HYBRIDITY, LAWFARE, AND UNLAWFARE IN THE MARITIME DOMAIN

On November 13, 2023, Dr. Ian Ralby presented Hybridity, Lawfare and Unlawfare in the Maritime Domain for this year’s West Coast Security Conference. The presentation was followed by a question-and-answer period with questions from the audience and CASIS Vancouver executives. The key points discussed were the strategic importance of the maritime domain, usage of hybrid maritime aggression by international antagonists such as China, Iran, and Russia, and strategies for countering these tactics.   Received: 01-14-2024 Revised: 01-26-202

Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea: Prospects and Challenges, by Kamal-Deen Ali

In Maritime Security Cooperation in the Gulf of Guinea, the legal adviser to the Ghana Navy, Commander Dr. Kamal-Deen Ali, argues that the world should pay attention to the maritime domain of West and Central Africa. The same argument can be made about his book, as Ali not only provides the most in-depth analysis of maritime security prospects and challenges in the Gulf of Guinea to date but offers conceptual frameworks for maritime security that are applicable around the world. Furthermore, the lessons that can be extracted from the Gulf of Guinea experience—both the problems of insecurity and the efforts to address them—can serve as helpful guidance for approaching similar challenges elsewhere

Wyrd, Wisdom, And Warriors: Heroic Sapience In Medieval Germanic Epics

This dissertation examines the nature of wisdom in medieval Germanic epics, and how this wisdom characterizes epic heroes. Germanic heroes of legend and those destined to rule a people or kingdom were expected to be both wise and brave; but the notion of what constituted wisdom was different in each of the three main surviving Germanic languages and cultures of the Middle Ages: Old English, Old Norse, and Middle High German. This dissertation examines the major epics from each of these three linguistic/cultural groups: Beowulf in Old English, Völsunga saga in Old Norse, and the Nibelungenlied in Middle High German. A chapter on Old English and Old Norse sapiential poetry—and its relation to the epics under consideration—is also included. Beowulf demonstrates his wisdom through formal speeches, combative dialogues, provision and reception of counsel, and his proverbial knowledge; but the fundamental aspect of Beowulf’s wisdom is his resignation to fate. Völsunga saga emphasizes Sigurðr’s quests for wisdom, presenting a more complex web of components comprising this wisdom: the ability to question, proverbial and mythological knowledge, the ability to answer or give counsel, and a gift of foresight or prophecy. As in Beowulf, however, the most important component remains resignation to fate. The Old English and Old Norse wisdom poems reflect the notions of wisdom presented in Beowulf and Völsunga saga, but the higher power to which one must resign is expressly God, never wyrd or even death. The interplay of social spheres in the Nibelungenlied influences the expression of heroic wisdom, of which the most important aspect seems the ability to negotiate the complexities of the courtly or mythological worlds. But Hagen, the central figure of wisdom, also demonstrates a fearlessness and resignation to fate and death unparalleled by any other character. While the Nibelungenlied presents different social structures and ideals to Beowulf or Völsunga saga—and therefore different perceptions of wisdom—the significance of resignation in characterizing heroic wisdom remains common to all of these texts

Private Military Companies and the <i>Jus Ad Bellum</i>

Abstract This chapter examines the use of private military companies (PMCs) to deal with international armed conflicts and the prohibition of the use of force in relation to such entities. It considers the jus ad bellum implications of private military contracting in international law and international relations. The chapter explains what PMCs are and what they do, drawing a distinction between mercenaries and various terms used to refer to private companies hired by states in lieu of armed forces. It presents case studies where PMCs have engaged in prohibited or lawful use of force at the behest of a state, or where they may be used by a state in situations that run counter to jus ad bellum. Three real-world examples are highlighted. The chapter concludes by assessing the implications of using PMCs in armed conflicts for state responsibility with respect to the prohibition on the use of force.</jats:p

Gold Flows from Venezuela: Supporting due diligence on the production and trade of gold in Venezuela

As highlighted by the Financial Action Task Force, gold is a preferred medium for illicit finance (FATF, 2015; 2021). It is highly valuable, portable and capable of holding its value even during significant market shocks in markets around the world. As an element, it is very difficult to trace through chemical analysis. It can be reshaped in myriad ways, or literally blended into anonymity. Perhaps most importantly, gold is not intrinsically illicit, so it can be laundered easily into legitimate supply chains, contributing to the greying of local, national and regional economies, and even the global financial system. In this context, gold flows from the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela (hereafter “Venezuela”) present serious challenges. Since the nationalisation of Venezuela’s mining industry in 2011, criminals of various kinds have encroached on the country’s gold mining sector. In the five years since the 2016 decree establishing the Orinoco Mining Arc (AMO) in the south of Venezuela, gold mining has expanded beyond the confines of the AMO. Over the same period, the volumes of gold flows out of the country have only grown in scale. The risks linked with those flows extend beyond human rights abuses and environmental destruction and include criminal economies linked with various forms of trafficking and money laundering, as well as the financing of terrorism. While it is extremely difficult to estimate gold production in Venezuela, processing capacity and reporting suggest that it could conceivably amount to as much as 75 t per year; as of July 2021, the market value of that production would exceed USD 4.4 billion (United States Dollars). Research suggests that actual current production throughout Venezuela amounts to a third to half that amount. Gold flows within Venezuela can be categorized under two broad headings: centralised and dispersed. In a rough metaphor, the centralised flows run to the tap, while the dispersed flows are the plumbing leaks. The centralised flows carry a portion of production from the country’s myriad small mining operations – there is no large-scale mining currently in Venezuela – to the government-monitored trading hubs in cities such as El Callao, where some is purchased by buyers representing Venezuelan elites. These flows also include the substantial and expanding trucking of gold sands and other crude material from shuttered and operational mines as well as alluvial deposits to cyanidation plants in Bolívar state. The production from those facilities appears to be divided between the Central Bank of Venezuela (BCV) and politically exposed persons (PEPs). While centralised flows of gold out of Venezuela might be considered legal, it is still necessary to carry out enhanced due diligence to ascertain whether conditions of extraction and trade are associated with actual or potential risks of severe human rights abuses, conflict financing and other financial crimes as per Annex II of the OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas (“OECD Guidance”), as well as environmental harm. In contrast, dispersed flows are those that leave the country from mining areas by various other routes. The Venezuelan military and political elites, Colombian militant groups, and domestic gangs are reported to be key actors in both categories of domestic gold flows. While centralised flows reportedly include gold transfers from the BCV to foreign governments and other entities in Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Iran and elsewhere, transnational dispersed flows reportedly benefit a wider and more overtly criminal range of 8 | GOLD FLOWS FROM VENEZUELA © OECD 2021 actors, including criminal cartels, Colombian grupos armados organizados (GAOs) and designated terrorist organizations. Gold from dispersed flows departing Venezuela appears to be laundered primarily within the Latin America and Caribbean (LAC) region, mainly in one or more key regional transit hubs. Currently, these have been identified as Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Brazil, Suriname, Guyana and Panama, and some reports of potential laundering elsewhere in Central American and in Mexico. Laundering networks can, however, extend across the globe and actors connected with Europe, the United States, the People’s Republic of China (hereafter “China”), the Middle East and possibly West Africa have also been implicated. Reports suggest that some gold laundering may involve informal value transfer systems that reach the Middle East and China. As pointed out by this and other reports, all risks listed in Annex II of the OECD Guidance are reported to be prevalent across supply chains of gold from Venezuela. Companies sourcing gold need to determine whether they purchase, handle, process or transport gold associated with any red flags linked to country of origin or transit, suppliers or other circumstances listed in the OECD Guidance to make sure they do not contribute to human rights abuses, conflict financing or financial crimes. Existing regulations and industry due diligence programmes have thus far been inadequate for ensuring due diligence is carried out on Venezuelan gold flows – making it likely that international purchases of Venezuelan gold may be contributing to abuses linked to Annex II risks. In addition to increasing regulatory consistency and implementation across legal regimes on due diligence for minerals in key mineral importing, transit and exporting jurisdictions, internal silos need to be dismantled. In particular, closer and more sustained collaboration between financial regulators including financial intelligence units and industry actors would allow for better detection of the links between gold flows and illicit financial flows (IFFs). The resulting picture is revealing but also preliminary, as more research is needed, including on a detailed mapping of gold flows from Venezuela, the illicit financial flows linked with that gold, and the ensuing risks for and responsibilities of actors connected with these gold supply chains. While this report is hence intended to provide only a baseline assessment, its preliminary findings already reveal areas in which further analytical work is necessary. The role of the maritime space in high-risk gold flows needs more attention; so does the role played by Free Trade Zones (FTZs) in facilitating gold flows and related financial crimes

Private military and security companies in the uncharted spaces of the law

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Wealth blindness beyond national jurisdiction

Marine genetic resources (MGR) are a new issue in high seas management. Discussion on how to best manage these resources is currently ongoing at the United Nations, within the context of a proposed treaty on the conservation and sustainable use of marine ‘Biodiversity Beyond National Jurisdiction’ (BBNJ), which is expected to be completed in 2020.But how accurately can states measure the potential economic value of resources that still do not have a clear market application? Developing states in particular already suffer from wealth blindness, where they lack the capacity to properly evaluate the economic value or market potential of their marine resources. This article explores the extent to which wealth blindness forms the backdrop to the current debates over the potential for profitably exploiting marine genetic resources, as well as how this relates to demands for capacity building and technology transfer in the BBNJ treaty negotiation process