Trends in Parliamentary Oversight: Proceedings from a Panel at the 2004 Southern Political Science Association Conference

World Bank Institute Working Paper- Series on Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary Development, Washington D

Tools for Legislative Oversight: An Empirical Investigation

World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3388</p

Tools for legislative oversight : an empirical investigation

Parliaments are the institutions through which governments are held accountable to the electorate. They have a wide range of tools with which to carry out this oversight function, but until recently little analysis had been undertaken on the characteristics or use of such tools. This paper uses data for 83 countries that was collected in 2001 to investigate whether the oversight potential relates to three variables, namely the form of government (presidential, semi-presidential, or parliamentary), per capita income levels, and the level of democracy. The paper finds that oversight potential is greatly affected by the form of government, per capita income levels, and levels of democracy. Countries with parliamentary forms of government, higher income levels, and which are more democratic have a greater number of oversight tools and greater oversight potential. While the oversight potential follows this general trend, the use of committees of enquiry, interpellations and ombudsman offices follows a different pattern. The use of interpellations as an oversight tool is most common in high income countries, less common in low income countries and least common in middle income countries while the presence of committees of enquiry and of the ombudsman offices is most common in middle income countries, less common in high income countries and least common in low income countries.Labor Policies,Municipal Financial Management,Income,Parliamentary Government,Health Economics&Finance,Governance Indicators,National Governance,TF054599-PHRD-KYRGYZ REPUBLIC: WATER MANAGEMENT IMPROVEMENT PROJECT,Parliamentary Government,Municipal Financial Management

Parliamentary Libraries, Institutes and Offices: The Sources of Parliamentary Information

World Bank Institute Working Paper Series on Contemporary Issues in Parliamentary, Washington D

On the hardware reduction of z-datapath of vectoring CORDIC

In this article we present a novel design of a hardware optimal vectoring CORDIC processor. We present a mathematical theory to show that using bipolar binary notation it is possible to eliminate all the arithmetic computations required along the z-datapath. Using this technique it is possible to achieve three and 1.5 times reduction in the number of registers and adder respectively compared to conventional CORDIC. Following this, a 16-bit vectoring CORDIC is designed for the application in Synchronizer for IEEE 802.11a standard. The total area and dynamic power consumption of the processor is 0.14 mm2 and 700?W respectively when synthesized in 0.18?m CMOS library which shows its effectiveness as a low-area low-power processor

Legislative ethics and codes of conduct

This chapter discusses the difference between codes of ethics and codes of conduct, their role, their function and their distribution. The chapter also pays some attention to what makes codes of conduct most effective

Scrutinizing public expenditures: assessing the performance of public accounts committees

In 2002, David McGee wrote a comprehensive report on two important elements in the system of public financial accountability, namely the office of the Auditor General and the parliamentary oversight committee commonly referred to as the Public Accounts Committee (PAC). The purpose of the present paper is to deepen McGee's analysis of PACs. In particular, the authors define PAC success and identify those factors that affect PAC peformance. They use data that were collected by the World Bank Institute in 2002, when a survey questionnaire was sent to 51 national and state/provincial parliaments in Commonwealth countries in Asia and Australasia, and Canada and the United Kingdom. The authors find that the institutional factors which most account for the success of the PACs are the focus on government's financial activity rather than its policies, the power to investigate all past and present government expenses, the power to follow up on government action in response to its recommendations, and its relationship with the Auditors General.National Governance,Parliamentary Government,Politics and Government,Business Environment,Business in Development

Estimation of Inequality Indices of the Cumulative Distribution Function

This work has been carried out thanks to the support of the A*MIDEX project (No. ANR-11-IDEX-0001-02) funded by the “Investissements d’Avenir” French Government program, managed by the French National Research Agency (ANR). The views in this paper do not necessarily reflect the official views, endorsed or currently used methods of the Office for National Statistics. We are grateful to an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments. We are responsible for any errors.Peer reviewedPreprintPostprin

The supply and demand sides of corruption:Canadian extractive companies in Africa

With the rapid expansion of Canadian investment in extractives around the world, it is perhaps not surprising that Canada’s reputation as a low-corruption country has faltered: Canada currently ranks ninth internationally in Transparency International (TI)’s corruption perception index, down from sixth in 2010, and sixth, down from first (i.e. best), in 2009 in TI’s Bribe Payers index. This article presents the preliminary findings of our ongoing research regarding both the demand side (that is, the request for bribes, principally by foreign officials) and the supply side (that is, the giving of bribes, principally by corporations) of corruption. We have examined Canadian mining companies operating in Ghana and Burkina Faso and have identified 10 “tensions” which need to be acknowledged in public policy formulation. We note that Canada is implementing policies to reduce supply-side corruption (e.g. by adopting anti-bribery legislation and guidelines for corporate social responsibility) but recommend that more be done, especially oversight of anti-corruption laws by Parliament. We also recommend that mining companies undertake ex-ante corruption risk assessment and develop proactive corporate anti-corruption policies. And, finally, while host countries have anti-corruption laws, implementation is weak. Global affairs could usefully support stronger parliamentary oversight in these countries