Tales of function and form: the discursive legitimation of international technocracy

It has become commonplace to say that, in the past, international governance has been legitimated mainly, if not exclusively, by its welfare-enhancing ‘output’. There has been very little research, however, on the history of legitimating international governance by its output to validate this point. In this essay I begin to address this gap by inquiring into the origins of output-oriented strategies for legitimating international organizations. Scrutinizing the programmatic literature on international organizations from the early 20th century, I illustrate how a new and distinctive account of technocratic legitimation emerged and in the 1920s separated from other types of liberal internationalism. My inquiry, centring on the works of James Arthur Salter, David Mitrany, Paul S. Reinsch and Pitman B. Potter, explores their respective conceptions of ‘good functional governance’, executed by a non-political international technocracy. Their account is explicitly pitched against a notion of ‘international politics’, perceived as violent, polarizing, and irrational. The emergence of such a technocratic legitimation of international governance, I submit, needs to be seen in the context of societal modernization and bureaucratization that unfolded in the first half of the 20th century. I also highlight how in this account the material output of governance is intimately linked to the virtues of the organizational form that brings it about

Civil society participation in international governance: the UN and the WTO compared

Civil society participation has become a buzzword in the debate about the legitimacy and accountability of international governance. Many organizations, prominently among them the World Trade Organization (WTO), have come under considerable pressure to open up their policy-making process towards non-state actors. Although the WTO has become more transparent in recent years, direct stakeholder access to its policy making is still denied. This situation is often contrasted with that at the United Nations (UN), where there is (allegedly) much more formally regulated and more substantial participation of civil society. In this paper, we compare the patterns of participation in these two organizations and seek to identify some common dynamics. We present a general framework for analysis based on a model of the policy cycle that allows us to distinguish 'push' and 'pull' factors that determine cooperation in different phases of policy making. In our empirical study, we find that in the WTO, there are few incentives for the organization itself to pull civil society actors into its policy-making process. Agendasetting is the task of governments; research and analysis is delivered by the Secretariat; compliance control is undertaken jointly by the organization and its members. To push the door to trade policy making open, civil society can only rely on public shaming, that is, threatening to undermine the organization's legitimacy as it violates widely accepted standards of good governance. In the UN system, there is in fact more cooperation, but it remains largely limited to the policy phases of agenda-setting, research and analysis and compliance control. Quite like the WTO, the UN protects an intergovernmental core of policy making in which cooperation with civil society remains at the discretion of state parties. Evidence for this are informal and ad hoc ways of collaboration and a lack of participatory rights for non-state actors in the Security Council and the General Assembly. We conclude that studying civil society participation in international public organizations through the lens of the policy cycle can give us a fine-grained picture of cooperative arrangements and enables us to identify potentials for cooperation as well as exclusion. Yet, we also observed two other factors at work that were not really grasped by the model of the policy cycle. First, the institutional culture of organizations can be more or less amenable to civil society. Second, organizations are susceptible to campaigns for 'good governance' that invoke standards of due process and may open the door to nonstate actors. --

Legitimacy and activities of civil society organizations

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) play an active and noteworthy role in governance, both at the national and international level. Three questions arise: First, how do CSOs exercise their advocacy, what repertoires, strategies and resources do they use? Second, to what degree are they legitimized to do so? Third, are there systematic differences between member and non-member CSOs, respectively between policy fields? Based on a survey of 60 exemplary CSOs covering four distinct international-level policy making fora, we will inquire into these questions. The central finding is that membership CSOs neither differ substantially from non-member CSOs in their roles and strategies of dealing with International Organizations, nor do they differ in other aspects of legitimacy, such as transparency or inclusion of beneficiaries. There are no systematic patterns in CSOs properties or behavior which correspond to policy fields. -- Zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen (ZGO) spielen im modernen Regieren eine wichtige Rolle, sowohl im Staat als auch auf internationaler Ebene. Drei Forschungsfragen stehen im Mittelpunkt dieses Papiers: Erstens, wie genau nehmen ZGO am Regierungsprozess teil und welche Einflussstrategien, Ressourcen und Handlungsrepertoire nutzen sie dabei? Zweitens, wie steht es um die Legitimation dieser Organisationen und ihrer Aktivitäten? Drittens, verhalten sich ZGO mit zahlreichen Mitgliedern systematisch anders als ZGO ohne Mitgliedschaft? Gestützt auf Daten von 60 transnationalen ZGO aus vier verschiedenen Politikfeldern gehen wir diesen Fragen nach. Zentrales Ergebnis ist, dass ZGO mit breiter Mitgliedschaft sich in ihren Rollenverständnis und ihren Einflussstrategien nicht grundlegend von anderen unterscheiden. Auch im Hinblick auf wichtige Aspekte ihrer Legitimität, wie etwa Transparenz oder Einbindung von Regelungsadressaten, gibt es keine auffälligen Unterschiede. Die Politikfelder, in denen ZGO aktiv sind, haben ebenfalls keinen messbaren Einfluss auf ihr Handlungsrepertoire und ihre politischen Strategien.

The Power of Rational Discourse and the Legitimacy of International Governance

governance; legitimacy; participation

Legitimacy and activities of civil society organizations

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) play an active and noteworthy role in governance, both at the national and international level. Three questions arise: First, how do CSOs exercise their advocacy, what repertoires, strategies and resources do they use? Second, to what degree are they legitimized to do so? Third, are there systematic differences between member and non-member CSOs, respectively between policy fields? Based on a survey of 60 exemplary CSOs covering four distinct international-level policy making fora, we will inquire into these questions. The central finding is that membership CSOs neither differ substantially from non-member CSOs in their roles and strategies of dealing with International Organizations, nor do they differ in other aspects of legitimacy, such as transparency or inclusion of beneficiaries. There are no systematic patterns in CSOs properties or behavior which correspond to policy fields.Zivilgesellschaftliche Organisationen (ZGO) spielen im modernen Regieren eine wichtige Rolle, sowohl im Staat als auch auf internationaler Ebene. Drei Forschungsfragen stehen im Mittelpunkt dieses Papiers: Erstens, wie genau nehmen ZGO am Regierungsprozess teil und welche Einflussstrategien, Ressourcen und Handlungsrepertoire nutzen sie dabei? Zweitens, wie steht es um die Legitimation dieser Organisationen und ihrer Aktivitäten? Drittens, verhalten sich ZGO mit zahlreichen Mitgliedern systematisch anders als ZGO ohne Mitgliedschaft? Gestützt auf Daten von 60 transnationalen ZGO aus vier verschiedenen Politikfeldern gehen wir diesen Fragen nach. Zentrales Ergebnis ist, dass ZGO mit breiter Mitgliedschaft sich in ihren Rollenverständnis und ihren Einflussstrategien nicht grundlegend von anderen unterscheiden. Auch im Hinblick auf wichtige Aspekte ihrer Legitimität, wie etwa Transparenz oder Einbindung von Regelungsadressaten, gibt es keine auffälligen Unterschiede. Die Politikfelder, in denen ZGO aktiv sind, haben ebenfalls keinen messbaren Einfluss auf ihr Handlungsrepertoire und ihre politischen Strategien

The 30 GHz communications satellite low noise receiver

A Ka-band low noise front end in proof of concept (POC) model form for ultimate spaceborne communications receiver deployment was developed. The low noise receiver consists of a 27.5 to 30.0 GHz image enhanced mixer integrated with a 3.7 to 6.2 GHz FET low noise IF amplifier and driven by a self contained 23.8 GHz phase locked local oscillator source. The measured level of receiver performance over the 27.3 to 30.0 GHz RF/3.7 to 6.2 GHz IF band includes 5.5 to 6.5 dB (typ) SSB noise figure, 20.5 + or - 1.5 dB conversion gain and +23 dBm minimum third order two tone intermodulation output intercept point

Civil society participation in international governance: the UN and the WTO compared

Civil society participation has become a buzzword in the debate about the legitimacy and accountability of international governance. Many organizations, prominently among them the World Trade Organization (WTO), have come under considerable pressure to open up their policy-making process towards non-state actors. Although the WTO has become more transparent in recent years, direct stakeholder access to its policy making is still denied. This situation is often contrasted with that at the United Nations (UN), where there is (allegedly) much more formally regulated and more substantial participation of civil society. In this paper, we compare the patterns of participation in these two organizations and seek to identify some common dynamics. We present a general framework for analysis based on a model of the policy cycle that allows us to distinguish 'push' and 'pull' factors that determine cooperation in different phases of policy making. In our empirical study, we find that in the WTO, there are few incentives for the organization itself to pull civil society actors into its policy-making process. Agendasetting is the task of governments; research and analysis is delivered by the Secretariat; compliance control is undertaken jointly by the organization and its members. To push the door to trade policy making open, civil society can only rely on public shaming, that is, threatening to undermine the organization's legitimacy as it violates widely accepted standards of good governance. In the UN system, there is in fact more cooperation, but it remains largely limited to the policy phases of agenda-setting, research and analysis and compliance control. Quite like the WTO, the UN protects an intergovernmental core of policy making in which cooperation with civil society remains at the discretion of state parties. Evidence for this are informal and ad hoc ways of collaboration and a lack of participatory rights for non-state actors in the Security Council and the General Assembly. We conclude that studying civil society participation in international public organizations through the lens of the policy cycle can give us a fine-grained picture of cooperative arrangements and enables us to identify potentials for cooperation as well as exclusion. Yet, we also observed two other factors at work that were not really grasped by the model of the policy cycle. First, the institutional culture of organizations can be more or less amenable to civil society. Second, organizations are susceptible to campaigns for 'good governance' that invoke standards of due process and may open the door to nonstate actors

Results from a three year testing project of new strawberry cultivars in Verticillium infested soils and under organic farming conditions

As part of a research project 13 cultivars were planted in 2005 at 11 sites on 9 farms in 5 different Austrian regions. The aim was to find new cultivars tolerant to soil-borne pathogens and leaf/fruit diseases, with high yield, winter hardness and good fruit quality, to serve as alternative to the highly susceptible cultivar ‘Elsanta’, regarding soil-borne diseases. Plant vigour and infestation with Verticillium dahliae and leaf diseases were evaluated in 2005 und 2006 at 7 sites and in 2007 at 3 sites. In addition, following parameters were assessed on 2 organically managed sites in 2006 and 2007: marketable yield, percentage of different categories of unmarketable fruits and incidence of the blossom weevil. In 2006 fruit characteristics and consumer acceptance were studied. ‘Elsanta’ showed the highest infestation with V. dahliae whereas ‘Salsa’, ‘Daroyal’ and ‘Alice’ were most tolerant. ‘Dora’, ‘Eva’, ‘Queen Elisa’ and ‘Daroyal’ recorded significantly higher losses by the blossom weevil than ‘Alice’. ‘Alba’ and ‘Divine’ were the earliest cultivars in ripening time. Highest marketable yield per plant had the late ripening cultivars, particularly ‘Salsa’ and ‘Sonata’. Of all early ripening cultivars tested, ‘Elsanta’ showed the highest productivity, followed by 'Alba', ‘Darselect’, ‘Daroyal’ and ‘Eva’. Regarding fruit firmness, content of ascorbic acid, shelf life and appearance, ‘Alba’, ’Clery’, ‘Eva’ and ‘Queen Elisa’ were most convincing. The best tasting cultivars were ‘Clery’, ‘Daroyal’ and ‘Divine’. Summing up all the results, ‘Alba’, ‘Alice’ and ‘Salsa’ can be recommended for organic production, whereas ‘Clery’, ‘Daroyal’, ‘Darselect’, ‘Elsanta’, ‘Eva’, ‘Queen Elisa’ and ‘Sonata’ are classified as suitable for only a limited extent. ‘Elsanta’, ‘Divine’, ‘Dora’ and ‘Sonata’ are particularly unsuitable for growing in Verticillium infested soils. ‘Divine’, ‘Dora’, and ‘Record’ cannot be recommended for organic production at all

ADR and Justice in consumer disputes in the EU

This policy brief reports on the main conclusions from an international conference held at Wolfson College, Oxford on 18–20 April 2016, at which representatives from seven governments, ombudsmen, and academic experts assessed efforts to implement new dispute resolution mechanisms across EU Member States. The briefing also assesses the levels of trust the public holds in ombudsmen, and what drives this trust. It finds a number of mechanisms under development, and makes a range of recommendations for future approaches