the contentious nature of modern legislating still left a confused record regarding the applicability of a particular provision and left the Court with a choice: effectuate the broad purpose of the law, or hold the drafters to their words. This Note will address this issue through the lens of a topic less controversial than the Affordable Care Act: an obscure jurisdiction stripping provision of the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act ( CERCLA ). Specifically, this Note will propose that judges read a word entirely out of CERCLA, just a the Court read four words out of the Affordable Care Act. In doing so, this Note will highlight, and question, three possible reasons for such a drastic remedial reading: (1) that Congress has failed to fix the statute and, as such, judges must do so; (2) that judges should read statutes differently when presented with a major question ; and (3) that judges should employ such drastic remedial reading when the intent of the legislature is particularly clear

Locations of Primary, Secondary, and Post Secondary Education in Downeast Maine

Washington and Hancock counties in Maine contain a variety of education institutions. This map shows locations of secondary educational facilities, and post secondary educational facilities. It also shows township boundaries and major highways

Factors Influencing EPA Sites Along the Hudson River

The Hudson River is under constant environmental threat from the cities located along its shores. In this project I looked at EPA monitored sites (including sites covered by Superfund) along the Hudson River and their relationships with dam location and urban density. By examining the number of EPA sites in relation to these two environmental factors, we can see if some sites are under substantially more risk than others. My goal in this study was to determine the importance of the relationships between dam density, urban presence, and EPA monitored toxic sites using GIS

Clinical Observations of Bone and Joint Diseases in Horses

Bone and joint diseases in the horse, as observed by the veterinary clinician, assume many forms frequently producing signs of lameness. The bones or joints of the limbs are most commonly affected and many factors which operate either singly or collectively produce the lesions observed

The Ambiguity and Unfairness of Dismissing Bad Writing

Courts routinely choose to explicitly dismiss arguments and issues raised by parties, regardless of their merit, based on unexplained determinations that the briefing was bad. This practice, which I call abandonment by poor presentation, is sometimes justified by practicality, by pointing to federal and local rules, by waiver and forfeiture doctrines, and by the norm of party presentation. None of these justifications hold water. I contend that the real reason judges find abandonment by poor presentation is agenda control: judges rely on the practice as a means of retaining control over how they decide cases. This unexplained, poorly justified, and subjective practice creates a number of problems for litigants and the law. I propose a simple solution: judges should stop finding abandonment by poor presentation. As common as the practice is, it actually serves little purpose and can easily be avoided