Generalizations of the Sugawara Model

Two generalizations of Sugawara models are discussed. In the first, new interactions are introduced by altering the current commutators but retaining the "free" form of T_(μν), as exemplified by a simple effective π^0 − 2γ interaction, which is compared with the standard triangle-diagram results. The second permits non-quadratic T_(μν), which retain the "algebra" part of the current commutators; these models avoid the Dashen-Frishman parity degeneracy

Inequalities of wealth distribution in a conservative economy

We analyze a conservative market model for the competition among economic agents in a close society. A minimum dynamics ensures that the poorest agent has a chance to improve its economic welfare. After a transient, the system self-organizes into a critical state where the wealth distribution have a minimum threshold, with almost no agent below this poverty line, also, very few extremely rich agents are stable in time. Above the poverty line the distribution follows an exponential behavior. The local solution exhibits a low Gini index, while the mean field solution of the model generates a wealth distribution similar to welfare states like Sweden.Comment: 7 pages, 4 figures, submitted to Physica A, Proceedings of the VIII LAWNP, Salvador, Brazil, 200

'A habitual disposition to the good': on reason, virtue and realism

Amidst the crisis of instrumental reason, a number of contemporary political philosophers including Jürgen Habermas have sought to rescue the project of a reasonable humanism from the twin threats of religious fundamentalism and secular naturalism. In his recent work, Habermas defends a post-metaphysical politics that aims to protect rationality against encroachment while also accommodating religious faith within the public sphere. This paper contends that Habermas’ post-metaphysical project fails to provide a robust alternative either to the double challenge of secular naturalism and religious fundamentalism or to the ruthless instrumentalism that underpins capitalism. By contrast with Habermas and also with the ‘new realism’ of contemporary political philosophers such as Raymond Geuss or Bernard Williams, realism in the tradition of Plato and Aristotle can defend reason against instrumental rationality and blind belief by integrating it with habit, feeling and even faith. Such metaphysical–political realism can help develop a politics of virtue that goes beyond communitarian thinking by emphasising plural modes of association (not merely ‘community’), substantive ties of sympathy and the importance of pursuing goodness and mutual flourishing

Playing Kant at the Court of King Arthur

This article contrasts the sense in which those whom Bernard Williams called ‘political realists’ and John Rawls are committed to the idea that political philosophy has to be distinctively political. Distinguishing the realist critique of political moralism from debates over ideal and non-ideal theory, it is argued that Rawls is more realist than many realists realise, and that realists can learn more about how to make a distinctively political vision of how our life together should be organised from his theorising, although it also points to a worrying tendency among Rawlsians to reach for inappropriately moralised arguments. G. A. Cohen’s advocacy of socialism and the second season of HBO’s The Wire are used as examples to illustrate these points

Education Can Compensate for Society - a Bit

In this paper I reflect on the findings of a number of loosely related research projects undertaken with colleagues over the last ten years. Their common theme is equity, in formal education and beyond, in wider family and social settings, and with inequity expressed as the stratification of a variety of educational outcomes. The projects are based on a standard mixture of pre-existing records, official documents, large-scale surveys, observations, interviews and focus groups. The numeric data were largely used to create biographical models of educational experiences, and the in-depth data were used to try to explain individual decisions and disparities at each stage of the model. Data have been collected for England and Wales, in five other countries of the European Union and for Japan. A meta-view of these various findings suggests that national school intakes tend to be at least moderately segregated by prior attainment and socio-economic factors, and that learning outcomes as assessed by formal means, such as examinations, are heavily stratified by these same factors. There is no convincing evidence that compulsory schooling does very much to overcome the initial disparity in the resources and attainment of school intakes. On the other hand, there are indications that the nature of a national school system and the social experiences of young people in schools can begin to equalise educational outcomes as more widely envisaged, including learning to trust and willingness to help others, aspirations, and attitudes to continuing in education and training. The cost-free implications of the argument in this paper, if accepted, are that everything possible should be done to make school intakes comprehensive, and that explicit consideration, by teachers and leaders, of the applied principles of equity could reduce potentially harmful misunderstandings in educational contexts

Theorising Disability: Beyond Common Sense

This article seeks to introduce the topic of disability to political theory via a discussion of some of the literature produced by disability theorists. The author argues that these more radical approaches conceptualise disability in ways that conflict with ‘common-sense’ notions of disability that tend to underpin political theoretical considerations of the topic. Furthermore, the author suggests that these more radical conceptualisations have profound implications for current debates on social justice, equality and citizenship that highlight the extent to which these notions are also currently underpinned by ‘common-sense’ notions of ‘normality’

Kant, Morality, and Hell

In this paper I argue that, although Kant argues that morality is independent of God (and hence, agrees with the Euthyphro), and rejects Divine Command Theory (or Theological Voluntarism), he believes that all moral duties are also the commands of God, who is a moral being, and who is morally required to punish those who transgress the moral law: "God’s justice is the precise allocation of punishments and rewards in accordance with men’s good or bad behavior." However, since we lack a strict proof of God's existence, we can still fulfill our duties from the motive of duty. if we did know that God exists, then this would undermine our pure moral motivation to do our duty, since we would have an even stronger interest in pleasing God through our good conduct. The effect of undermining our pure moral motivation would be to make us less eligible for divine reward, since God rewards us for doing our duty from the motive of duty

Principles of Stakes Fairness in Sport

Fairness in sport is not just about assigning the top prizes to the worthiest competitors. It is also about the way the prize structure itself is organised. For many sporting competitions, although it may be acceptable for winners to receive more than losers, it can seem unfair for winners to take everything and for losers to get nothing. Yet this insight leaves unanswered some difficult questions about what stakes fairness requires and which principles of stakes fairness are appropriate for particular competitions. In this article I specify a range of different principles of stakes fairness (ten in total) that could regulate sporting competitions. I also put forward a theoretical method for pairing up appropriate principles of stakes fairness with given sporting competitions. Specifically, I argue that the underlying rationales for holding sporting competitions can provide useful guides for identifying appropriate principles of stakes fairness. I then seek to clarify and work through some of the implications of this method for a sample of real world controversies over sporting prize structures. I also attempt to refine the method in response to two possible objections from indeterminacy and relativism. Finally, I compare and contrast my conclusions with more general philosophical debates about justice

Utilitarian Collective Choice and Voting

In his seminal Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth Arrow stated that his theory applies to voting. Many voting theorists have been convinced that, on account of Arrow’s theorem, all voting methods must be seriously flawed. Arrow’s theory is strictly ordinal, the cardinal aggregation of preferences being explicitly rejected. In this paper I point out that all voting methods are cardinal and therefore outside the reach of Arrow’s result. Parallel to Arrow’s ordinal approach, there evolved a consistent cardinal theory of collective choice. This theory, most prominently associated with the work of Harsanyi, continued the older utilitarian tradition in a more formal style. The purpose of this paper is to show that various derivations of utilitarian SWFs can also be used to derive utilitarian voting (UV). By this I mean a voting rule that allows the voter to score each alternative in accordance with a given scale. UV-k indicates a scale with k distinct values. The general theory leaves k to be determined on pragmatic grounds. A (1,0) scale gives approval voting. I prefer the scale (1,0,-1) and refer to the resulting voting rule as evaluative voting. A conclusion of the paper is that the defects of conventional voting methods result not from Arrow’s theorem, but rather from restrictions imposed on voters’ expression of their preferences. The analysis is extended to strategic voting, utilizing a novel set of assumptions regarding voter behavior