Random tree growth by vertex splitting

We study a model of growing planar tree graphs where in each time step we separate the tree into two components by splitting a vertex and then connect the two pieces by inserting a new link between the daughter vertices. This model generalises the preferential attachment model and Ford's $\alpha$-model for phylogenetic trees. We develop a mean field theory for the vertex degree distribution, prove that the mean field theory is exact in some special cases and check that it agrees with numerical simulations in general. We calculate various correlation functions and show that the intrinsic Hausdorff dimension can vary from one to infinity, depending on the parameters of the model.Comment: 47 page

Is risk aversion irrational? Examining the “fallacy” of large numbers

A moderately risk averse person may turn down a 50/50 gamble that either results in her winning $200 or losing$100. Such behaviour seems rational if, for instance, the pain of losing $100 is felt more strongly than the joy of winning$200. The aim of this paper is to examine an influential argument that some have interpreted as showing that such moderate risk aversion is irrational. After presenting an axiomatic argument that I take to be the strongest case for the claim that moderate risk aversion is irrational, I show that it essentially depends on an assumption that those who think that risk aversion can be rational should be skeptical of. Hence, I conclude that risk aversion need not be irrational

Basic Study of Synchronization in a Two Degree of Freedom, Duffing Based System

The issue of synchronization has been analyzed from many points of view since it was first described in 17th century. Nowadays the theory that stands behind it is so developed, it might be difficult to understand where it all comes from. This paper reminds the key concepts of synchronization by examination of two coupled Duffing oscillators. It describes also the origins of Duffing equation and proves its ability to behave chaotically

Random trees with superexponential branching weights

We study rooted planar random trees with a probability distribution which is proportional to a product of weight factors $w_n$ associated to the vertices of the tree and depending only on their individual degrees $n$. We focus on the case when $w_n$ grows faster than exponentially with $n$. In this case the measures on trees of finite size $N$ converge weakly as $N$ tends to infinity to a measure which is concentrated on a single tree with one vertex of infinite degree. For explicit weight factors of the form $w_n=((n-1)!)^\alpha$ with $\alpha >0$ we obtain more refined results about the approach to the infinite volume limit.Comment: 19 page

The endpoint multilinear Kakeya theorem via the Borsuk--Ulam theorem

We give an essentially self-contained proof of Guth's recent endpoint multilinear Kakeya theorem which avoids the use of somewhat sophisticated algebraic topology, and which instead appeals to the Borsuk-Ulam theorem

Nonlinear repolarization in optical fibers: polarization attraction with copropagating beams

3openopenKozlov, V.; Turitsyn, K.; Wabnitz, S.Kozlov, Victor; Turitsyn, K.; Wabnitz, Stefa

Colouring multijoints

Let L_1, ..., L_d be pairwise disjoint collections of lines in a d-dimensional vector space over some field. If the collections are sufficiently generic we prove that there exists a d-colouring of the set of multijoints J such that for each j, for each line in L_j, the number of points on it of colour j is O(|J|^{1/d}).Comment: We welcome comments on how this result relates to others in discrete geometr

Comparativism and the Measurement of Partial Belief

According to comparativism, degrees of belief are reducible to a system of purely ordinal comparisons of relative confidence. (For example, being more confident that P than that Q, or being equally confident that P and that Q.) In this paper, I raise several general challenges for comparativism, relating to (i) its capacity to illuminate apparently meaningful claims regarding intervals and ratios of strengths of belief, (ii) its capacity to draw enough intuitively meaningful and theoretically relevant distinctions between doxastic states, and (iii) its capacity to handle common instances of irrationality