The Role of the State in Managing and Forestalling Systemic Financial Crises: Some Issues and Perspectives

This paper reviews recent state interventions in financial crises and draws lessons for crisis management. A number of areas are identified where crisis management could be strengthened, including with regard to the tools and instruments used to involve the private sector in crisis resolution (with a view to reducing the recent enhanced role of official bailouts and the associated moral hazard), to allow for the orderly resolution of systemically important financial firms (to make these firms safe to fai), and with regard to achieving better integration with ex ante macroprudential surveillance. The paper proposes the establishment of high level systemic risk councils (SRCs) in each country with responsibility for overseeing systemic risk in both tranquil times and crisis periods and coordinating the activities of key government ministries, agencies, and the central bank

Banking Union as a Shock Absorber

This study investigates the shock-absorbing properties of a banking union by providing a detailed comparison between the way regional financial shocks have been absorbed at the federal level in the US, but have led to severe regional (national) financial dislocation and tensions in the euro area. The extent to which the institutions of the banking union, which is now emerging in the euro area, should increase its capacity to deal with future regional boom and bust cycles is also discussed. Cross-border capital flows in the form of equity appear to be much more stable than those taking the form of credit, especially inter-bank credit. Moreover, credit booms and bust leave a debt overhang and losses can materialise only via insolvencies, whereas equity flows absorb automatically losses in case of a bust and provide the cross border owner with incentives to continue to provide financing. It follows that cross-border banks can absorb regional shocks. But large banks pose the 'too big to fail' problem and they would also propagate regional shocks, especially if they originate in large countries, to the entire area

Prokineticin 2 Regulates the Electrical Activity of Rat Suprachiasmatic Nuclei Neurons

Neuropeptide signaling plays roles in coordinating cellular activities and maintaining robust oscillations within the mammalian suprachiasmatic nucleus (SCN). Prokineticin2 (PK2) is a signaling molecule from the SCN and involves in the generation of circadian locomotor activity. Prokineticin receptor 2 (PKR2), a receptor for PK2, has been shown to be expressed in the SCN. However, very little is known about the cellular action of PK2 within the SCN. In the present study, we investigated the effect of PK2 on spontaneous firing and miniature inhibitory postsynaptic currents (mIPSCs) using whole cell patch-clamp recording in the SCN slices. PK2 dose-dependently increased spontaneous firing rates in most neurons from the dorsal SCN. PK2 acted postsynaptically to reduce γ-aminobutyric acid (GABA)-ergic function within the SCN, and PK2 reduced the amplitude but not frequency of mIPSCs. Furthermore, PK2 also suppressed exogenous GABA-induced currents. And the inhibitory effect of PK2 required PKC activation in the postsynaptic cells. Our data suggest that PK2 could alter cellular activities within the SCN and may influence behavioral and physiological rhythms

Superstar Central Bankers

The personalities of central bankers moved center stage during the recent financial crisis. Some central bankers even gained superstar status. In this paper, we evaluate the pivotal role of superstar central bankers by assessing the difference an outstanding governor makes to economic performance. We employ school grades given to central bankers by the financial press. A superstar central banker is one receiving the top grade. In a probit estimation we first relate the grades to measures of economic performance, institutional features, and personal characteristics. We then employ a nearest neighbor matching approach to identify the central bankers which are closest to those receiving the top grade and compare the economic performance across both groups. The results suggest that a superstar governor indeed matters: a top-graded central banker faces a significantly more favorable output-inflation trade-off than his peers

Bank Leverage Ratios and Financial Stability: A Micro- and Macroprudential Perspective

Bank leverage ratios have made an impressive and largely unopposed return; they are mostly used alongside risk-weighted capital requirements. The reasons for this return are manifold, and they are not limited to the fact that bank equity levels in the wake of the global financial crisis (GFC) were exceptionally thin, necessitating a string of costly bailouts. A number of other factors have been equally important; these include, among others, the world's revulsion with debt following the GFC and the eurozone crisis, and the universal acceptance of Hyman Minsky's insights into the nature of the financial system and its role in the real economy. The best examples of the causal link between excessive debt, asset bubbles, and financial instability are the Spanish and Irish banking crises, which resulted from nothing more sophisticated than straightforward real estate loans. Bank leverage ratios are primarily seen as a microprudential measure that intends to increase bank resilience. Yet in today's environment of excessive liquidity due to very low interest rates and quantitative easing, bank leverage ratios should also be viewed as a key part of the macroprudential framework. In this context, this paper discusses the role of leverage ratios as both microprudential and macroprudential measures. As such, it explains the role of the leverage cycle in causing financial instability and sheds light on the impact of leverage restraints on good bank governance and allocative efficiency