11 research outputs found

    A New Perspective on the Judicial Contempt Power: Recommendations for Reform

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    Advocacy and Contempt: Constitutional Limitations on the Judicial Contempt Power. Part One: The Conflict Between Advocacy and Contempt

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    The courts\u27 inherent power to punish misconduct that interferes with the judicial process as criminal contempt often conflicts with attorneys\u27 first amendment and due process rights, and their clients\u27 sixth amendment rights to vigorous legal representation. In balancing these competing interests, the Supreme Court has employed seemingly diverse standards to demarcate the constitutional limitations on the substantive scope of the contempt power. Professor Raveson argues that the Constitution should limit the contempt power so that it may only be used to punish actual obstructions of the administration of justice. He maintains that because the goals of our system of justice are frequently in opposition, the appropriate dividing line between permissible advocacy and obstruction can be drawn only by balancing the various goals of a trial in a way that maximizes the value of these interests to the system of justice as a whole. The proper balance, in turn, can only be achieved by including within the calculus of contempt recognition of the actual experiences of trial participants. Professor Raveson concludes that appropriate consideration of the value of advocacy to the processes of justice requires that advocacy sometimes be permitted to interfere with competing aims of a trial. Realization of the full value of advocacy and maximization of the various goals of our trial system require that a buffer zone be constructed surrounding valuable advocacy to afford adequate protection from punishment and to diminish deterrence

    Advocacy and Contempt—Part Two: Charting the Boundaries of Contempt: Ensuring Adequate Breathing Room for Advocacy

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    Professor Raveson previously argued that the Constitution limits the contempt power to the punishment of actual obstructions of the administration of justice. In this Article, he maintains that any standard for defining contempt that is less restrictive than actual obstruction or the imminent threat of obstruction would be unconstitutionally overbroad. In addition, Professor Raveson discusses the inevitable imprecision that inheres even in the actual obstruction standard for contempt. He explains that the appropriate division between permissible advocacy and contempt must reflect a balance between the frequently conflicting goals of a trial in order to maximize the value of these interests to the system of justice as a whole. Finally, Professor Raveson suggests a number of variables that can assist to define and balance these competing interests, as well as provide greater certainty to the bench and bar in determining whether particular conduct is contemptuous

    Unmasking the Motives of Government Decisionmakers: A Subpoena for Your Thoughts

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