6 research outputs found
Global Overview of Existing Cyber Capacity Assessment Tools (GOAT)
This Global Overview of Assessment Tools (GOAT) document has been developed by the Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE), Working Group A – Task Force Strategy and Assessments, as a project under its Work Plan 2020.The Task Force recognized the need to create awareness on the different cyber capacity assessment tools that exist and to provide details on their methodologies, outputs and impact, in order to help the GFCE community (beneficiaries, funders and implementers) and beyond identify suitable tools and approaches geared to the prevailing needs and knowledge gaps. The GOAT therefore aims to assist them in the decision-making process by providing a comprehensive overview of the different tools, their approaches, benefits and outputs, and what to do and whom to contact if a country wishes to be assessed
Il Futuro della Cybersecurity in Italia: Ambiti Progettuali Strategici
Il presente volume nasce come continuazione del precedente, con l’obiettivo di delineare un insieme di ambiti progettuali e di azioni che la comunità nazionale della ricerca ritiene essenziali a complemento e a supporto di quelli previsti nel DPCM Gentiloni in materia di sicurezza cibernetica, pubblicato nel febbraio del 2017. La lettura non richiede particolari conoscenze tecniche; il testo è fruibile da chiunque utilizzi strumenti informatici o navighi in rete.
Nel volume vengono considerati molteplici aspetti della cybersecurity, che vanno dalla definizione di infrastrutture e centri necessari a organizzare la difesa alle azioni e alle tecnologie da sviluppare per essere protetti al meglio, dall’individuazione delle principali tecnologie da difendere alla proposta di un insieme di azioni orizzontali per la formazione, la sensibilizzazione e la gestione dei rischi. Gli ambiti progettuali e le azioni, che noi speriamo possano svilupparsi nei prossimi anni in Italia, sono poi accompagnate da una serie di raccomandazioni agli organi preposti per affrontare al meglio, e da Paese consapevole, la sfida della trasformazione digitale. Le raccomandazioni non intendono essere esaustive, ma vanno a toccare dei punti che riteniamo essenziali per una corretta implementazione di una politica di sicurezza cibernetica a livello nazionale. Politica che, per sua natura, dovrà necessariamente essere dinamica e in continua evoluzione in base ai cambiamenti tecnologici, normativi, sociali e geopolitici. All’interno del volume, sono riportati dei riquadri con sfondo violetto o grigio; i primi sono usati nel capitolo introduttivo e nelle conclusioni per mettere in evidenza alcuni concetti ritenuti importanti, i secondi sono usati negli altri capitoli per spiegare il significato di alcuni termini tecnici comunemente utilizzati dagli addetti ai lavori.
In conclusione, ringraziamo tutti i colleghi che hanno contribuito a questo volume: un gruppo di oltre 120 ricercatori, provenienti da circa 40 tra Enti di Ricerca e Università, unico per numerosità ed eccellenza, che rappresenta il meglio della ricerca in Italia nel settore della cybersecurity. Un grazie speciale va a Gabriella Caramagno e ad Angela Miola che hanno contribuito a tutte le fasi di produzione del libro. Tra i ringraziamenti ci fa piacere aggiungere il supporto ottenuto dai partecipanti al progetto FILIERASICURA
European Cybersecurity in Context: A Policy-Oriented Comparative Analysis
The almost total reliance of modern societies on information and communication technologies (ICTs) has made cybersecurity a top priority in EU agen- da-setting and policy-making processes. Empirical data suggests that anarchy is likely to prevail in cyberspace, despite several international normative and regulatory attempts to govern the responsible use of this muddled domain. Indeed, the implemen- tation of an effective governance system based on non-binding norms is apparently considered an opti- mistic mirage. This pessimistic evaluation is triggered and exacerbated by the intrinsic features that char- acterise cyberspace: as explained by the National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations in 2006, the cyber domain has core attributes belong- ing to the acronym VUCA (Vulnerability, Uncertainty, Complexity, Ambiguity). These attributes enable the increasing divergence between states’ declarations in support of cyber norms and their real (or realistic) misconduct of large-scale cyber operations against their adversaries, for military, economic, and polit- ical purposes, which are deemed legitimate by the various sources. The result is a complex interplay between ‘personalised’ and vague regulations and the safeguarding of states’ national interests.
There is an extensive literature that covers the pro and cons of the cyber domain, ranging from tech- nical definitions and socio-political peculiarities to ongoing progress in integrating the virtual and physical dimensions. However, recent political and military events (i.e., the Russia–Ukrainian conflict, USA–China confrontation, etc.) have stressed: a) the strategic importance of the cyber domain in the international political power dynamics of the twen- ty-first century, b) the growing intersection between
cybersecurity and space security for national security and international stability and peace, c) the growing importance of private actors in guaranteeing both digital transformation and national security (i.e., Internet Service Providers, Over The Top, technol- ogy leading companies, SpaceX), d) the new powers acquired by non-state actors to influence conven- tional forms of conflict thanks to the unconventional means granted to them by the digital revolution.
With this distressing reality in mind, the major con- cern is that, due to the above-mentioned peculiar- ities of cyberspace, it is not possible to implement binding cyber rules or norms to deter the offensive use of cyber capabilities. According to a cost-bene- fit analysis (conducted in line with a construct of the realist theory of International Relations), an aggres- sor has more incentive to deviate from than to observe existing international norms of responsible state behaviour in cyberspace because no targeted retaliation is internationally declared if red lines are crossed. This creates a vicious cycle with serious political, social, and economic repercussions.
This scenario highlights the need for adequate normative and policy tools and an appropriate reg- ulatory framework to avoid and prevent the mali- cious use of the cyber tools. In this sense, Joseph Nye, in an article published by Foreign Affairs, was correct to point out: ‘violations, if not addressed, can weaken norms, but they do not render them irrelevant (...) history shows that societies take time to learn to how respond to major disruptive techno- logical changes and to put in place rules that make the world safer from new dangers’
