Consensus Emerging from the Bottom-up: the Role of Cognitive Variables in Opinion Dynamics

The study of opinions $-$ e.g., their formation and change, and their effects on our society $-$ by means of theoretical and numerical models has been one of the main goals of sociophysics until now, but it is one of the defining topics addressed by social psychology and complexity science. Despite the flourishing of different models and theories, several key questions still remain unanswered. The aim of this paper is to provide a cognitively grounded computational model of opinions in which they are described as mental representations and defined in terms of distinctive mental features. We also define how these representations change dynamically through different processes, describing the interplay between mental and social dynamics of opinions. We present two versions of the model, one with discrete opinions (voter model-like), and one with continuous ones (Deffuant-like). By means of numerical simulations, we compare the behaviour of our cognitive model with the classical sociophysical models, and we identify interesting differences in the dynamics of consensus for each of the models considered.Comment: 14 pages, 8 figure

Repage: REPutation and ImAGE Among Limited Autonomous Partners

This paper introduces Repage, a computational system that adopts a cognitive theory of reputation. We propose a fundamental difference between image and reputation, which suggests a way out from the paradox of sociality, i.e. the trade-off between agents' autonomy and their need to adapt to social environment. On one hand, agents are autonomous if they select partners based on their social evaluations (images). On the other, they need to update evaluations by taking into account others'. Hence, social evaluations must circulate and be represented as "reported evaluations" (reputation), before and in order for agents to decide whether to accept them or not. To represent this level of cognitive detail in artificial agents' design, there is a need for a specialised subsystem, which we are in the course of developing for the public domain. In the paper, after a short presentation of the cognitive theory of reputation and its motivations, we describe the implementation of Repage.Reputation, Agent Systems, Cognitive Design, Fuzzy Evaluation

Gossip for social control in natural and artificial societies

In this work we propose a theory of gossip as a means for social control. Exercising social control roughly means to isolate and to punish cheaters. However, punishment is costly and it inevitably implies the problem of second-order cooperation. Moving from a cognitive model of gossip, we report data from ethnographic studies and agent-based simulations to support our claim that gossip reduces the costs of social control without lowering its efficacy

How Social Norms Can Make the World More Regular and Better

Is there any difference between social norms and mere regularities emerging spontaneously from the behaviours of entities that have no norm-based cognition? And if so, which effects do we expect to observe in a world in which agents are endowed with such a type of cognition? The agent-based simulations presented here are aimed to understand what would happen in a world populated by normative agents, able to recognize norms and to reason upon them, compared to other, cognitively, less complex agents, following only their own individual goals

A convention or (tacit) agreement betwixt us: on reliance and its normative consequences

The aim of this paper is to clarify what kind of normativity characterizes a convention. First, we argue that conventions have normative consequences because they always involve a form of trust and reliance.We contend that it is by reference to a moral principle impinging on these aspects (i.e. the principle of Reliability) that interpersonal obligations and rights originate from conventional regularities. Second, we argue that the system of mutual expectations presupposed by conventions is a source of agreements. Agreements stemming from conventions are "tacit" in the sense that they are implicated by what agents do (or forbear from doing) and without that any communication between them is necessary. To justify this conclusion, we assume that: (1) there is a salient interpretation, in some contexts, of everyone\u27s silence as confirmatory of the others\u27 expectations (an epistemic assumption), and (2) the participating agents share a value of not being motivated by hostile attitudes (a motivational assumption). By clarifying the relation between conventions and agreements, the peculiar normativity of conventions is analyzed

Reputation

In this chapter, the role of reputation as a distributed instrument for social order is addressed. A short review of the state of the art will show the role of reputation in promoting (a) social control in cooperative contexts - like social groups and subgroups - and (b) partner selection in competitive contexts, like (e-) markets and industrial districts. In the initial section, current mechanisms of reputation - be they applied to electronic markets or MAS - will be shown to have poor theoretical backgrounds, missing almost completely the cognitive and social properties of the phenomenon under study. In the rest of the chapter a social cognitive model of reputation developed in the last decade by some of the authors will be presented. Its simulation-based applications to the theoretical study of norm-abiding behaviour, partner selection and to the refinement and improvement of current reputation mechanisms will be discussed. Final remarks and ideas for future research will conclude the chapte

From anarchy to monopoly : how competition and protection shaped mafia's behavior

Mafia-like organizations are highly dynamic and organized criminal groups characterized by their extortive activities that impact societies and economies in different modes and magnitudes. This renders the understanding of how these organizations evolved an objective of both scientific and applicationoriented interests. We propose an agent-based simulation model - the Extortion Racket System model - aimed at understanding the factors and processes explaining the successful settlement of the Sicilian Mafia in Southern Italy, and which may more generally account for the transition from an anarchical situation of uncoordinated extortion to a monopolistic social order. Our results show that in situations of anarchy, these organizations do not last long. This indicates that a monopolistic situation shall be preferred over anarchical ones. Competition is a necessary and sufficient condition for the emergence of a monopolistic situation. However, when competition is combined with protection, the resulting monopolistic regime presents features that make it even more preferable and sustainable for the targets

Emergence In the Loop: Simulating the two way dynamics of norm innovation

In this paper we will present the EMIL project, "EMergence In the Loop: Simulating the two-way dynamics of norm innovation", a three-year project funded by the European Commission (Sixth Framework Programme -Information Society and Technologies) in the framework of the initiative "Simulating Emergent Properties in Complex Systems". The EMIL project intends to contribute to the study of social complex systems by modelling norm innovation as a phenomenon implying interrelationships among multiple levels. It shall endeavour to point out that social dynamics in societies of intelligent agents is necessarily bi-directional, which adds complexity to the emergence processes. The micro-macro link will be modelled and observed in the emergence of properties at the macro-level and their immergence into the micro-level units. The main scientific aim of the EMIL project is to construct a simulator for exploring and experimenting norm-innovation

Punishment and Gossip: Sustaining Cooperation in a Public Goods Game

In an environment in which free-riders are better off than cooperators, social control is required to foster and maintain coopera- tion. There are two main paths through which social control can be ap- plied: punishment and reputation. Our experiments explore the efficacy of punishment and reputation on cooperation rates, both in isolation and in combination. Using a Public Goods Game, we are interested in assessing how cooperation rates change when agents can play one of two different reactive strategies, i.e., they can pay a cost in order to reduce the payoff of free-riders, or they can know others\u27 reputation and then either play defect with free-riders, or refuse to interact with them. Co- operation is maintained at a high level through punishment, but also reputation-based partner selection proves effective in maintaining coop- eration. However, when agents are informed about free-riders\u27 reputation and play Defect, cooperation decreases. Finally, a combination of punish- ment and reputation-based partner selection leads to higher cooperation rates