Difference-making grounds

We define a notion of difference-making for partial grounds of a fact in rough analogy to existing notions of difference-making for causes of an event. Using orthodox assumptions about ground, we show that it induces a non-trivial division with examples of partial grounds on both sides. We then demonstrate the theoretical fruitfulness of the notion by applying it to the analysis of a certain kind of putative counter-example to the transitivity of ground recently described by Jonathan Schaffer. First, we show that our conceptual apparatus of difference-making enables us to give a much clearer description than Schaffer does of what makes the relevant instances of transitivity appear problematic. Second, we suggest that difference-making is best seen as a mark of good grounding-based explanations rather than a necessary condition on grounding, and argue that this enables us to deal with the counter-example in a satisfactory way. Along the way, we show that Schaffer's own proposal for salvaging a form of transitivity by moving to a contrastive conception of ground is unsuccessful. We conclude by sketching some natural strategies for extending our proposal to a more comprehensive account of grounding-based explanations

Bolzano's Notion of Grounding and the Classical Model of Science

Betti, A. [Promotor]Jong, W.R. de [Copromotor

Metaphysical explanations and the counterfactual theory of explanation

According to an increasingly popular view among philosophers of science, both causal and non-causal explanations can be accounted for by a single theory: the counterfactual theory of explanation. A kind of non-causal explanation that has gained much attention recently but that this theory seems unable to account for are grounding explanations. Reutlinger :239-256, 2017) has argued that, despite these appearances to the contrary, such explanations are covered by his version of the counterfactual theory. His idea is supported by recent work on grounding by Schaffer and Wilson who claim there to be a tight connection between grounding and counterfactual dependence. The present paper evaluates the prospects of the idea. We show that there is only a weak sense in which grounding explanations convey information about counterfactual dependencies, and that this fact cannot plausibly be taken to reveal a distinctive feature that grounding explanations share with other kinds of explanations

Grounding and the explanatory role of generalizations

According to Hempel’s (Aspects of scientific explanation and other essays. The Free Press, New York, 1965) influential theory of explanation, explaining why some a is G consists in showing that the truth that a is G follows from a law-like generalization to the effect that all Fs are G together with the initial condition that a is F. While Hempel’s overall account is now widely considered to be deeply flawed, the idea that some generalizations play the explanatory role that the account predicts is still often endorsed by contemporary philosophers of science. This idea, however, conflicts with widely shared views in metaphysics according to which the generalization that all Fs are G is partially explained by the fact that a is G. I discuss two solutions to this conflict that have been proposed recently, argue that they are unsatisfactory, and offer an alternative

Metaphysical explanations and the counterfactual theory of explanation

According to an increasingly popular view among philosophers of science, both causal and non-causal explanations can be accounted for by a single theory: the counterfactual theory of explanation. A kind of non-causal explanation that has gained much attention recently but that this theory seems unable to account for are grounding explanations. Reutlinger (Eur J Philos Sci 7(2):239-256, 2017) has argued that, despite these appearances to the contrary, such explanations are covered by his version of the counterfactual theory. His idea is supported by recent work on grounding by Schaffer and Wilson who claim there to be a tight connection between grounding and counterfactual dependence. The present paper evaluates the prospects of the idea. We show that there is only a weak sense in which grounding explanations convey information about counterfactual dependencies, and that this fact cannot plausibly be taken to reveal a distinctive feature that grounding explanations share with other kinds of explanations

Performa Reproduksi Kerbau Lumpur Pada Berbagai Paritas Di Kecamatan Batang Anai Kabupaten Padang Pariaman

Penelitian ini bertujuan untuk mengetahui performa reproduksi kerbau lumpur pada berbagai paritas di Kecamatan Batang Anai Kabupaten Padang Pariaman. Penelitian ini menggunakan 89 orang peternak selaku responden dengan kepemilikan 148 ekor kerbau. Metode penelitian ini yaitu metode survei, untuk pengambilan sampel dilakukan dengan cara purposive sampling dengan kriteria ternak kerbau dewasa paritas 2-7. Variabel yang diamati yaitu lama bunting, masa kosong, calving interval, conception rate dan calving rate. Data diperoleh dianalisis secara deskriptif serta di uji menggunakan uji t (lama bunting, masa kosong, calving interval) dan uji chi square (conception rate, calving rate). Hasil penelitian rataan lama bunting tertinggi paritas 7 (11,44±0,53 bulan) dan terendah paritas 2 (10,77±0,42 bulan). Rataan masa kosong tertinggi paritas 7 (8,55±2,46 bulan) dan terendah paritas 2 (5,03±0,36 bulan). Rataan calving interval tertinggi paritas 7 (20±2,6 bulan) dan terendah paritas 2 (15,81±0,52 bulan). Persentase conception rate tertinggi paritas 2 (46,77%) dan terendah paritas 7 (11,11%). Persentase calving rate tertinggi paritas 2 (54,83%) dan terendah paritas 7 (22,22%). Hasil penelitian ini dapat disimpulkan bahwa pada lama bunting paritas 2,3 dan 4 hampir sama tetapi berbeda dengan paritas 5,6 dan 7 serta paritas 4 tidak berbeda dengan paritas 5,6 dan 7. Pada days open dan calving interval paritas 2 dan 3 hampir sama tetapi berbeda dengan paritas 4,5,6 dan 7 sedangkan paritas 4 berbeda dengan paritas 5,6 dan 7. Namun, tidak ada perbedaan berbagai paritas terhadap conception rate dan calving rate. Kata Kunci : calving interval, calving rate, conception rate,lama bunting , masa kosong, paritas

Bolzano and Kim on grounding and unification

It is sometimes mentioned that Bernard Bolzano’s work on grounding anticipates many insights of the current debate on metaphysical grounding. The present paper discusses a certain part of Bolzano’s theory of grounding that has thus far not been discussed in the literature. This part does not so much anticipate what are nowadays common assumptions about grounding, but rather goes beyond them. Central to the discussion will be a thesis of Bolzano’s by which he tries to establish a connection between grounding and (deductive) unification. The paper spells out this thesis in detail and discusses the assumptions on which it rests. Next to this mainly historical aim, the paper also presents reasons why philosophers who are not interested in the historical Bolzano should find the thesis interesting by relating it to a certain view on unification and explanation that has been put forward by Kim. A final part of the paper provides a critical evaluation of the thesis against the background of current accounts of grounding

In defence of explanatory realism

Explanatory realism is the view that explanations work by providing information about relations of productive determination such as causation or grounding. The view has gained considerable popularity in the last decades, especially in the context of metaphysical debates about non-causal explanation. What makes the view particularly attractive is that it fits nicely with the idea that not all explanations are causal whilst avoiding an implausible pluralism about explanation. Another attractive feature of the view is that it allows explanation to be a partially epistemic, context-dependent phenomenon. In spite of its attractiveness, explanatory realism has recently been subject to criticism. In particular, Taylor (Philos Stud 175(1):197–219, 2018). has presented four types of explanation that the view allegedly cannot account for. This paper defends explanatory realism against Taylor’s challenges. We will show that Taylor’s counterexamples are either explanations that turn out to provide information about entities standing in productive determination relations or that they are not genuine explanations in the first place