Do Absolute Majorities Spend Less? Evidence from Germany

The number of parties in government is usually considered to increase spending. We show that this is not necessarily the case. Using a new method to detect close election outcomes in multi-party systems, we isolate truly exogenous variation in the type of government. With data from municipalities in the German state of Bavaria, we show in regression discontinuity-type estimations that absolute majorities spend more, not less, and increase the property tax rate. We also find weakly significant results for increases in debt. Politically, our results show that the mayor that heads an absolute majority of his own party gains the most, but the party itself does not

Do Parties Matter? Estimating the Effect of Political Power in Multi-Party Systems

This paper estimates the effect of political power on tax policies in municipal councils under a proportional election system. The main challenge in estimating the causal effect of parties on policy is to isolate the effect of power from underlying voter preferences and the selection effect of parties. We use an instrumental variable approach where close elections provide the exogenous variation in our variable of interest: voting power. Using data from German municipalities in the state of Bavaria, our estimation results suggest that power does matter. Somewhat surprisingly, the center-left party SPD is found to lower all three locally controlled taxes, whereas The Greens increase both property taxes considerably. These results remain robust across a range of specifications. What is more, the effect of the SPD is confirmed by a simple regression discontinuity estimation of mayors in these local governments

Zur Rueckgewinnung im Steuerrecht

SIGLEBibliothek Weltwirtschaft Kiel C 148007 / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekDEGerman

Die Behandlung der Ausschuettungen von auslaendischen Einkuenften nach der Koerperschaftssteuerreform Verbesserungsvorschlaege

Bibliothek Weltwirtschaft Kiel C 136,158 / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekSIGLEDEGerman

Ziele und Moeglichkeiten der Privatisierung auf kommunaler Ebene

Bibliothek Weltwirtschaft Kiel C 139226 / FIZ - Fachinformationszzentrum Karlsruhe / TIB - Technische InformationsbibliothekSIGLEDEGerman