1. Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit. 2. International Regulation without International Government: Improving IO Performance through Orchestration

1. A new kind of international regulatory system is spontaneously arising out of the failure of international 'Old Governance' (i.e., treaties and intergovernmental organizations) to adequately regulate international business. Nongovernmental organizations, business firms, and other actors, singly and in novel combinations, are creating innovative institutions to apply transnational norms to business. These institutions are predominantly private and operate through voluntary standards. The Authors depict the diversity of these new regulatory institutions on the 'Governance Triangle,' according to the roles of different actors in their operations. To analyze this complex system, we adapt the domestic 'New Governance' model of regulation to the international setting. 'Transnational New Governance' potentially provides many benefits of New Governance and is particularly suitable for international regulation because it demands less of states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). However, Transnational New Governance does require states and IGOs to act as orchestrators of the international regulatory system, and that system currently suffers from a significant orchestration deficit. If states and IGOs expanded 'directive' and especially 'facilitative' orchestration of the Transnational New Governance system, they could strengthen high-quality private regulatory standards, improve the international regulatory system, and better achieve their own regulatory goals. 2. International organizations (IOs) have been widely criticized as ineffective. Yet scholars and practitioners assessing IO performance frequently focus on traditional modes of governance such as treaties and inter-state dispute-resolution mechanisms. When they observe poor performance, moreover, they often prescribe a strengthening of those same activities. We call this reliance on traditional state-based mechanisms 'International Old Governance' (IOG). A better way to understand and improve IO performance is to consider the full range of ways in which IOs can and do operate - including, increasingly, by reaching out to private actors and institutions, collaborating with them, and supporting and shaping their activities. Such actions are helping to develop an intricate global network of public, private and mixed institutions and norms, partially orchestrated by IOs, that we call 'Transnational New Governance' (TNG). With proper orchestration by IOs, TNG can ameliorate both 'state failure' - the inadequacies of IOG - and 'market failure' - the problems that result when the creation and evolution of norm-setting institutions is highly decentralized. Orchestration thus provides a significant way for IOs to improve their regulatory performance. Some IOs already engage actively with private actors and institutions - we provide a range of illustrations, highlighting the activities of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). Yet there remains a significant 'orchestration deficit' that provides real opportunities for IOs. We draw on the lessons of existing IO activities to suggest additional possibilities for improving IO performance. -- 1. Ein internationales regulatorisches System neuer Art entsteht derzeit spontan aus dem Versagen der internationalen 'Old Governance' - also der bestehenden internationalen Verträge und Organisationen - dabei, den internationalen Handel angemessen zu regulieren. Nichtregierungsorganisationen, Unternehmen und andere Akteure - allein und in ganz neuen Kombinationen - schaffen sich neue internationale Einrichtungen, um transnationale Normen auf internationale Geschäftstätigkeit anzuwenden. Es geht dabei vornehmlich um private Einrichtungen, die vor allem über freiwillige Standardbefolgung wirken. In diesem Beitrag werden die unterschiedlichen Regulierungseinrichtungen als Teil eines 'Governance Dreiecks' beschreiben und das geschieht vor allem in Blick darauf, welche Rollen die unterschiedlichen Akteure in ihrer Tätigkeit spielen. Um dieses komplexe System zu untersuchen passen wir das innenpolitische Regulierungsmodell der 'New Governance' an den internationalen Rahmen an. Die 'Transnational New Governance' enthält viele Vorteile der 'New Governance' und sie ist für die internationale Regulierung besonders angemessen, weil sie geringere Anforderungen an die Staatenwelt und an die intergouvernementalen Organisationen, die IGOs, stellen. Allerdings ist es für eine wirksame 'Transnational New Governance' weiterhin erforderlich, dass die Staaten und die IGOs das internationale regulatorische System 'orchestrieren'. Das heutige internationale regulatorische System leidet allerdings unter einem Orchestrierungsdefizit. Würden die Staaten und die IGOs die 'anweisende' und 'ermöglichende' Orchestrierungsfunktion des 'Transnational New Governance System' ausbauen, dann stärkten sie die privaten regulatorischen Standards von hoher Qualität, verbesserten das internationale regulatorische System und könnten ihre eigenen regulatorischen Ziele besser verwirklichen. 2. Internationale Organisationen (IOs) werden vielfach ob Ihrer Ineffizienz kritisiert. Allerdings konzentrieren sich Wissenschaftler und Praktiker bei dieser Bewertung der Leistungsfähigkeit von IOs häufig auf Maßstäbe, die den herkömmlichen Formen von Governance - wie internationalen Verträgen und den Mechanismen für die Schlichtung zwischenstaatlicher Konflikte - entlehnt sind. Soweit eine ungenügende Leistung festgestellt wird, empfehlen sie zudem meist, Tätigkeiten der traditionellen Art zu verstärken. Wir bezeichnen dies als ein Sich-Verlassen auf die herkömmlichen staats-basierten Mechanismen, als 'International Old Governance' (IOG). Man versteht die IOs besser und verbessert ihre Leistungsfähigkeit aber der Situation weitaus angemessener, wenn man die gesamte Vielfalt wirklicher und möglicher IO-Tätigkeiten in den Blick nimmt: Das umfasst vor allem, dass die IOs private Akteure und Organisationen einbeziehen, mit ihnen zusammenarbeiten, ihre Aktivitäten stützen, sie formen und ihnen Richtung geben. Diese Tätigkeiten schaffen ein fein gesponnenes globales Netzwerk von öffentlichen, privaten und gemischten Organisationen und Normen, das seinerseits teilweise durch die IOs orchestriert wird. Dieses Netzwerk bezeichnen wir als 'Transnational New Governance' (TNG). Wenn die Orchestrierung durch IOs gut funktioniert kann sie auch Staatsversagen (state failure) abmildern - also hier die Inadäquanzen von 'International Organization Governance' - und ebenso kann sie Marktversagen ausgleichen, also die Probleme, die sich ergeben wenn Herausbildung und Schaffung normgebender Einrichtungen höchst dezentralisiert verläuft. Über die Orchestrierung können die IOs auch die Leistungsfähigkeit ihrer Regulierungen erhöhen. Einige IOs sind schon jetzt stark zusammen mit privaten Akteuren und Einrichtungen unterwegs; in diesem Beitrag mustern wir das Spektrum solcher Aktivitäten. Wir betonen dabei die Unternehmungen des UN Environment Programme (UNEP), des Umweltprogramms der VN. Allerdings verbleibt ein erhebliches 'Orchestrierungsdefizit', das für die IOs zugleich Herausforderung und Chance ist. Wir stützten uns auf den Erfahrungsschatz der vorgefundenen IO-Aktivitäten, um den Möglichkeitsraum der IOs für die Zukunft auszumessen und Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der Leistungsfähigkeit von IOs anzuregen.

1. Strengthening International Regulation Through Transnational New Governance: Overcoming the Orchestration Deficit. 2. International Regulation without International Government: Improving IO Performance through Orchestration

1. A new kind of international regulatory system is spontaneously arising out of the failure of international 'Old Governance' (i.e., treaties and intergovernmental organizations) to adequately regulate international business. Nongovernmental organizations, business firms, and other actors, singly and in novel combinations, are creating innovative institutions to apply transnational norms to business. These institutions are predominantly private and operate through voluntary standards. The Authors depict the diversity of these new regulatory institutions on the 'Governance Triangle,' according to the roles of different actors in their operations. To analyze this complex system, we adapt the domestic 'New Governance' model of regulation to the international setting. 'Transnational New Governance' potentially provides many benefits of New Governance and is particularly suitable for international regulation because it demands less of states and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). However, Transnational New Governance does require states and IGOs to act as orchestrators of the international regulatory system, and that system currently suffers from a significant orchestration deficit. If states and IGOs expanded 'directive' and especially 'facilitative' orchestration of the Transnational New Governance system, they could strengthen high-quality private regulatory standards, improve the international regulatory system, and better achieve their own regulatory goals. 2. International organizations (IOs) have been widely criticized as ineffective. Yet scholars and practitioners assessing IO performance frequently focus on traditional modes of governance such as treaties and inter-state dispute-resolution mechanisms. When they observe poor performance, moreover, they often prescribe a strengthening of those same activities. We call this reliance on traditional state-based mechanisms 'International Old Governance' (IOG). A better way to understand and improve IO performance is to consider the full range of ways in which IOs can and do operate - including, increasingly, by reaching out to private actors and institutions, collaborating with them, and supporting and shaping their activities. Such actions are helping to develop an intricate global network of public, private and mixed institutions and norms, partially orchestrated by IOs, that we call 'Transnational New Governance' (TNG). With proper orchestration by IOs, TNG can ameliorate both 'state failure' - the inadequacies of IOG - and 'market failure' - the problems that result when the creation and evolution of norm-setting institutions is highly decentralized. Orchestration thus provides a significant way for IOs to improve their regulatory performance. Some IOs already engage actively with private actors and institutions - we provide a range of illustrations, highlighting the activities of the UN Environment Programme (UNEP). Yet there remains a significant 'orchestration deficit' that provides real opportunities for IOs. We draw on the lessons of existing IO activities to suggest additional possibilities for improving IO performance.1. Ein internationales regulatorisches System neuer Art entsteht derzeit spontan aus dem Versagen der internationalen 'Old Governance' - also der bestehenden internationalen Verträge und Organisationen - dabei, den internationalen Handel angemessen zu regulieren. Nichtregierungsorganisationen, Unternehmen und andere Akteure - allein und in ganz neuen Kombinationen - schaffen sich neue internationale Einrichtungen, um transnationale Normen auf internationale Geschäftstätigkeit anzuwenden. Es geht dabei vornehmlich um private Einrichtungen, die vor allem über freiwillige Standardbefolgung wirken. In diesem Beitrag werden die unterschiedlichen Regulierungseinrichtungen als Teil eines 'Governance Dreiecks' beschreiben und das geschieht vor allem in Blick darauf, welche Rollen die unterschiedlichen Akteure in ihrer Tätigkeit spielen. Um dieses komplexe System zu untersuchen passen wir das innenpolitische Regulierungsmodell der 'New Governance' an den internationalen Rahmen an. Die 'Transnational New Governance' enthält viele Vorteile der 'New Governance' und sie ist für die internationale Regulierung besonders angemessen, weil sie geringere Anforderungen an die Staatenwelt und an die intergouvernementalen Organisationen, die IGOs, stellen. Allerdings ist es für eine wirksame 'Transnational New Governance' weiterhin erforderlich, dass die Staaten und die IGOs das internationale regulatorische System 'orchestrieren'. Das heutige internationale regulatorische System leidet allerdings unter einem Orchestrierungsdefizit. Würden die Staaten und die IGOs die 'anweisende' und 'ermöglichende' Orchestrierungsfunktion des 'Transnational New Governance System' ausbauen, dann stärkten sie die privaten regulatorischen Standards von hoher Qualität, verbesserten das internationale regulatorische System und könnten ihre eigenen regulatorischen Ziele besser verwirklichen. 2. Internationale Organisationen (IOs) werden vielfach ob Ihrer Ineffizienz kritisiert. Allerdings konzentrieren sich Wissenschaftler und Praktiker bei dieser Bewertung der Leistungsfähigkeit von IOs häufig auf Maßstäbe, die den herkömmlichen Formen von Governance - wie internationalen Verträgen und den Mechanismen für die Schlichtung zwischenstaatlicher Konflikte - entlehnt sind. Soweit eine ungenügende Leistung festgestellt wird, empfehlen sie zudem meist, Tätigkeiten der traditionellen Art zu verstärken. Wir bezeichnen dies als ein Sich-Verlassen auf die herkömmlichen staats-basierten Mechanismen, als 'International Old Governance' (IOG). Man versteht die IOs besser und verbessert ihre Leistungsfähigkeit aber der Situation weitaus angemessener, wenn man die gesamte Vielfalt wirklicher und möglicher IO-Tätigkeiten in den Blick nimmt: Das umfasst vor allem, dass die IOs private Akteure und Organisationen einbeziehen, mit ihnen zusammenarbeiten, ihre Aktivitäten stützen, sie formen und ihnen Richtung geben. Diese Tätigkeiten schaffen ein fein gesponnenes globales Netzwerk von öffentlichen, privaten und gemischten Organisationen und Normen, das seinerseits teilweise durch die IOs orchestriert wird. Dieses Netzwerk bezeichnen wir als 'Transnational New Governance' (TNG). Wenn die Orchestrierung durch IOs gut funktioniert kann sie auch Staatsversagen (state failure) abmildern - also hier die Inadäquanzen von 'International Organization Governance' - und ebenso kann sie Marktversagen ausgleichen, also die Probleme, die sich ergeben wenn Herausbildung und Schaffung normgebender Einrichtungen höchst dezentralisiert verläuft. Über die Orchestrierung können die IOs auch die Leistungsfähigkeit ihrer Regulierungen erhöhen. Einige IOs sind schon jetzt stark zusammen mit privaten Akteuren und Einrichtungen unterwegs; in diesem Beitrag mustern wir das Spektrum solcher Aktivitäten. Wir betonen dabei die Unternehmungen des UN Environment Programme (UNEP), des Umweltprogramms der VN. Allerdings verbleibt ein erhebliches 'Orchestrierungsdefizit', das für die IOs zugleich Herausforderung und Chance ist. Wir stützten uns auf den Erfahrungsschatz der vorgefundenen IO-Aktivitäten, um den Möglichkeitsraum der IOs für die Zukunft auszumessen und Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der Leistungsfähigkeit von IOs anzuregen

Suburbs of Their Own: African-American Outmigration and Persistent Segregation in Chicago

Popular narratives of African-American outmigration from the city tell a story of "melting-pot suburbs" and the end of segregation. However, these narratives rely on declines in the White population proportion across suburbs and declines in absolute levels of segregation across metropolitan regions. This paper uses segregation indices, ArcGIS spatial analysis, and descriptive statistics at the municipal level to examine the relationship between increased African-American suburbanization and levels of segregation in the Chicago MSA. African-Americans are leaving Chicago and entering the suburbs and the level of metropolitan segregation in the region has been steadily declining since the 1970s. However, analysis reveals that re-segregation rather than integration is occurring in Chicago's suburbs; that African-Americans remain uniquely segregated in the Chicago MSA; that the rate of segregation is declining at a faster pace in the City than in the suburbs; and that the suburbs are now a greater contributor to metropolitan segregation than the City. As the suburbs become the new terrain for residential segregation, theory must re-examine why African-American entrance into the suburbs has not fit a spatial assimilation model

The Customary International Law Game

Structural realists in political science and some rationalist legal scholars argue that customary international law cannot affect state behavior: that it is “epiphenomenal.” This article develops a game theoretic model of a multilateral prisoner’s dilemma in the customary international law context that shows that it is plausible that states would comply with customary international law under certain circumstances. Our model shows that these circumstances relate to: (i) the relative value of cooperation versus defection, (ii) the number of states effectively involved, (iii) the extent to which increasing the number of states involved increases the value of cooperation or the detriments of defection, including whether the particular issue has characteristics of a commons problem, a public good, or a network good, (iv) the information available to the states involved regarding compliance and defection, (v) the relative patience of states in valuing the benefits of long-term cooperation compared to short-term defection, (vi) the expected duration of interaction, (vii) the frequency of interaction, and (viii) whether there are also bilateral relationships or other multilateral relationships between the involved states. This model shows that customary international law is plausible in the sense that it may well affect state behavior where certain conditions are met. It shows what types of contexts, including malleable institutional features, may affect the ability of states to produce and comply with customary international law. This article identifies a number of empirical strategies that may be used to test the model

Manufacturing in Winnipeg & Manitoba : a quantitative overview

ii, 58 p

Enriching the RIT framework

The purpose of this volume is to theorize the role of intermediaries in the regulatory process and to trace their roles empirically across a wide range of settings. While we began with a spare Regulator Intermediary Target (RIT) theoretical framework, we also extended that conception -- often drawing on lessons learned from the substantive papers of the contributors. We have already indicated some of these connections in the introductory framework paper (Abbott, Levi-Faur and Snidal 2017); this conclusion develops them further, extracting additional lessons from the empirical cases. It also identifies further implications for regulatory analysis from the volume as a whole. Doing so reinforces the message that intermediaries are essential to expanding the reach and effectiveness of regulation, but introducing intermediaries also creates new regulatory twists and complications. We begin this conclusion by reminding ourselves that, whereas regulation is often treated as a technical problem, it is an inherently normative enterprise. Introducing intermediaries with their different goals makes the normative issues even more apparent. We then provide a brief overview of the range of intermediaries and other regulatory actors covered in this volume, highlighting the wide variation in who the intermediaries are, what they do and what goals they pursue. Recognizing that intermediaries have their own goals makes their selection an important issue, and we consider that next. Selection also opens up an analysis of the pathologies that surround RIT processes, and of possible ways of overcoming them. Finally, although the RIT model is more complicated than the standard principal-agent (P-A) model, it is still much simpler than the world. We close by discussing the tradeoffs involved in using simple models to understand complex realities, and argue that RIT provides a valuable baseline for more complicated analyses of regulatory processes

Suspended in context : school discipline, STEM course-taking, and school racial/ethnic composition

STEM curricula and school disciplinary regimes are both key foundations of the transition to adulthood, and they may be connected within school contexts in ways that reflect and exacerbate the intergenerational transmission of inequality. This study examines such connections with particular attention to student race/ethnicity and the racial/ethnic composition of high schools. Bivariate probit analyses of the High School Longitudinal Study of 2009 and the Civil Rights Data Collection of 2012 revealed that being suspended prior to high school was associated with truncated trajectories of advanced math course-taking by the end of high school while taking Algebra I or above in grade 9 was associated with avoiding suspension across the high school career. Although the proportion of disciplinary cases who were same racial/ethnic peers was associated with the math coursework of boys, various aspects of school racial/ethnic composition did not moderate the associations between suspension and math coursework over time for boys or girls. These results confirm the value of studying the interplay of formal and informal processes of schooling in addition to each on their own.Sociolog

A central component of the N1 event-related brain potential could index the early and automatic inhibition of the actions systematically activated by objects

Stimuli of the environment, like objects, systematically activate the actions they are associated to. These activations occur extremely fast. Nevertheless, behavioural data reveal that, in most cases, these activations are then automatically inhibited, around 100 ms after the occurrence of the stimulus. We thus tested whether this early inhibition could be indexed by a central component of the N1 event-related brain potential (ERP). To achieve that goal, we looked at whether this ERP component is greater in tasks that could increase the inhibition and in trials where reaction times happen to be long. The illumination of a real space bar of a keyboard out of the dark was used as a stimulus. To maximize the modulation of the inhibition, the task participants had to perform was manipulated across blocks. A look-only task and a count task were used to increase inhibition and an immediate press task was used to decrease it. ERPs of the two block-conditions where presses had to be prevented and where the largest central N1s were predicted were compared to those elicited in the press task, differentiating the ERPs to the third of the trials where presses were the slowest from the ERPs to the third of the trials with the fastest presses. Despite larger negativities due to motor potentials and despite greater attention likely in immediate press-trials, central N1s were found to be minimal for the fastest presses, intermediate for the slowest ones and maximal for the two no-press conditions. These results thus provide a strong support for the idea that the central N1 indexes an early and short lasting automatic inhibition of the actions systematically activated by objects. They also confirm that the strength of this automatic inhibition spontaneously fluctuates across trials and tasks. On the other hand, just before N1s, parietal P1s were found greater for fastest presses. They might thus index the initial activation of these actions. Finally, consistent with the idea that N300s index late inhibition processes, that occur preferentially when the task requires them, these ERPs were quasi absent for fast presses trials and much larger in the three other conditions

The power of the “weak” and international organizations

By nearly every measure, power in the international system is concentrated, meaning that most states lack significant power resources. And yet international relations theory tends to focus on the behavior of great powers. This special issue instead explores the strategies that “weak” states use in the context of international organizations both to advance their interests and to resist pressure from stronger states. We define weakness as a relative lack of power across one or more dimensions. While the literature, to the extent it has focused on weak actors, has too often defined weakness solely in material terms, we adopt a broader conception that builds on the influential typology of power by Barnett and Duvall (Barnett and Duvall, 2005a, Barnett and Duvall, International Organization 59, 39–75, 2005b). A multidimensional conceptualization of power allows analysts to show how actors that are weak in one dimension (often material power) may be stronger on other dimensions, giving them greater capacity for action than is often recognized. From this framework we create a typology of “strategies of the weak” that emphasizes the agency of weaker actors to make the most of their positions. The contributions to the special issue, summarized here, illuminate and substantiate many of these strategies across a diverse range of international organizations, understood as both forums and actors. As the articles show, these alternative theoretical mechanisms help explain how and why seemingly weak states sometimes fare better than a simplistic assessment of their material capabilities might suggest. By deepening our understanding of weakness and how it influences state behavior, the volume advances our theoretical understanding of how power is built, wielded, and resisted in and through international organization