Where Two Are Fighting, the Third Wins: Stronger Selection Facilitates Greater Polymorphism in Traits Conferring Competition-Dispersal Tradeoffs

A major conundrum in evolution is that, despite natural selection, polymorphism is still omnipresent in nature: Numerous species exhibit multiple morphs, namely several abundant values of an important trait. Polymorphism is particularly prevalent in asymmetric traits, which are beneficial to their carrier in disruptive competitive interference but at the same time bear disadvantages in other aspects, such as greater mortality or lower fecundity. Here we focus on asymmetric traits in which a better competitor disperses fewer offspring in the absence of competition. We report a general pattern in which polymorphic populations emerge when disruptive selection increases: The stronger the selection, the greater the number of morphs that evolve. This pattern is general and is insensitive to the form of the fitness function. The pattern is somewhat counterintuitive since directional selection is excepted to sharpen the trait distribution and thereby reduce its diversity (but note that similar patterns were suggested in studies that demonstrated increased biodiversity as local selection increases in ecological communities). We explain the underlying mechanism in which stronger selection drives the population towards more competitive values of the trait, which in turn reduces the population density, thereby enabling lesser competitors to stably persist with reduced need to directly compete. Thus, we believe that the pattern is more general and may apply to asymmetric traits more broadly. This robust pattern suggests a comparative, unified explanation to a variety of polymorphic traits in nature.ope

Adaptive Evolution of Cooperation through Darwinian Dynamics in Public Goods Games

The linear or threshold Public Goods game (PGG) is extensively accepted as a paradigmatic model to approach the evolution of cooperation in social dilemmas. Here we explore the significant effect of nonlinearity of the structures of public goods on the evolution of cooperation within the well-mixed population by adopting Darwinian dynamics, which simultaneously consider the evolution of populations and strategies on a continuous adaptive landscape, and extend the concept of evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) as a coalition of strategies that is both convergent-stable and resistant to invasion. Results show (i) that in the linear PGG contributing nothing is an ESS, which contradicts experimental data, (ii) that in the threshold PGG contributing the threshold value is a fragile ESS, which cannot resist the invasion of contributing nothing, and (iii) that there exists a robust ESS of contributing more than half in the sigmoid PGG if the return rate is relatively high. This work reveals the significant effect of the nonlinearity of the structures of public goods on the evolution of cooperation, and suggests that, compared with the linear or threshold PGG, the sigmoid PGG might be a more proper model for the evolution of cooperation within the well-mixed population

Kin Selection and the Evolution of Social Information Use in Animal Conflict

Animals often use social information about conspecifics in making decisions about cooperation and conflict. While the importance of kin selection in the evolution of intraspecific cooperation and conflict is widely acknowledged, few studies have examined how relatedness influences the evolution of social information use. Here we specifically examine how relatedness affects the evolution of a stylised form of social information use known as eavesdropping. Eavesdropping involves individuals escalating conflicts with rivals observed to have lost their last encounter and avoiding fights with those seen to have won. We use a game theoretical model to examine how relatedness affects the evolution of eavesdropping, both when strategies are discrete and when they are continuous or mixed. We show that relatedness influences the evolution of eavesdropping, such that information use peaks at intermediate relatedness. Our study highlights the importance of considering kin selection when exploring the evolution of complex forms of information use

Rapid Transition towards the Division of Labor via Evolution of Developmental Plasticity

A crucial step in several major evolutionary transitions is the division of labor between components of the emerging higher-level evolutionary unit. Examples include the separation of germ and soma in simple multicellular organisms, appearance of multiple cell types and organs in more complex organisms, and emergence of casts in eusocial insects. How the division of labor was achieved in the face of selfishness of lower-level units is controversial. I present a simple mathematical model describing the evolutionary emergence of the division of labor via developmental plasticity starting with a colony of undifferentiated cells and ending with completely differentiated multicellular organisms. I explore how the plausibility and the dynamics of the division of labor depend on its fitness advantage, mutation rate, costs of developmental plasticity, and the colony size. The model shows that the transition to differentiated multicellularity, which has happened many times in the history of life, can be achieved relatively easily. My approach is expandable in a number of directions including the emergence of multiple cell types, complex organs, or casts of eusocial insects

Natural Variation in an ABC Transporter Gene Associated with Seed Size Evolution in Tomato Species

Seed size is a key determinant of evolutionary fitness in plants and is a trait that often undergoes tremendous changes during crop domestication. Seed size is most often quantitatively inherited, and it has been shown that Sw4.1 is one of the most significant quantitative trait loci (QTLs) underlying the evolution of seed size in the genus Solanum—especially in species related to the cultivated tomato. Using a combination of genetic, developmental, molecular, and transgenic techniques, we have pinpointed the cause of the Sw4.1 QTL to a gene encoding an ABC transporter gene. This gene exerts its control on seed size, not through the maternal plant, but rather via gene expression in the developing zygote. Phenotypic effects of allelic variation at Sw4.1 are manifested early in seed development at stages corresponding to the rapid deposition of starch and lipids into the endospermic cells. Through synteny, we have identified the Arabidopsis Sw4.1 ortholog. Mutagenesis has revealed that this ortholog is associated with seed length variation and fatty acid deposition in seeds, raising the possibility that the ABC transporter may modulate seed size variation in other species. Transcription studies show that the ABC transporter gene is expressed not only in seeds, but also in other tissues (leaves and roots) and, thus, may perform functions in parts of the plants other than developing seeds. Cloning and characterization of the Sw4.1 QTL gives new insight into how plants change seed during evolution and may open future opportunities for modulating seed size in crop plants for human purposes

The demographic benefits of belligerence and bravery: defeated group repopulation or victorious group size expansion?

Intraspecific coalitional aggression between groups of individuals is a widespread trait in the animal world. It occurs in invertebrates and vertebrates, and is prevalent in humans. What are the conditions under which coalitional aggression evolves in natural populations? In this article, I develop a mathematical model delineating conditions where natural selection can favor the coevolution of belligerence and bravery between small-scale societies. Belligerence increases an actor's group probability of trying to conquer another group and bravery increase the actors's group probability of defeating an attacked group. The model takes into account two different types of demographic scenarios that may lead to the coevolution of belligerence and bravery. Under the first, the fitness benefits driving the coevolution of belligerence and bravery come through the repopulation of defeated groups by fission of victorious ones. Under the second demographic scenario, the fitness benefits come through a temporary increase in the local carrying capacity of victorious groups, after transfer of resources from defeated groups to victorious ones. The analysis of the model suggests that the selective pressures on belligerence and bravery are stronger when defeated groups can be repopulated by victorious ones. The analysis also suggests that, depending on the shape of the contest success function, costly bravery can evolve in groups of any size

The Beverton-Holt q-Difference equation with periodic growth rate

In this paper, we study the Beverton–Holt equation with periodic inherent growth rate and periodic carrying capacity in the quantum calculus time setting. After a brief introduction to quantum calculus, we solve the Beverton–Holt q-difference equation using the logistic transformation. This leads to a linear q-difference equation where the solution is obtained using variation of parameters. The analysis of the solution aids our investigation of the first and second Cushing–Henson conjectures under the assumption of a periodic growth rate and a periodic carrying capacity. The first Cushing–Henson conjecture holds in the classical sense, which guarantees the existence of a unique periodic solution which is globally attractive. The analysis of the average of the unique periodic solution of the Beverton–Holt q-difference equation yields formulations of modified second Cushing–Henson conjectures

Evolution of Density-Dependent Cooperation

Cooperation is surprisingly common in life despite of its vulnerability to selfish cheating, i.e. defecting. Defectors do not contribute to common resources but take the advantage of cooperators' investments. Therefore, the emergence and maintenance of cooperation have been considered irrational phenomena. In this study, we focus on plastic, quantitative cooperation behaviour, especialy on its evolution. We assume that individuals are capable to sense the population density in their neighbourhood and adjust their real-valued invesments on public goods based on that information. The ecological setting is described with stochastic demographic events, e.g. birth and death, occurring at individual level. Individuals form small populations, which further constitute a structured metapopulation. For evolutionary investigations, we apply the adaptive dynamics framework. The cost of cooperative investment is incorporated into the model in two ways, by decreasing the birth rate or by increasing the death rate. In the first case, density-dependent cooperation evolves to be a decreasing function of population sie as expected. In the latter case, however, the density-dependent cooperative investment can have a qualitatively different form as it my evolve to be highest in intermediate-sized populations. Indeed, we emphasize that some details in modelling may have a significant impact on the results obtaned