Cartel and Oligopoly Pricing of Nonreplenishable Natural Resources

This essay is concerned with the implications of these structures in markets for nonrenewable natural resources. Following Hotelling (1931) and numerous subsequent authors, we assume that the total reserves of the resource in the hands of each producer cannot be increased and are reduced by production. Demand and cost conditions, including the relevant rate of interest, are constant over time. In such a world, producers must rationally consider price or output paths over time, so that both models outlined above become non-zero sum differential games. In what follows, we examine solutions to the games implied by various assumptions

Jeffrey Rohlfs' 1974 Model of Facebook: An Introduction

This short essay, forthcoming in Competition Policy International, summarizes and evaluates Jeffrey Rohlfs’ 1974 Bell Journal paper, “A Theory of Interdependent Demand for a Telecommunications Service.” Rohlfs’ work helped create a large literature on markets with network externalities in which demand decisions have long-lasting consequences, a literature that has informed competition policy. But Rohlfs assumed that demand-side decisions did not have long-lasting consequences. Social networking and Internet-based markets of this sort are increasingly important but have not been extensively studied. While they may pose interesting antitrust challenges, they are almost certainly not the challenges to which the post-Rohlfs literature pointed

Greenhouse policy architectures and institutions

Supported by the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research

Why Is Platform Pricing Generally Highly Skewed?

Bolt and Tieman (2008) suggested the prevalence of profit function non-concavity may account for the widespread use of skewed pricing by two-sided platform businesses. In both the Rochet-Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006) models, however, skewed pricing may simply reflect substantial differences between side-specific demand functions; non-concavity is not necessary. In the Rochet-Tirole (2003) model, ubiquitous high pass-through rates, which seem implausible, are required for non-concavity to be prevalent. In the Armstrong (2006) model, non-concavity is not sufficient for skewed pricing. In both models, non-concavity is associated with strong indirect network effects; in the Armstrong (2006) model, such effects are also associated with dynamic instability

Sunk Costs and Antitrust Barriers to Entry

US antitrust policy takes as its objective consumer welfare, not total economic welfare. With that objective, Joe Bain's definition of entry barriers is more useful than George Stigler's or definitions based on economic welfare. It follows that economies of scale that involve sunk costs may create antitrust barriers to entry. A simple model shows that sunk costs without scale economies may discourage entry without creating an antitrust entry barrier

The Economics of Interchange Fees and Their Regulation: An Overview

This essay surveys the economic literature on interchange fees and the debate over whether interchange should be regulated and, if so, how. We consider, first, the operation of unitary payment systems, like American Express, in the context of the recent economic literature on two-sided markets, in which businesses cater to two interdependent groups of customers. The main focus is on the determination of price structure. We then discuss the basic economics of multi-party payment systems and the role of interchange in the operation of such systems under some standard, though unrealistic, simplifying assumptions. The key point of this discussion is that the interchange fee is not an ordinary price; its most direct effect is on price structure, not price level. We then examine the implications for privately determined interchange fees of some of the relevant market imperfections that have been discussed in the economic literature. While some studies suggest that privately determined interchange fees are inefficiently high, others point to fees being inefficiently low. Moreover, there is a consensus among economists that, as a matter of theory, it is not possible to arrive, except by happenstance, at the socially optimal interchange fee through any regulatory system that considers only costs. This distinguishes the market imperfections at issue here for multi-party systems from the more familiar area of public utility regulation, where setting price equal to marginal cost is theoretically ideal. Next, we consider the issues facing policy makers. Since there is so much uncertainty about the relation between privately and socially optimal interchange fees, the outcome of a policy debate can depend critically on who bears the burden of proof under whatever set of institutions and laws the deliberation takes place. There is no apparent basis in today's economics - at a theoretical or empirical level - for concluding that it is generally possible to improve social welfare by a noticeable reduction in privately set interchange fees. Thus, if antitrust or other regulators had to show that such intervention would improve welfare, they could not do so. This, again, is quite unlike public utility regulation or many areas of antitrust including, in particular, ordinary cartels. By the same token, there is no basis in economics for concluding that the privately set interchange fee is just right. Thus, if card associations had to bear the burden of proof - for example, to obtain a comfort or clearance letter from authorities for engaging in presumptively illegal coordinated behavior - it would be difficult for them to demonstrate that they set socially optimal fees. We take a pragmatic approach by suggesting two fact-based inquiries that we believe policymakers should undertake before intervening to affect interchange. First, policymakers should establish that there is a significant market failure that needs to be addressed. Second, policymakers should establish that it is possible to correct a serious market imperfection, assuming one exists, by whatever intervention they are considering (such as cost-based regulation of interchange fee levels) and thereby to increase social welfare significantly after taking into account other distortions that the intervention may create. We illustrate both of these points by examining the recent Australian experience.Technology and Industry, Regulatory Reform

Comparing greenhouse gases for policy purposes

In order to derive optimal policies for greenhouse gas emissions control, the discounted marginal damages of emissions of different gases must be compared. The greenhouse warming potential (GWP) index, which is most often used to compare greenhouse gases, is not based on such a damage comparison. This essay presents assumptions under which ratios of gas-specific discounted marginal damages reduce to ratios of discounted marginal contributions to radiative forcing, where the discount rate is the difference between the discount rate relevant to climate-related damages and the rate of growth of marginal climate-related damages over time. If there are important gas-specific costs or benefits not tied to radiative forcing, however, such as direct effects of carbon dioxide on plant growth, there is in general no shortcut around explicit comparison of discounted net marginal damages.Supported by the MIT Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research

A Survey of the Economic Role of Software Platforms in Computer-Based Industries

Software platforms are a critical component of the computer systems underpinning leading– edge products ranging from third– generation mobile phones to video games. After describing some key economic features of computer systems and software platforms, the paper presents case studies of personal computers, video games, personal digital assistants, smart mobile phones, and digital content devices. It then compares several economic aspects of these businesses including their industry evolution, pricing structures, and degrees of integration.software platforms, hardware platforms, network effects, bundling, multi-sided markets

Renewable Electricity Generation in the United States

This paper provides an overview of the use of renewable energy sources to generate electricity in the United States and a critical analysis of the federal and state policies that have supported the deployment of renewable generation. Particular attention is paid to the use of wind energy and to the contrasting experiences in Texas and California.Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research