Interlanguage Signs and Lexical Transfer Errors

A theory of interlanguage (IL) lexicons is outlined, with emphasis on IL lexical entries, based on the HPSG notion of lexical sign. This theory accounts for idiosyncratic or lexical transfer of syntactic subcategorisation and idioms from the first language to the IL. It also accounts for developmental stages in IL lexical grammar, and grammatical variation in the use of the same lexical item. The theory offers a tool for robust parsing of lexical transfer errors and diagnosis of such errors.Comment: Paper presented at COLING-94. 4 pages, Postscrip

Pre-Supernova Outbursts via Wave Heating in Massive Stars II: Hydrogen-poor Stars

Pre-supernova (SN) outbursts from massive stars may be driven by hydrodynamical wave energy emerging from the core of the progenitor star during late nuclear burning phases. Here, we examine the effects of wave heating in stars containing little or no hydrogen, i.e., progenitors of type IIb/Ib SNe. Because there is no massive hydrogen envelope, wave energy is thermalized near the stellar surface where the overlying atmospheric mass is small but the optical depth is large. Wave energy can thus unbind this material, driving an optically thick, super-Eddington wind. Using 1D hydodynamic MESA simulations of $\sim \! 5 \, M_\odot$ He stars, we find that wave heating can drive pre-SN outbursts composed of a dense wind whose mass loss rate can exceed $\sim \! 0.1 \, M_\odot/{\rm yr}$. The wind terminal velocities are a few $100 \, {\rm km}/{\rm s}$, and outburst luminosities can reach $\sim \! 10^6 \, L_\odot$. Wave-driven outbursts may be linked with observed or inferred pre-SN outbursts of type Ibn/transitional/transformational SNe, and pre-SN wave-driven mass loss is a good candidate to produce these types of SNe. However, we also show that non-linear wave breaking in the core of the star may prevent such outbursts in stars with thick convective helium-burning shells. Hence, only a limited subset of SN progenitors are likely to experience wave-driven pre-SN outbursts.Comment: Accepted to MNRA

Effects of Asymmetric Payoffs and Information Cost in Sequential Information Revelation Games

This paper explores the effects of costly information and asymmetry in reward and penalty on an agent's strategic behavior in acquiring and revealing information. Whether information is costly to acquire or not, in order to induce truthfulness in an agent's action, the penalty should not be stressed more than the reward to avoid herding or imitation. When the reward is greater than the penalty, if information is not costly, for the relatively low quality of information, the agent exhibits anti-herding. However, an equilibrium -- in which she acts truthfully for all parameters of information quality -- can be induced by managing the reward and penalty. If information is costly, within certain parameter sets of information quality, the agent exhibits deviation and imitation. Also, for the moderate quality of information, the agent acquires her information although it is costly and reveals it truthfully. The derived results can provide the reasoning behind agents' behavior trends in information revelation according to reputation and the difficulty of a given task.Asymmetry in reward and penalty, Information Cost, Truthfulness in information revelation, Herding, Anti-Herding, Imitation, Deviation

The current state of E-commerce in Jordan: Applicability and future prospects

This study aimed at determining the current state of e-commerce in Jordan, as well as its future prospects. The research population consisted of all Jordanian industrial, service and/or trade companies that have a registered website. The population size was 712 companies. A total of 118 questionnaires were distributed to randomly selected companies and 95 were returned. Cronbach alpha measure was used to test the reliability of the organizational questionnaire and was calculated to be 0.80 reflecting stability and consistency of the scale and indicating the goodness of the measure. Other statistical tests were used to test the research hypotheses such as One-Sample t-test, Independent-Samples t-test, One-Way ANOVA, Chi-Square and Bivariate Correlations (Pearson). The research indicated that Jordan has adequate and efficient e-commerce requirements in general, but there is no suitable and appropriate Community Culture in order to reach E-commerce Readiness Stage. Some recommendations are then made based on research findings

Strategic Disclosure of Valuable Information within Competitive Environments

Can valuable information be disclosed intentionally by the informed agent even within a competitive environment? In this article, we bring our interest into the asymmetry in reward and penalty in the payoff structure and explore its effects on the strategic disclosure of valuable information. According to our results, the asymmetry in reward and penalty is a necessary condition for the disclosure of valuable information. This asymmetry also decides which quality of information is revealed for which incentive; if the penalty is larger than the reward or the reward is weakly larger than the penalty, there exists an equilibrium in which only a low quality type of information is revealed, in order to induce imitation. On the other hand, if the reward is sufficiently larger than the penalty, there exist equilibria in which either all types or only high quality type of information is revealed, in order to induce deviation. The evaluation of the equilibrium in terms of expected payoff yields that the equilibrium where valuable information is disclosed strategically dominates the equilibrium where it is concealed.

Strategic Behavior, Truthfulness and Welfare of Waiting Option in the Duopoly Forecasting Announcement Market

In this paper, we discuss the possibility of strategic behavior and truthful reporting in a two players' announcement game when there is a cost for getting information. First we show that the best strategy of each player is to announce the observed signal truthfully if the announcement is made simultaneously. Second we show that if the order of announcement is given exogenously, the player who moves first reports her information truthfully always. But the best strategy of the player who moves later depends on the information cost, the belief in the information quality and payoffs. Also we discuss what is a good scheme to induce player who moves later to observe her signal and announce truthfully. Finally, we discuss about the welfare of using the waiting option in an endogenous ordering. We show that player can be better off in terms of ex-ante compared to the simultaneous announcement case even if she uses the waiting option for delaying her decision. This is a interesting result because the possibility of waiting option is usually understood as a main reason to make player worse-off compared to the simultaneous movement case. The conditions under which each player can be better off or worse off from using the option are explained. Some results of the experiments that support our model are denoted. Some assertions in this paper can be used as an alternative explanation for the phenomenon of the coincidence or discrepancy in the sovereign credit rating or corporate credit rating market by professional analysts and the reputation marketsStrategic imitation and deviation, Optimality of waiting option, Positive and Negative Penguin effect