Signaling By Choice Of Evaluation

We consider an individual's choice whether to be evaluated. Separating signaling equilibria can arise when individuals are risk averse, even if the cost of evaluation is zero for all.

The use of relative priorities in optimizing the performance of a queueing system

Relative priorities in an n-class queueing system can reduce server and customer costs. This property is demonstrated in a single server Markovian model where the goal is to minimize a non-linear cost function of class expected waiting times. Special attention is given to minimizing server’s costs when the expected waiting time of each class is restricted

The Choice of When to Buy and When To Sell

A consumer who wants to consume a good at a particular period may nevertheless attempt to buy it earlier if he is concerned that the good will otherwise be sold. We analyze the behavior of consumers in equilibrium and the price a profit-maximizing firm would charge. We show that a firm profits by not selling early. If, however, the firm is obligated to also offer the good early, then the firm may maximize profits by setting a price which induces consumers to all arrive early, or all arrive late, depending on the good's value to the customer