Coordinating Sectoral Policymaking: Searching for Countervailing Mechanisms in the EU Legislative Process

In contrast to parliamentary systems, the Council of Ministers, the main legislative body of the European Union, consists of different formations in which national ministers with similar sectoral portfolios participate. This decision-making structure has led to a ‘loss of coherence’. In this paper I analyze several ways to strengthen policy coordination in the Union, including current coordination by the General Affairs Council and further involvement of the European Council. The analysis shows that ex ante-coordination, which is possible when drafting a proposal (for instance, in the case of Coreper) is more effective than ex post-coordination. In addition, imposing a hierarchical structure in which the European Council may review policy initiatives is also rather effective. However, this arrangement raises the question whether such a structure is suitable for a democratic system in which Parliament is not the principal decision-making body.

European Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issue

In various European legal acts the Council has delegated power to the Commission to set common policy, conditional on specific procedural requirements, which are commonly known as "comitology". In this paper we analyse whether and how far these implementation procedures help to overcome a dilemma of delegation, which arises if (a) a principal and an agent have conflicting interests and (b) the principal, due to the structure of the principal-agent relationship, cannot perfectly control the agent (structure-induced agent discretion).

European Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issue

In various European legal acts the Council has delegated power to the Commission to set common policy, conditional on specific procedural requirements, which are commonly known as "comitology". In this paper we analyse whether and how far these implementation procedures help to overcome a dilemma of delegation, which arises if (a) a principal and an agent have conflicting interests and (b) the principal, due to the structure of the principal-agent relationship, cannot perfectly control the agent (structure-induced agent discretion). --European Union,comitology,principal-agent-relationship,structure-induced agent discretion

The Comitology Game: European Policymaking with Parliamentary Involvement

This paper discusses institutional reforms that might strengthen the role of the European Parliament in the policymaking process of the European Union. Using simple game theory, the paper analyzes the working properties of the different implementation procedures that are known as 'comitology'. The Council of the European Union employs these procedures when it delegates some of its policymaking power to the Commission as part of Union legislation. We show how the balance of power is determined by the current comitology procedures, and how this balance would change if the role of the European Parliament were strengthened in the comitology game. -- Dieser Beitrag diskutiert institutionelle reformen, die die Rolle des Europäischen Parlaments im Entscheidungsprozeß der Europäischen Union stärken können. Mit Hilfe eines einfachen spieltheoretischen Modells wird der Wirkungsmechanismus verschiedener unter dem Stichwort Komitologie bekannter Implementationsprozeduren analysiert. Der Rat wendet diese an, wenn er im Rahmen des EU-Gesetzgebungsprozesses seine Entscheidungsgewalt zum Teil der Kommission überträgt. Wir zeigen, wie das Machtgleichgewicht durch die geltenden Komitologie-Prozeduren bestimmt wird und wie sich dieses Gleichgewicht verändern würde, wenn die Stellung des Parlamentes gestärkt würde.Strategic power index,comitology,balance of power

Coordinating Sectoral Policymaking: Searching for Countervailing Mechanisms in the EU Legislative Process

In contrast to parliamentary systems, the Council of Ministers, the main legislative body of the European Union, consists of different formations in which national ministers with similar sectoral portfolios participate. This decision-making structure has led to a loss of coherence'. In this paper I analyze several ways to strengthen policy coordination in the Union, including current coordination by the General Affairs Council and further involvement of the European Council. The analysis shows that ex ante-coordination, which is possible when drafting a proposal (for instance, in the case of Coreper) is more effective than ex post-coordination. In addition, imposing a hierarchical structure in which the European Council may review policy initiatives is also rather effective. However, this arrangement raises the question whether such a structure is suitable for a democratic system in which Parliament is not the principal decision-making body

Isotopically pure magnesium isotope-24 is prepared from magnesium-24 oxide

Apparatus is used to prepare isotopically pure magnesium isotope-24, suitable for use in neutron scattering and polarization experiments. The apparatus permits thermal reduction of magnesium-24 oxide with aluminum and calcium oxide, and subsequent vaporization of the product metal in vacuum. It uses a resistance-heated furnace tube and cap assembly

Policymaking, Comitology and the Balance of power in the European Union

Using simple game theory, this paper analyzes the working properties of the different procedures laid down in the comitology decision, i.e., the European Council's decision on procedures for the exercise of implementing powers conferred on the Commission. Furthermore, it addresses the question of how the balance of power is determined by this decision

The comitology game: European policymaking with parliamentary involvement

This paper discusses institutional reforms that might strengthen the role of the European Parliament in the policymaking process of the European Union. Using simple game theory, the paper analyzes the working properties of the different implementation procedures that are known as ‘comitology’. The Council of the European Union employs these procedures when it delegates some of its policymaking power to the Commission as part of Union legislation. We show how the balance of power is determined by the current comitology procedures, and how this balance would change if the role of the European Parliament were strengthened in the comitology game

Living in Parallel Universes? The implementation of EU rules on movable cultural heritage in Bulgaria

This paper proposes an analytical framework, which we use to examine the implementation of the European Union’s policy on movable cultural heritage. We apply this framework to the case of transposition and implementation of the EU rules regarding movable cultural heritage in Bulgaria. We find different implementation outcomes stemming from one and the same formal policy. Due to high levels of polarization between political decision makers, the implementing actors have broad discretion to apply different informal policies. In depth analysis of implementation also suggests that under these conditions different implementing players have followed their normative orientations and applied completely different informal policies. Different implementing actors apply different policies and, thus, as it were, they live in parallel universes where different implementation practices exist

European Policymaking: An Agency-Theoretic Analysis of the Issue

In various European legal acts the Council has delegated power to the Commission to set common policy, conditional on specific procedural requirements, which are commonly known as "comitology". In this paper we analyse whether and how far these implementation procedures help to overcome a dilemma of delegation, which arises if (a) a principal and an agent have conflicting interests and (b) the principal, due to the structure of the principal-agent relationship, cannot perfectly control the agent (structure-induced agent discretion)