ARE ART AUCTION ESTIMATES BIASED? (forthcoming Southern Economic Journal: http://journal.southerneconomic.org/doi/abs

ABSTRACT This paper considers whether pre-sale auction estimates are unbiased predictors of price when "no-sales" are considered utilizing a newly constructed sample of over 500 works by eight early 20 th century American artists. Unbiased pre-sale auction estimates in predicting price, while expected, are generally not supported in previous work, but these studies (excepting one) do not include no-sales in the calculations. In order to study the question we employ a standard approach that uses an inverse Mills ration arising from a sample selection probit, as suggested by We find that controlling for selection bias, pre-sale auction estimates appear to be biased downward and we offer possible reasons for this result

ARE ART AUCTION ESTIMATES BIASED?

ABSTRACT This paper considers whether pre-sale auction estimates are unbiased predictors of price when "no-sales" are considered utilizing a newly constructed sample of over 500 works by eight early 20 th century American artists. Unbiased pre-sale auction estimates in predicting price, while expected, are generally not supported in previous work, but these studies (excepting one) do not include no-sales in the calculations. In order to study the question we employ a standard approach that uses an inverse Mills ration arising from a sample selection probit, as suggested by We find that controlling for selection bias, pre-sale auction estimates appear to be biased downward and we offer possible reasons for this result

The Logic of Natural Monopoly Regulation

The authors explain why the elementary logic of rate-of-return regulation generates not the competitive outcome but the monopoly outcome. Within the framework of the "passive regulator" that this logic entails, public regulation cannot alter the monopoly outcome, but can only change the form in which the monopoly rent is captured. The authors also explain why it is essentially no different even if the regulator is an "active regulator," who does not passively allow as costs all that the monopolist declares to be costs.Monopoly; Regulation

Crystal Structure of PrgI-SipD: Insight into a Secretion Competent State of the Type Three Secretion System Needle Tip and its Interaction with Host Ligands

Many infectious Gram-negative bacteria, including Salmonella typhimurium, require a Type Three Secretion System (T3SS) to translocate virulence factors into host cells. The T3SS consists of a membrane protein complex and an extracellular needle together that form a continuous channel. Regulated secretion of virulence factors requires the presence of SipD at the T3SS needle tip in S. typhimurium. Here we report three-dimensional structures of individual SipD, SipD in fusion with the needle subunit PrgI, and of SipD:PrgI in complex with the bile salt, deoxycholate. Assembly of the complex involves major conformational changes in both SipD and PrgI. This rearrangement is mediated via a π bulge in the central SipD helix and is stabilized by conserved amino acids that may allow for specificity in the assembly and composition of the tip proteins. Five copies each of the needle subunit PrgI and SipD form the T3SS needle tip complex. Using surface plasmon resonance spectroscopy and crystal structure analysis we found that the T3SS needle tip complex binds deoxycholate with micromolar affinity via a cleft formed at the SipD:PrgI interface. In the structure-based three-dimensional model of the T3SS needle tip, the bound deoxycholate faces the host membrane. Recently, binding of SipD with bile salts present in the gut was shown to impede bacterial infection. Binding of bile salts to the SipD:PrgI interface in this particular arrangement may thus inhibit the T3SS function. The structures presented in this study provide insight into the open state of the T3SS needle tip. Our findings present the atomic details of the T3SS arrangement occurring at the pathogen-host interface

The constitutional dilemma of European integration

The paper analyzes European integration from a constitutional economics perspective. It is argued that the use of the Prisoners' Dilemma as a description of the advantages of European integration is fallacious. If the situation is a PD, the solution is impossible; if it is not, it is unnecessary

Is a Federal European Constitution for an Enlarged European Union Necessary? Some Preliminary Suggestions Using Public Choice Analysis

In order to guarantee a further successful functioning of the enlarged European Union a Federal European Constitution is proposed. Six basic elements of a future European federal constitution are developed: the European commission should be turned into an European government and the European legislation should consist of a two chamber system with full responsibility over all federal items. Three further key elements are the subsidiarity principle, federalism and the secession right, which are best suited to limiting the domain of the central European authority to which certain tasks are given, such as defense, foreign and environmental policy. Another important feature is direct democracy, which provides the possibility for European voters to participate actively in the political decision making, to break political and interest group cartels, and to prevent an unwanted shifting of responsibilities from EU member states to the European federal level