Puesta en práctica de una asignatura de alimentación en formacíon inicial del profesorado.

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Ranking de Portales Estatales de Transparencia 2015

La transparencia y rendición de cuentas han adquirido cada vez más importancia en México. No sólo por que ahora contamos con leyes y organismos encargados de observar el avance en la implementación de estas nuevas políticas, sino por que este año nuestro país encabeza el grupo internacional de la Alianza para el Gobierno Abierto. El ejemplo mexicano atraerá muchas miradas y colocará en el centro de la discusión sus nuevas prácticas y las decisiones políticas para impulsar proyectos de transparencia y gobierno abierto en la región

Concepciones sobre el trabajo práctico de campo (TPC): una aproximación al pensamiento de los futuros profesores.

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El Diseño de Intermediarios Financieros Exitosos: Evidencia de Indonesia

The success (outreach and sustainability) of eight rural financial intermediation systems in Indonesia, in profitably reaching large numbers of small individual clients, is explained in terms of organizational design. Networks of semi-autonomous writs use local information and contract enforcement mechanisms to lower transaction costs. Reflecting basic concerns with institutional and financial viability, elements of mechanism design have included compatible incentives such as performance-based compensations (profit sharing, collection fees), efficiency wages (equivalent to quasi-equity), and system monitoring; managerial discretion over transactions conducted at market terms, policies to protect portfolio value, and no dependency creating subsidies are important. Interventions have been appropriate for the problem at hand

The Design of Successful Rural Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from Indonesia

This paper examines the high degree of success of several systems of rural financial intermediaries in Indonesia, in terms both of self-sustainability and outreach. These systems have provided credit and deposit services, profitably and at low transaction costs, to large numbers of very small individual clients. This generalized success reflects both a hospitable environment for financial intermediation and, particularly, the elements of an effective organizational design, in reflection of an underlying concern with institutional viability. This design bas provided both the incentives and opportunities for successful behavior. The provision of financial services to marginal clientele depends on the solution of the paradox resulting from those agents with inexpensive access to information and monitoring mechanisms not having enough resources or being too risk averse to locally provide sufficient credit, while those with the resources have no access to the required information and contract enforcement tools. Regulatory constraints may make this situation worse. The design of Indonesian locally-operated financial institutions offers a solution to this paradox. Character-based lending that relies on local agents is comparatively inexpensive. With the recruitment of local agents for lending, however, the information/enforcement problem becomes an agency problem. In Indonesia, the solution has been a system of compatible incentives (performance-based remunerations and efficiency wages), coupled with the verification of profits. In practice, managers have been made co-owners. This requires that managers possess discretionary powers over performance-relevant variables. Thus, no loan targeting exists and financial policies, while not uniform, have been adequate to protect institutional viability. The one-time subsidies implicit in seed capital and start-up loans to these intermediaries have not created dependency on outside funds, while the extent of the interventions bas been proportional to the magnitude of the problems to be solved, rather than being massive undertakings with large fixed-cost structures. Gradual growth, by trial and error, bas been a good approach to institution building. These organizations have been credibly committed to collect loans, while borrowers have pledged their (valuable) reputation as collateral. Traditional hierarchical structures (village chief) have been used for contract enforcement. The chief may also be operating as an indigenous credit rating agency. The lessons learned in Indonesia shed light on successful institution building elsewhere

Principles of Regulation and Prudential Supervision: Should They Be Different for Microenterprise Finance Organizations?

This paper offers the microenterprise development community a discussion of general principles of financial intermediary regulation and prudential supervision as well as an evaluation of how these issues are relevant for microenterprise finance organizations. Regulation, financial repression, prudential regulation, financial intermediary supervision, and internal control are defined first. A clear distinction among these concepts in critical for the analysis. The rationale for the regulation of depository financial institutions is provided next. The importance of a well-functioning payments system is not a sufficient reason for government regulation of financial markets. Opportunistic behavior on the part of depository institutions that results in excessive risks and instability, asymmetric information and moral hazard, and the associated negative externalities are at the core of the rationale for regulation. Consumer protection issues, in the presence of market failure, and conditions for the successful enforcement of financial contracts are emphasized. Regulation is desirable because, in the case of financial markets, preventive action is more cost-effective than remedial interventions. There are no standardized rules for optimum regulation. The authors propose seven regulatory "commandments," including competitive neutrality, minimum cost, specific objectives, incentive compatibility, and flexibility. Recognition of idiosyncratic risks is critical. Among frequently adopted instruments of prudential regulation described are the role of lender of last resort, deposit insurance, licensing, capital adequacy requirements, prohibition of loans to insiders, diversification rules, admissible activities, and enforcement powers. Preventive regulation is distinguished from protective regulation. Five supervision "commandments" are also proposed. Off-site and on-site methodologies for supervision are evaluated. Typical risks (credit, interest rate, liquidity, fraud) are described. Sui generis risks such as subsidy-dependence and donor-intrusion are added to traditional lists of risk. Difficulties of generalization for microenterprise finance organizations are discussed

Los establecimientos científicos de la ciudad de México vistos por viajeros, 1821-1855

Los distintos diarios y memorias de viajeros que recorrieron la ciudad de México durante la primera mitad del siglo XIX, 1821-1855, son una valiosa fuente para la historia de la práctica científica en los primeros años de vida del México independiente. ElThe different diaries and memories of travelers who visited the city of Mexico during first half of century XIX, 1821-1855, are a valuable source for the history of the scientific practice in the first years of life of independent Mexico. The developmen